[PEN-L:6178] Re: Why Nato needs to destroy Serbia

["J. Barkley Rosser, Jr." <rosserjb@xxxxxxx>]

Louis,
      There are several errors in this paper.
     1)  The first "tranche" of candidate members
to the EU do not include Slovakia but do include
Slovenia and Estonia along with Cyprus.
     2)  The Czech Republic does not have the
highest per capita income of any non-EU member
in Europe.  Slovenia does, as has been noted on
numerous occasions previously on this list.
     BTW, the big problem re Slovenia has been
the insistence by the EU that Slovenia open itself
up to unfettered foreign direct investment by EU
corporations.  The Slovenians have been resisting
because of having a high rate of worker-owned
enterprises derived from their old worker-managed
system.  We have discussed these matters at length...
Barkley Rosser
-----Original Message-----
From: Louis Proyect <lnp3@xxxxxxxxx>
To: marxism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <marxism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>;
pen-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <pen-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thursday, April 29, 1999 4:06 PM
>Subject: [PEN-L:6172] Why Nato needs to destroy Serbia


>>From "Trouble in Paradise? Europe in the 21st Century", a paper by Steven
>Philip Kramer and Irene Kyriakopoulos of the Institute for National
>Strategic Studies. The entire paper is must reading and can be found at
>http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair49/m49cont.html.
>
>======
>
>Europe can also grow by expanding its membership wisely. The club of 12
>added three new members in l995: Austria, Sweden, and Finland. These
>affluent, industrialized democracies bring with them higher than average
>per capita incomes, well-developed market economies and strong export
>orientation; such attributes change immediately the economic statistics of
>the EU as a whole and in the right direction. The financial benefits are
>especially visible because these new members will be net contributors to
>the EU's budget and thus enhance EU-financed projects. At the same time,
>potential costs to political cohesion in the European Union are minimized
>because the new members are, in reality, old and established partners of
>the EU through EFTA. Their political, social, cultural, and economic
>institutions are mature and in harmony with those of EU member states.
>Thus, Europe's most recent enlargement may actually represent a win-win
>outcome and one that stimulates economic expansion for the union as a
>whole. Nonetheless, this enlargement does present some problems. It
>reinforces the need to overhaul the cumbersome institutional structure of
>the EU at the l996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The three new
>members' security identity is marked by a long tradition of neutrality:
>they may be less willing to support the idea of robust European security
>cooperation. Finally, these nations seem less committed to the Monnet ideal
>of Europe; Swedish public opinion is already showing reservations about the
>likely benefits of EU membership.
>
>But what are the limits to the EU's enlargement? In theory, Europe could
>have and should have become whole again after the end of the Cold War.
>Instead, there is now a new divide, the result of the de facto separation
>between two groups of countries: those that are members of the EU
>(industrial democracies with developed political institutions and mature
>market economies) and those that are not (former Communist countries facing
>serious problems of political and economic adjustment). The success and
>speed with which Western Europe can integrate the states of Central and
>Eastern Europe, as well as Russia, into its political and economic
>structures will be critical determinants of this process. If true
>integration can be achieved, the single market will expand immensely. The
>benefits associated with economies of scale will be considerable and, if
>past trends are a guide, trade flows will grow significantly as well.
>
>It would be a mistake to invoke economics as the singular driving force
>pushing toward EU expansion. A strong argument can be made that economic
>integration is a means toward a larger goal, that of political (and, by
>extension, social and cultural) unification. In contrast to other economic
>zones or free trade areas (including the largest and most recent one,
>NAFTA), the EU is composed of countries with a common collective
>conscience, heritage, and culture. Geographically, their boundaries and
>history tie them together on the European continent. Their political and
>economic institutions are similarly based on common conceptions of
>governance, from the birth of participatory democracy in the Greek
>city-states to monarchy to parliamentary democracy and from feudalism to
>contemporary political economy. Culturally, EU member states have created
>and share in the values of Western civilization, from Greek philosophy to
>the spread of Christianity to the Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment.
>Indeed, the notion of a European identity (symbolized in the EU passport
>since l985) has a far stronger cultural, sociogeographic content than the
>American one (in the sense of the North American or South American
>continent, and even less so in the case of both of them combined). These
>factors indicate that the current divide in Europe may be temporary,
>ephemeral, and artificial. The limits of the EU will most likely be
>expanded to include all the states professing a broadly based and genuine
>popular allegiance to a common European ethos, culture, history and civic
>values. By these criteria, the European Union might eventually include all
>the countries on the continent of Europe all the way to the Urals; indeed,
>Russia is as much a European power on its western side as it is Asiatic on
>its eastern side.
