Re: Re: Re: Is Authoritarianism Necessary for Equality? (RE:: Keeping focus after the WTO

[Jim Devine <jdevine@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I wrote: >>At a minimum, the state instituting land reform has to be
authoritarian against the land-owners. Otherwise, the compensation for the
latter will be high.<<

Doug asks: >Yeah, but why not peasants *taking* the land themselves,
instead of having an authoritarian government do the work? I'm reminded of
why I hate the word "empowerment," since it implies a bestowal from on high
rather than an act of self-assertion.<

Good question. The peasants have to push the state to engage in this kind
of policy (hopefully in alliance with urban workers), counteracting the
political power of the landlords.The state might -- and should -- add
coherence and consistency to the land reform (across the country), but the
rural insurgency is more likely to be a cause of the reform (or the
revolution). If the peasants and their allies have enough power, the state
can complement grass-roots efforts.

Of course, it was US General Doug MacArthur who instituted land reform in
Japan (and now his neo-liberal descendents criticize that policy). (BTW,
Doug, are you named after him? You were born at the right time.) It was
Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT who did it in Taiwan and the US/Syngman Rhee
regime in the ROK. The pressure to so such radical things came from the
fear that the Chinese and N. Korean revolutions would spread, along with
the urge to punish the losing side of WW2.

Even though it is unlikely that Uncle Sam and the Neo-liberal Troika
(IMF/WB/WTO) will allow such reforms, it should remind us that land reform
is a basically a capitalist reform. Not only that, but it typically leaves
the landless peasants high and dry. Even as a capitalist reform, it doesn't
work well without support from the government (increased credit for
farmers, help with distribution, etc.)

Nathan writes: >Democratic appropriation of property is not authoritarian
(except in the tyranny of the majority sense), so I don't even buy the idea
that top-down land reform is necessarily authoritarian. It is also quite
reasonable to legalize long-term rent-sharecropping relationships as
ownership rights based on landlords having long ago amoritized investments.<

My point was that the landlords would resist (often with force, including
death squads) and therefore would need to be brought to heel.

>And if compensation is called for, a steeply progressive taxation policy
can also be used to recover much of the compensation paid to landlords. And
even in the wimpiest land reforms with full compensation for landlords,
requirements to reinvest the proceeds in industrial concerns  will at least
serve the conversion of feudal relationships into industrial development.
Just breaking down landlords as a reactionary political class that itself
usually paralyzes development.<

The fact is that the landlords push for more-than-full compensation. If
their political power is not undermined by the power of a peasant
insurgency (or an external threat), they'll get it.

If you've got the political power, you can institute compensation schemes
based on what the landlords reported for tax purposes, which means that you
can compensate them for a song. Jacobo Arbenz tried that in Guatemala, I
believe. Whether he did that or not, he got his comeuppance from Uncle Sam.
(The little bit I read in ENCARTA suggests he did not try that method. But
it has been tried.)

Jim Devine jdevine@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx &
http://clawww.lmu.edu/Faculty/JDevine/JDevine.html