[PEN-L:7366] (Fwd) Selected pieces of analysis of the Kosovo situation from

[phillp2@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (ts99u-1.cc.umanitoba.ca [130.179.154.224]) by]

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Date sent:      	Thu, 27 May 1999 12:11:47 -0700
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From:           	Sid Shniad <shniad@xxxxxx>
Subject:        	Selected pieces of analysis of the Kosovo situation from
 	Stratfor

Stratfor Analysis

Current Status of the War			2100 GMT, 990516

As the new week begins, it is time to take stock of the war. This is not
particularly difficult as we have clearly entered a period of stalemate in
which neither side is able to bring the conflict to a close and indeed, for
the moment, neither side is motivated to bring it to a close. From the
NATO perspective, the air war is not particularly costly or risky. Given
the fragility of the NATO coalition, the policy of air war intensification
without either a diplomatic breakthrough or a ground war is the lowest
risk option. The advantage of this strategy is threefold. First, it keeps
open the possibility, however distant, that the Serbs will crack under
the bombing attack and capitulate to NATO?s demands. Second,
absent that, it allows NATO to keep further war fighting options open
while also keeping open diplomatic options. Third, as we have said, it
also avoids decision-making in NATO?s councils. The less decision-
making goes on, the less likely the coalition is to come apart.

>From Belgrade?s side, the stalemate is also acceptable. First, while
daily tragedies occur, from a strictly military viewpoint, the bombing is
not affecting Sebia?s long-term war fighting capability. The light
infantry forces that would be used in an extended resistance to a
NATO invasion are not being sufficiently hurt by the bombing to force
a strategic reconsideration. Second, Milosevic?s political standing has
been strengthened by the bombing. While NATO?s psychological
warfare staff is trying to generate a sense of impending disintegration in
Milosevic?s support, both among civilians and military, and some war
weariness is certainly setting in, it is our view that the sense of
victimization at the hands of NATO is sufficient to hold his support
together. Appearing to be too eager to seek a settlement may actually
hurt him rather than help him. Finally, the Russian internal political
situation has become so unsettled that the basic premise that allowed
Milosevic to resist NATO has become problematic. It is in Milosevic?s
interests to wait until the situation in Moscow clarifies itself and
hopefully the pro-Serb factions reassert themselves, before entering
negotiations.

Thus, the major tendency is toward gridlock. There are, however,
forces on the horizon that can generate movement. On NATO?s
side, the Italian political situation is deteriorating daily. The
government could move into crisis by mid-week over the bombing
issue. That political crisis could end the war unilaterally. Should
Italy deny NATO the use of its air bases for the bombing
campaign, it would signal the end of the war. Italy is absolutely
necessary for the war. This means that NATO, in anticipation of
the outcome of the Italian crisis, might be forced to seek some
diplomatic initiatives. Indeed, the Italian situation is one reason
that Milosevic not only might, but must, hold out. It is his major
hope for a breakthrough.

Yugoslavia has its own pressures leading it to make concessions. While
the current situation in Moscow is an argument for waiting, there is
tremendous long-term danger there for Yugoslavia. If victory in
Moscow?s political wars goes to western-oriented leaders, which might
happen if only for a short time, and Milosevic loses his support from
that quarter, his strategic position will deteriorate dramatically. China
is simply too far away to matter. A shift in Moscow could trigger a shift
in Greece and Macedonia, opening the way to a ground war. In
addition, while the air campaign is not decisive, it does hurt. All of
these factors cause movement toward diplomacy.

The key question continues to be the makeup of the peacekeeping
force and the quantity and type of force Serbia will be permitted
to keep in Kosovo. It is interesting to us that the discussions on
this seem to be going on in slow motion. Discussions that should
take hours are taking days. Discussions that should take days are
taking weeks. One reason for this is the situation in Moscow and
Rome. But the underlying problem is that each side believes that
the other?s problems are more serious than its own. Milosevic
hopes that Clinton?s problems with Rome will cripple him.
Clinton hopes that Milosevic?s problems with Moscow will cripple
him.

>From our perspective, there is an ongoing tragedy here. There is a clear
structure for a peace agreement in place. It has been there from the
beginning. The discussions have now degenerated to what weapons
peacekeepers will carry. The real problem is not one of substantial
issues, but of appearance. Clinton cannot appear to have fought
this war for nothing. Milosevic cannot appear to have put his
country through this pounding for nothing. Each must find a way
to claim victory while allowing the other to do the same.

In an odd way, Clinton and Milosevic are similar men. They are willing
to fight wars for domestic political reasons even when the strategic
issues could be settled fairly readily. Each knows that the victory he
wants is impossible. Clinton cannot invade Serbia and impose a new
government. Milosevic will not be able to avoid foreign troops in
Kosovo. Each is more concerned about how the final, obvious
agreement will be arrived at than what that agreement will contain,
because each knows pretty much what will be in the agreement. It is
not a question just of stubbornness, although both are extraordinarily
willful men. Rather, it is the reasoning behind fighting wars.

Wars fought for geopolitical reasons are ultimately manageable.
Wars fought for domestic political reasons are the hardest to
solve. That means that the nations whose geopolitical interests are most
affected by this--Italy, Germany and Russia--will ultimately have to
take responsibility for imposing an agreement. The problem is that
everyone?s attention is on other things, and there is no pressing urgency
in the war. That is the most extraordinary fact: Kosovo refugees and
the bombing of Serbia aside, no one at all seems to feel a sense of
urgency.

This has surprised us during the past few weeks and it continues to
surprise us. However, if we had looked closely at the careers of these
two men, perhaps we would have been less surprised. For men to
whom appearance is everything, how war is settled can be more
important than what is achieved.


