[PEN-L:7172] "Albright's War."

[Louis Proyect <lnp3@xxxxxxxxx>]

>Then there's the Munich analogy (Milosevic = Hitler) she uses, based partly
>on her Czech-Jewish background. MONTHLY REVIEW had a great article a few
>years ago about the Munich analogy, which has constantly been invoked to
>argue against making concessions to the old USSR and the various Hitlers du
>jour since then. Among other things, it argues that an important reason why
>Neville Chamberlain wanted to "appease" the Germans was because he hoped
>that Hitler would help beat Stalin.

"In Our Time" by Clement Leibovitz and Alvin Finkel, published by Monthly
Review

When British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from his Munich
meetings with Adolf Hitler in September 1938, he proclaimed that he held in
his hands a document guaranteeing "peace in our time." In the decades
since, Chamberlain's folly has become the occasion for a commonplace
historical lesson: that when the "good" innocently accept the assurances of
the "evil," the result is catastrophic.

Clement Leibovitz and Alvin Finkel challenge the familiar understanding of
Munich as the product of a naive "appeasement" of Nazi appetites. They
argue that it was the culmination of cynical collaboration between the Tory
government and the Nazis in the 1930s. Based upon a careful reading of
official and unofficial correspondence, conference notes, cabinet minutes,
and diaries, In Our Time documents the steps taken under diplomatic cover
by the West to strike a bargain with Hitler based upon shared anti-Soviet
premises.

Munich, write the authors, "formalized what had been an informal
understanding between Britain and Germany to that point, with France, with
varying degrees of enthusiasm and reluctance, concurring: Germany could do
as it wished in central and eastern Europe and the democracies were not to
intervene, particularly should Germany carry its warfare to the Soviet
Union."

Gripping, direct, and detailed, In Our Time overturns the conventional
wisdom about World War II, its roots, and its lessons. With profound
implications for understanding international relations in the Cold War and
after, it sheds new light on a signal event of the twentieth century.

About the authors

CLEMENT LEIBOVITZ, a native of Egypt and graduate from Haifa Technion
Institute of Technology, Israel, now lives in Canada. He spent eight years
researching the events leading to World War II. A retired professor in
computer services at the University of Alberta and a founder of Jews for
Peace in the Middle East, an Edmonton organization, he is currently writing
on socialist philosophy.

ALVIN FINKEL is professor of history at Athabasca University in Alberta, an
open-learning institute. He is the author of Business and Social Reform in
the Thirties (1979) and The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (1989), and
co-author of the two-volume History of the Canadian Peoples (1993, 1997).

>From the first chapter:

It is not known what Chamberlain's actions and initiatives at the time of
the Munich agreement would have been, had England been as strong a military
power as Germany. This missing knowledge might have indicated the measure
in which his appeasement policy towards Germany was indeed due to an
awareness of Britain's military weakness and to his dedication to peace.

However, there is on Chamberlain's record another case of appeasement in
which, as at Munich, there also was a victim, an aggressor and the shadow
of the Soviet Union in the background. At the time, the case did not make
it to the newspapers. It was the object of debates in the British Cabinet
and Foreign Office and centred around a suggested pact of non-aggression
with Japan. The matter was kept confidential and would have been made
public only if successful.

The reading of a number of documents dating from 1934 reveals Chamberlain's
early interest in Foreign Affairs, as well as his strong influence over Sir
John Simon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

On September 1, 1934, Chamberlain addressed a personal and confidential
letter to Sir John Simon. It included the draft of a memorandum on
relations with Japan in which Chamberlain exposed his views on the
international situation:

".. I atttach particular weight to your cool and analytical judgement.
....If you could bring off an agreement with Japan such as I have suggested,
it would stamp your tenure of office with the special distinction that is
attached to memorable historical events...

"...I hope you may think sufficiently well of the idea to pursue it and
that you will some day be remembered (inter alia!) as the author of the
'Simon-Hirota pact.'"

The pact in question was to be one of non-aggression between England and
Japan. The praise to Simon and the holding out of bright prospects may have
been designed to sway him to Chamberlain's views. It surely indicates the
great importance that Chamberlain attached to the proposition. The letter
goes on:

"As for the U.S.A. don't let us be browbeaten by her. She will never repay
us for sacrificing our interests in order to conciliate her and if we
maintain at once a bold and a frank attitude towards her I am not afraid of
the result."

There were, at the time, many points of friction between England and the
U.S., one of them being the attitude towards Japan concerning the
Manchurian crisis. However, few English politicians would have thought it
wise to antagonise the U.S. unless absolutely necessary. This was one of
many instances in which Chamberlain would reveal his unwillingness to take
into consideration US suggestions or policies.