>
>There are grounds for optimism that such an accomplishment is possible:
>since l989, the reunification of Germany has involved not just the
>absorption of the former GDR by the FDR but also the immediate inclusion,
>through Germany's membership, of the former Communist GDR into the EU. This
>has not been an easy process; in addition to major political, social,
>industrial, and other dislocations caused by the decision to reunify the
>two countries, the financial costs have been enormous and borne mostly by
>German taxpayers. But beyond the direct financial costs, the full economic
>costs of this inevitable task are incurred (directly or indirectly) by all
>citizens of the EU. It is inconceivable now that Europe would have room for
>two German states, one inside the EU, the other outside, because despite
>their differences in political and economic systems over decades, the two
>German states share common linguistic, cultural and historic traditions.
>The extent to which such traditions form a common civic denominator among
>the peoples of Europe will most likely define the limits of the post Cold
>War EU, its economic geography, ethnographic composition and new political
>identity. European history, after all, reflects a legacy of both
>centripetal and centrifugal forces. Diversity and unity are not
>contradictory. In the High Middle Ages, for example, there was a remarkable
>unity in cultural and intellectual life at a time of political
>fragmentation. Today it is possible to imagine political and economic
>integration together with enormous degrees of cultural diversity.
>
>In the near term, enlargement of the European Union is constrained by
>serious political uncertainties. These, in turn, lead to calculations
>unfavorable to the commitment of scarce resources outside of the EU. The
>issues, prospects and problems associated with future enlargement must be
>dealt with in terms of the economic calculus prevailing in Europe today.
>Further enlargement can take place in two directions: south and northeast.
>
>Expansion to the south would mean simply opening up the EU to Malta and
>Cyprus. The economic benefits or costs would be minimal, given the small
>size of the economies involved. The political gains would be negligible,
>the potential dangers great. Malta has a long history as a maverick within
>international organizations. Giving Malta the existing right of veto could
>paralyze the operations of EU institutions, especially if the Maltese
>Labour Party returns to power. Entry of Cyprus is predicated on a solution
>of the Cypriot question, which depends in turn on a breakthrough in
>Greek-Turkish relations. Far more than expansion, there will certainly be
>greater involvement of Europe in the Mediterranean. The conflict in Algeria
>has focused the attention of Mediterranean states like France, Italy, and
>Spain on the importance of stabilizing the countries of the Maghreb to
>avoid generalization of instability and immigration because of Islamic
>fundamentalism, a high birthrate and economic backwardness. It is to
>conjure potential dangers emanating from the Maghreb rather than in pursuit
>of economic gains that the EU is likely to incur significant financial
>burdens.
>
>Thus when EU enlargement is invoked what is usually meant is expansion to
>the northeast. The first tranche of candidates are the Czech Republic,
>Poland, and Hungary (Slovakia is often included in this group, but will be
>discussed separately). The political experience of these three countries
>since the end of Communist rule has been generally positive. Democratic
>elections, alternation of power, freedom of speech, and rule of law have
>prevailed. The process of democratization was based either on historical
>experience (the Czech Republic from 1918 to 1938), the record of resistance
>to Communist rule (Solidarity in Poland), or the origins of a genuine
>multiparty system under Communist rule (Hungary). Neither Poland nor the
>Czech Republic is involved in any significant boundary disputes or national
>minority questions, although antisemitism persists in Poland. Hungary's
>differences with Slovakia seemed to have been resolved by a new treaty
>negotiated under the stability pact rubric but reemerged when Slovakia
>voted to make Slovak the official language of the country. A treaty with
>Romania remains to be negotiated. The left wing Hungarian government of
>Gyula Horn has been far more conciliatory on issues related to the large
>Hungarian national minorities in neighboring countries than was its
>conservative predecessor. Assuming that this issue is satisfactorily
>resolved, there is reason to think that the membership of these countries
>in the EU is at least as sound a proposition on political grounds as was
>Greek membership in l981 and Spanish and Portuguese membership a decade
>ago. Including them in the EU would expand the zone of stability and
>security in Europe.
>
>Slovakia has not gone as far in creating a free market and has weaker
>democratic credentials. Had it not been part of Czechoslovakia it is
>unlikely that it would be considered at this point for EU membership.