Slouching Toward Peace			0337 GMT, 990519

We continue to see strong indications that we are in the terminal phase
of the war. The decision of Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to
accompany Viktor Chernomyrdin to Belgrade is a strong indicator that
the United States and Russia have now reach detailed agreement on the
terms needed to end the war. Ahtisaari had said that he would not
travel to Belgrade unless Chernomyrdin and Strobe Talbott made
substantial progress and, by implication, had a common position.
Ahtisaari, the EU representative on Kosovo, with close ties to the
United Nations, was not prepared to commit his offices to negotiations
until after a unified position was crafted between the U.S. and Russia.
His reasoning was sound. If the U.S. and Russia weren?t working from
a common script, nothing he achieved in Belgrade would hold together.
Moreover, Milosevic would try to use any gap between the U.S. and
Russian position to extract further concessions. Given that, no progress
was possible until the U.S. and Russia had a common position.

That common position, clearly based on the G-8 agreements
already achieved, is now in place. The presence of Ahtisaari in
Belgrade means clearly that whatever troops enter Kosovo will be
under UN and not NATO command. The presence of Chernomyrdin
further guarantees that the political oversight of those troops will not be
solely in the hands of NATO and the United States. Finally, Ahtisaari?s
involvement signals the commitment by the continental EU countries to
end the war. In short, Ahtisaari is going to Belgrade to give
Milosevic guarantees on behalf of the UN and EU while
Chernomyrdin is going to give him guarantees on behalf of
Russia.

Chernomyrdin is also going to deliver a harsher message: that unless
Belgrade accepts the deal as it stands, Belgrade will be alone, China
being irrelevant to the equation. In our view, Milosevic would not have
been able to resist NATO with the tenacity he has had he not had
Russian support. The threat of the loss of Russian backing changes the
strategic and geopolitical foundations of his decisions. Therefore, with
the premise on which his decision was based dissolving, the decision
itself has to be altered. Belgrade is already indicating that it is
prepared to live with the deal. Milosevic will undoubtedly want to
scrutinize the details and attempt to extract whatever technical points
possible that would increase the probability of retained sovereignty over
Kosovo.

He will also have one additional demand: disarming the KLA. That
will be easier to agree to than to enforce. This actually will help
Milosevic in the long run. By agreeing to withdraw most Serbian
forces from Kosovo, Milosevic shifts the responsibility for
controlling the KLA to the United Nations and to Russia. KLA
actions will create an opportunity to drive a wedge between Russia and
NATO as Russia blames NATO for its actions. Indeed, it will drive a
wedge between NATO members Germany and Italy on one side and
the U.S. and UK on the other. Germany and Italy will want the KLA
controlled and will hold the U.S. and UK responsible for its actions.
Since the KLA has become uncontrollable and will have a vested
interest in maintaining tension, this will give Milosevic leverage in the
post-war environment.

Thus, the next few days will be filled with discussions of how to
control the KLA and how to return the Albanians to their homes.
Milosevic will use the former as a means to make himself the
aggrieved party. Delays in the latter he will blame, with some
legitimacy, on the damage caused by NATO bombing of Kosovo?s
infrastructure. Milosevic will concede many points, but he will be in
a fairly good position to control the post-war evolution of events.
Indeed, having filed charges against NATO for war crimes
already, he will even be able to counter demands that he face war
crimes tribunals with full agreement, provided Bill Clinton and
Tony Blair also go on trial. Milosevic?s position: let the courts
judge us all.  Milosevic is in an excellent position to complicate the
peace.

So as we close in on the end game, we will be seeing merely the
beginning of a new chapter in the eternal book of Balkan politics, into
which few wise men intrude without good reason. We are now finally
moving to a peace agreement not fundamentally different from
what could have been achieved in the second week of the war.
Indeed, had NATO not made Rambouillet accords a take it or
leave it proposition, something like this might have been achieved
before the bombing began. As we slouch toward a sullen peace
which is merely the preface for future warfare, it will soon be time to
dissect the decisions on both sides that led us to war and then back to
where we were before the first shots were fired.


U.S. Concedes Important Point in Kosovo	 2209 GMT, 990523

While movement toward a negotiated settlement in Kosovo appears to
have slowed significantly, with each side weighing and perhaps
misjudging the other?s resolve, it has not altogether stalled. In an
important concession to Belgrade, U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright said in an interview on CBS?s "Face the
Nation" that, following a negotiated peace settlement with NATO,
some Yugoslav troops may be permitted to remain in Kosovo,
though they would be limited in number and authority.

This step back from NATO?s demand that all Yugoslav forces
withdraw from Kosovo is a necessary element of any negotiated
settlement in Kosovo and may be an indicator of progress toward
reaching that settlement. On one level, Belgrade can not and will not
accept a settlement that leaves it no official politico-military presence
in Kosovo. This would be tantamount to surrendering the province to
foreign conquerors and, but for lines on the map, would be
indistinguishable from Kosovo independence. Belgrade will not
abandon Kosovo without a fight.

On another level, NATO actually needs Yugoslav forces to stay in
Kosovo for a negotiated settlement to succeed. The international
security presence envisioned by the Group of Eight will take time to
gather, time to organize, time to deploy, and time to gain familiarity
with the province, let alone control over it. In the meanwhile, NATO
needs a force to maintain order in the province. It certainly can not rely
on the KLA to do this ? not without acknowledging that it is NATO?s
intention to create an independent Kosovo under the leadership of the
KLA guerrillas. Instead, as the Western allies did with German troops,
officials, and police in the immediate aftermath of World War Two,
NATO will have to rely on the forces it only recently bombarded in
Kosovo to keep the province from spinning into chaos.