We now quote from the draft memorandum:

"... I suggest that the paramount consideration in this matter to which
everything else, home politics, economy, or desire for disarmament must be
subjected is the safety, first of this country and then of the British
Empire..."

We note Chamberlain's priorities in 1934. Security came first, before "home
politics", economy or disarmament. He went on:

"At this moment in the autumn of 1934 there is no immediate threat to our
safety. But there is a universal feeling of apprehension about the future,
whether it is a matter of 2, 3, 5 or 10 years, that such a threat may
materialise and that the quarter from which it will come is Germany."

Chamberlain was decidedly not a naive person. Early enough he perceived the
German threat and decided that meeting that threat should be Britain's
first priority. He went on:

"In a recent and extremely interesting survey of affairs and persons of
that country Sir E. Phipps summed up his conclusions in a grave warning of
the need for a strong, united and watchful Europe."

"That country" is Germany. Chamberlain seems to support the opinion of the
British ambassador Sir E. Phipps. He knows exactly what must be done while
there is still time: create a strong, united, watchful Europe.

However, in order to prevent Japan's hostility -- while England would have
to face the German threat -- he now strikes a note of appeasement, in the
direction of Japan:

"...the Cabinet has already more than once expressed its concurrence with
the idea that it is desirable to cultivate the most friendly relations with
Japan.

"...It is true that various circumstances, such as the Japanese action in
Manchukuo(10), her defiant attitude towards the League of Nations and her
aggressive export policy, have made her unpopular in Europe and have
certainly not rendered it easier to introduce greater cordiality into our
relations with her. Yet it is at least arguable that the Manchukuo affair,
except insofar as it served to discredit the League, has not hitherto
harmed us and, so long as the open door is maintained, is actually likely
to benefit British exporters."

It is interesting to note how Chamberlain's language is coloured by his
perception of British interests. There is a Japanese action in "Manchukuo"
as there also is a Manchukuo affair. As to Japanese aggression this is
limited to her export policy. Chamberlain belittles the importance of
Japanese aggression (action, affair), belittles its harmful aspect
(discredit of the League), ignores the harm to the victims of aggression,
and highlights the benefit to British exporters.

Chamberlain is not always revolted by the thought of war and aggression. To
look forward to the improved situation for British interests resulting from
Japanese aggression may be a mark of realism: it is not a mark of profound
devotion to peace. Chamberlain goes on:

"...Considerations of this kind had led me to the view that whatever
difficulties and objections there may be in exploratory discussions with
Japan just now they are not so serious as to outweigh the immense
advantages which would accrue from a satisfactory outcome."

This is a paradoxical position coming from a politician who so clearly
perceives the German danger and the necessity of uniting Europe against a
possible German aggression. Is it not setting a bad precedent to condone
Japan's aggression? Does it not jeopardise the future reliance on the
League of Nations when it is discredited? And, finally, is it not creating
a deadly danger to the British Empire, to strengthen such an aggressive
country as Japan -- at a time when Japan is relatively much weaker than the
constellation of USA, France and Great Britain ? The year was 1934. Italy
was not yet friendly to Germany, Japan and Germany were not yet bound by
treaties and any one of them could be dealt with easily; even both of them
could have been dealt with easily. Precisely at that time, instead of
taking a stand against aggression wherever it may occur, Chamberlain is
suggesting the following:

"...we should endeavour to frame a Pact of Non-Aggression with Japan for a
period say of ten years. Chamberlain foresaw objections and answered them
in advance:

"...I have heard it suggested that whatever may have been the case in the
past the Japanese are now in so aggressive a mood and so much under the
influence of ambitious soldiers and sailors that they would not think of
tying their hands by any agreement to keep the peace. This view seems to me
to give insufficient weight to their anxieties about the Soviet Government,
the only Power which really menaces their present acquisitions or their
future ambitions. With Russia on their flank it seems to me that Japan
would gladly see any accession of security in other directions."

This quote reveals the same appeasement spirit that will later be at work
with respect to Germany. Consider, for instance, his reference to Japan's
anxiety which, according to Chamberlain, should be given more weight. The
anxiety is not due to Japan being threatened by the Soviet Union. Even
Chamberlain does not say that. The threat, he says, is against their
present acquisitions -- the term sounds very legal; it suggests the payment
of a fair price -- and against their future ambitions.


Louis Proyect

(http://www.panix.com/~lnp3/marxism.html)