>Beyond this tranche of countries it is hard to see many likely candidates
>for EU membership in the next decade. Until peace reigns in the Balkans,
>incorporating any Balkan state could be risky, as it could be involved in a
>widened war. This certainly is the case of most of the republics of the
>former Yugoslavia. Nor is there much progress toward liberal democracy in
>other Balkan countries, although Bulgaria has shown good sense in dealing
>with its minority problems. Slovenia is economically developed, but it is
>not clear whether it should be rewarded for having pulled the plug out of
>Yugoslavia and unleashing civil war. Rumania seems not to have undergone
>much genuine reform at all. The Baltics remain a problem because of the
>continuing problem of Russian minorities.
>
>It is fair to say that EU membership can consolidate democracy. But
>affording EU membership to states not yet far advanced toward democracy or
>harboring territorial disputes with neighbors or unresolved national
>minority questions runs the risk of importing these problems into the EU.
>Even the admission of the strongest candidates poses serious risks if the
>decision making mechanism of the EU is not reformed and until there is a
>consensus on the direction the EU is supposed to take. The more states are
>admitted, the more difficult it will be to change the institutional
>structure and the more dysfunctional the present structure will be. One
>danger is that once admitted, new states will immediately be relegated to
>the bottom tier of a multispeed Europe, which will have to be multispeed in
>part because of their admission. The upcoming IGC will have to resolve
>issues of institutional structure that logically should have been dealt
>with before any enlargement.
>
>Beyond the political dimension, expansion to the east involves equally
>serious problems of economic integration. Both in terms of industrial
>development and income levels, a large gap exists between Western Europe
>and countries that stayed behind the Iron Curtain for decades. The least
>troubling and most optimistic case is the Czech Republic, the best economic
>performer in Eastern Europe: its per capita income is just over $7,000,
>putting the country in first place among all non-EU states in Europe. Yet,
>compared to EU income levels, the Czech standard of living is very low: it
>barely reaches one-half of average EU income, significantly lower than that
>of Greece and Portugal, the EU's least well-off member states (both have
>average incomes around $9,000).
>
>The Czech Republic situation is similar to that of Slovenia (a new state
>but located in a region with a strong industrial tradition). Slovakia,
>Hungary, Belarus, and Estonia may be grouped together in a tier below, with
>income levels around $5,500. The former Yugoslavia might also have been
>placed in the same group; Croatia and, to a lesser extent, Serbia and
>Montenegro were relatively well off before the dissolution of the Yugoslav
>state. But all other former members of the now-defunct Warsaw Pact are
>countries of even lesser means, with average incomes inordinately low in
>comparison to EU levels. The economies of Poland, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and
>Romania show signs of improvement but will remain fragile in the transition
>to decentralization and open market rules. By any measure, these countries
>do not have the economic credentials to be considered candidates for
>admission to the EU any time soon. Nor are their evolving political
>institutions stable enough to contribute to inter-European cooperation in
>the realm of foreign policy and security. Admission to the EU would amount
>to virtual guarantee of significant income transfers (at high cost) from
>Western Europe in exchange for future (unspecified if not insignificant)
>political benefits.
>
>However, the need to develop stronger ties between Western Europe and its
>eastern neighbors cannot be overlooked. Short of enlargement by formal
>expansion through admission of new states, it is possible to meet that need
>through interim measures such as association agreements. This course of
>action has already received policy priority, is feasible, and can benefit
>all sides. Greater economic integration can lead to political integration
>between east and west in Europe, in much the same way that it has
>facilitated political integration throughout the EU in the post- World War
>II period. Despite its cumbersomeness and slow speed, EU enlargement
>through economic integration has been successful for Europe. The recent
>admission of former EFTA countries adds to the body of strong evidence that
>long-term association agreements promote de facto economic and political
>integration, leading naturally to EU membership. Of even greater
>significance is the success with which association agreements paved the way
>for admission into the EU of Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the l980s. Not
>only were these countries relatively poor, but their political record had
>been marked by military dictatorships in the post-World War II period. By
>comparison, the countries to the east of the EU are less well off in
>material terms and significantly more burdened by the experience of
>Communist rule. Enlargement of the EU to the east may be out the question
>for now but could become possible in the future, even though it might
>require long-term association agreements.(Note 5)
>
>Political considerations will probably lead to the admission of the Czech
>Republic, Hungary, and Poland by early in the next decade. In the long
>term, inclusion of these states and of other states in the East later on
>will pave the way for enormous expansion of European trade and economic
>growth. Initially and for some time, however, the economic and financial
>costs to the EU will be far greater than the benefits. Enlargement to the
>East may help solve Europe's economic problems in the future but will
>certainly exacerbate them in the next decade.
>
>BUT IS THE POLITICAL WILL THERE?
