Re: Re: shirtless helots & neo-asceticism

[JKSCHW@xxxxxxx]

Yoshie tries to make Kant out to be an ascetic and a fan of self-denial by
quoting a passge with a logical and epistemological point taht she
misconstrues. Kanr is saying in the "Common Saying" essay that because
virturous action is caused by something noumenal, thewrefore unknowable, we
cannot know for sure that ever act rightly from the right reasons. But it is
(Kant thinks) a matter of logic that if we act only from our desire for
happiness or any other inclination taht we are not acting morally if we
happen to do the right thing. We "can be aware<" however, of a different sort
of motivation when we act against inclination, in self denial. This is not
advocacy of self-denial. It is rather a point that the possibility of
self-denial  gives us a sort of awareness of a motivation that is not a
matter of mere inclination, even if it is not real knowledge that we acting
virtuously.

I *****   I willingly concede that no-one can have certain awareness of
 _having fulfilled_ his duty completely unselfishly....But man is aware with
 the utmost clarity that he _ought to fulfill_ his duty completely
 unselfishly, and _must_ totally separate his desire for happiness from the
 concept of duty, in order to preserve the latter's purity....We can be
 aware not so much of any accompanying motives, but rather of our own
 self-denial with respect to many motives which conflict with the idea of
 duty.  (Kant, "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it
 does not Apply in Practice'")   *****

 >Try as you might, I don't think you can find Marx emphasizing an awareness
 of "self-denial" as a way of highlighting a path toward moral purity.

Marx is not interestred in moral purity. But that was not the anology I was
pressing. Marx does emphasize the idea that a life of productive activity is
the hgappy life for human beings. Kant said it first and possibly better.


 >In his essay on the sexual impulse, Kant sounds startlingly feminist.

>  Kant's infamous definition of marriage, however, outraged even sober Hegel
 (no fan of the Romantic exaltation of love & desire):

So he he had goiod and bad formulations. Youi gotta problem with his idae
taht it is wrong for men to use women for their own sexual pleasure and then
throw them away like a lemon that has been sucked? Or taht human love
involves concern for the happiness of the beloved and joy in their joy?
(Sounds real ascetic and self-denying to me.)

 > As for Kant's attitude toward women, he might have
 thought of women as "humans," but he didn't think of women as capable of
 practical reason.

That woulld mean, for K, that they would be incapable of free and moral
action, that is, they would not be human. I don't think he thought that. And
if he did--the passages you quote can be understood as diescriptions of the
state of the law at the time rather than advocacy of the inferiority of women
and its proper subordation--it was inconsistent with his theory, which
demands treating women as equals to men.

 "Apprentices to mechanics or tradesmen, servants who are not employed by
 the state, minors..., women in general and all those who are obliged to
 depend for their living (i.e. for food and protection) on the offices of
 others (excluding the state) -- all these people have no civil personality,
 and their existence is, so to speak, purely inherent" (Kant, _The
 Metaphysics of Morals_).

 Y says that that K's rejection of utilitariansim is connected to his his
rejection of revolutionary actiivity, Cf his statement that:

 *****   all resistance against the supreme legislative power, all incitement
 of the subjects to violent expressions of discontent, all defiance which
 breaks out into rebellion, is [absolutely prohibited]. . . . The reason for
this is that the people, under an
 existing civil constitution, has no longer any right to judge how the
 constitution should be administered.  (Kant, "On the Common Saying:

Of course this is not related to the rejection of utilitarianism. Kant was
just flat out wrong here ina pplying his won principles. Am I permitted to
attempt to overthrow the state? Kant should ask, can I will that the uktimate
maxim onw hich I act be a universal rule for all mankind? Roughly, what if
everybody did that? If I can say, all right, great, I want everybody to
overthrow the state, then it is morally permissible (and may be morally
required, depoending on whether we read the categorical imperative as
positive or negative).

--jks