>
>The above conclusions are based on relatively optimistic assumptions about
>the future: namely, that no political and security problems emerge that
>significantly threaten European interests and the European economy. Such
>threats might include revival of the conflict in Bosnia and spillover to
>other areas, such as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or Kosovo,
>perhaps leading to a regional war; the continued weakening of reformist
>forces in Russia, resulting in a nationalist and expansionist foreign
>policy; a war in the Middle East affecting oil supplies; or continued
>distancing of the United States from Europe to the point that American
>security guarantees lose their credibility. Clearly, such external factors
>could provoke a crisis in the European economy, making our predictions of
>future sources of economic growth questionable. U.S. involvement in Bosnia
>and the Dayton peace accords have obviated the immediate threat of an
>aggravated Balkan crisis. The weak and divided response of Western Europe
>to the crisis from its outset, which in turn was partly a result of
>ambivalent European leadership and the domestic preoccupation's already
>discussed, was a key factor for U.S. intervention. There is no guarantee,
>however, that the peace settlement will long survive the end of the NATO
>peacekeeping mission, and that, if it does not, Europe will be any better
>equipped to respond to a renewed crisis than last time.
>
>But a far more obvious threat to Europe's economic future is whether Europe
>will have the political will to move resolutely toward EU institutional
>reform at the upcoming IGC meeting, on which economic growth depends. The
>European Union looks like the Ptolemaic system of the universe before the
>advent of Copernicus, with its ponderous system of circles within circles.
>Enlargement of the EU only makes it more cumbersome. Widening has preceded
>adequate deepening. The structure of the EU reflects the underlying
>ambivalence of European states about yielding sovereignty in areas
>particularly sensitive to them.
>
>What is alarming is that expectations for the IGC are being cut back. It is
>not surprising that the British Government is wary about majority voting
>and "federalism" in general. France under Chirac is uncomfortable about the
>increasingly clear signals from Bonn that Germany will insist on additional
>movement toward federalism in exchange for EMU. The French seem to have
>forgotten that the primary purpose of their historical European policy was
>to irreversibly moor Germany to European institutions. Paradoxically, they
>are now resisting Germany's demand to be further tied down.
>
>It is almost certain that the EU will come up with some kind of package
>addressing institutional reform by 1997; after all, the IGC cannot be
>allowed to fail. The question is whether the politically acceptable package
>will also prove workable. The need to compromise between different visions
>of Europe may produce a Europe without vision. The states of Europe lack
>the reality of power they once possessed to act effectively on the national
>level, or the will to make Europe really succeed; the whole seems to be
>less than the sum of its parts. Europe awaits its Copernican revolution.
>Whether the leadership necessary to make that revolution presents
>itself--under the admittedly difficult economic and political circumstances
>just described--may be the critical factor in determining whether the EU
>will survive as a viable institution and whether Europe will play the kind
>of role to which its wealth, population, and history would seem to destine
>it.
>
>ABOUT THE AUTHORS
>Steven Philip Kramer is Professor of History at the Industrial College of
>the Armed Forces, National Defense University. Dr. Kramer has taught
>contemporary European history and government at the University of New
>Mexico and Georgetown University, served as a Council of Foreign Relations
>Fellow in the Department of State, and directed the Face-to-Face program of
>the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has also been a John J.
>McCloy Distinguished Fellow in Residence at the American Institute for
>Contemporary German Studies and a Fellow at the Institute for the Study of
>Diplomacy at Georgetown. He has written widely on European politics and
>culture. His most recent book is Does France Still Count: The French Role
>in the New Europe (1994).
>
>Professor Kramer received a B.A. from Brandeis University and a Ph.D. from
>Princeton University.
>
>Irene Kyriakopoulos is Professor of Economics at the Industrial College of
>the Armed Forces, National Defense University. Dr. Kyriakopoulos teaches
>economics of strategy and resources management and directs a course on the
>political economy of the European Union. She has served as Research
>Associate on the staff of The Brookings Institution, as a member of the
>Economics faculty of The George Washington University and as Faculty Fellow
>at the Office of Personnel Management. Her research interests and
>activities have focused on defense economics, European integration and the
>economic dimension of international security. Her latest publication is
>"Economic Integration as a Model for Security Cooperation," in Reiner K.
>Huber and Rudolf Avenhaus, eds., Models for Security Policy in the
>Post-Cold War Era (1996).
>
>Professor Kyriakopoulos received a B.S. from the University of Maryland and
>a Ph.D. from The George Washington University.
>
>
>Louis Proyect
>
>(http://www.panix.com/~lnp3/marxism.html)
>
>