[PEN-L:6172] Why Nato needs to destroy Serbia

[Louis Proyect <lnp3@xxxxxxxxx>]

>From "Trouble in Paradise? Europe in the 21st Century", a paper by Steven
Philip Kramer and Irene Kyriakopoulos of the Institute for National
Strategic Studies. The entire paper is must reading and can be found at
http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair49/m49cont.html.

======

Europe can also grow by expanding its membership wisely. The club of 12
added three new members in l995: Austria, Sweden, and Finland. These
affluent, industrialized democracies bring with them higher than average
per capita incomes, well-developed market economies and strong export
orientation; such attributes change immediately the economic statistics of
the EU as a whole and in the right direction. The financial benefits are
especially visible because these new members will be net contributors to
the EU's budget and thus enhance EU-financed projects. At the same time,
potential costs to political cohesion in the European Union are minimized
because the new members are, in reality, old and established partners of
the EU through EFTA. Their political, social, cultural, and economic
institutions are mature and in harmony with those of EU member states.
Thus, Europe's most recent enlargement may actually represent a win-win
outcome and one that stimulates economic expansion for the union as a
whole. Nonetheless, this enlargement does present some problems. It
reinforces the need to overhaul the cumbersome institutional structure of
the EU at the l996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The three new
members' security identity is marked by a long tradition of neutrality:
they may be less willing to support the idea of robust European security
cooperation. Finally, these nations seem less committed to the Monnet ideal
of Europe; Swedish public opinion is already showing reservations about the
likely benefits of EU membership.

But what are the limits to the EU's enlargement? In theory, Europe could
have and should have become whole again after the end of the Cold War.
Instead, there is now a new divide, the result of the de facto separation
between two groups of countries: those that are members of the EU
(industrial democracies with developed political institutions and mature
market economies) and those that are not (former Communist countries facing
serious problems of political and economic adjustment). The success and
speed with which Western Europe can integrate the states of Central and
Eastern Europe, as well as Russia, into its political and economic
structures will be critical determinants of this process. If true
integration can be achieved, the single market will expand immensely. The
benefits associated with economies of scale will be considerable and, if
past trends are a guide, trade flows will grow significantly as well.

It would be a mistake to invoke economics as the singular driving force
pushing toward EU expansion. A strong argument can be made that economic
integration is a means toward a larger goal, that of political (and, by
extension, social and cultural) unification. In contrast to other economic
zones or free trade areas (including the largest and most recent one,
NAFTA), the EU is composed of countries with a common collective
conscience, heritage, and culture. Geographically, their boundaries and
history tie them together on the European continent. Their political and
economic institutions are similarly based on common conceptions of
governance, from the birth of participatory democracy in the Greek
city-states to monarchy to parliamentary democracy and from feudalism to
contemporary political economy. Culturally, EU member states have created
and share in the values of Western civilization, from Greek philosophy to
the spread of Christianity to the Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment.
Indeed, the notion of a European identity (symbolized in the EU passport
since l985) has a far stronger cultural, sociogeographic content than the
American one (in the sense of the North American or South American
continent, and even less so in the case of both of them combined). These
factors indicate that the current divide in Europe may be temporary,
ephemeral, and artificial. The limits of the EU will most likely be
expanded to include all the states professing a broadly based and genuine
popular allegiance to a common European ethos, culture, history and civic
values. By these criteria, the European Union might eventually include all
the countries on the continent of Europe all the way to the Urals; indeed,
Russia is as much a European power on its western side as it is Asiatic on
its eastern side.

There are grounds for optimism that such an accomplishment is possible:
since l989, the reunification of Germany has involved not just the
absorption of the former GDR by the FDR but also the immediate inclusion,
through Germany's membership, of the former Communist GDR into the EU. This
has not been an easy process; in addition to major political, social,
industrial, and other dislocations caused by the decision to reunify the
two countries, the financial costs have been enormous and borne mostly by
German taxpayers. But beyond the direct financial costs, the full economic
costs of this inevitable task are incurred (directly or indirectly) by all
citizens of the EU. It is inconceivable now that Europe would have room for
two German states, one inside the EU, the other outside, because despite
their differences in political and economic systems over decades, the two
German states share common linguistic, cultural and historic traditions.
The extent to which such traditions form a common civic denominator among
the peoples of Europe will most likely define the limits of the post Cold
War EU, its economic geography, ethnographic composition and new political
identity. European history, after all, reflects a legacy of both
centripetal and centrifugal forces. Diversity and unity are not
contradictory. In the High Middle Ages, for example, there was a remarkable
unity in cultural and intellectual life at a time of political
fragmentation. Today it is possible to imagine political and economic
integration together with enormous degrees of cultural diversity.

In the near term, enlargement of the European Union is constrained by
serious political uncertainties. These, in turn, lead to calculations
unfavorable to the commitment of scarce resources outside of the EU. The
issues, prospects and problems associated with future enlargement must be
dealt with in terms of the economic calculus prevailing in Europe today.
Further enlargement can take place in two directions: south and northeast.

Expansion to the south would mean simply opening up the EU to Malta and
Cyprus. The economic benefits or costs would be minimal, given the small
size of the economies involved. The political gains would be negligible,
the potential dangers great. Malta has a long history as a maverick within
international organizations. Giving Malta the existing right of veto could
paralyze the operations of EU institutions, especially if the Maltese
Labour Party returns to power. Entry of Cyprus is predicated on a solution
of the Cypriot question, which depends in turn on a breakthrough in
Greek-Turkish relations. Far more than expansion, there will certainly be
greater involvement of Europe in the Mediterranean. The conflict in Algeria
has focused the attention of Mediterranean states like France, Italy, and
Spain on the importance of stabilizing the countries of the Maghreb to
avoid generalization of instability and immigration because of Islamic
fundamentalism, a high birthrate and economic backwardness. It is to
conjure potential dangers emanating from the Maghreb rather than in pursuit
of economic gains that the EU is likely to incur significant financial
burdens.

Thus when EU enlargement is invoked what is usually meant is expansion to
the northeast. The first tranche of candidates are the Czech Republic,
Poland, and Hungary (Slovakia is often included in this group, but will be
discussed separately). The political experience of these three countries
since the end of Communist rule has been generally positive. Democratic
elections, alternation of power, freedom of speech, and rule of law have
prevailed. The process of democratization was based either on historical
experience (the Czech Republic from 1918 to 1938), the record of resistance
to Communist rule (Solidarity in Poland), or the origins of a genuine
multiparty system under Communist rule (Hungary). Neither Poland nor the
Czech Republic is involved in any significant boundary disputes or national
minority questions, although antisemitism persists in Poland. Hungary's
differences with Slovakia seemed to have been resolved by a new treaty
negotiated under the stability pact rubric but reemerged when Slovakia
voted to make Slovak the official language of the country. A treaty with
Romania remains to be negotiated. The left wing Hungarian government of
Gyula Horn has been far more conciliatory on issues related to the large
Hungarian national minorities in neighboring countries than was its
conservative predecessor. Assuming that this issue is satisfactorily
resolved, there is reason to think that the membership of these countries
in the EU is at least as sound a proposition on political grounds as was
Greek membership in l981 and Spanish and Portuguese membership a decade
ago. Including them in the EU would expand the zone of stability and
security in Europe.

Slovakia has not gone as far in creating a free market and has weaker
democratic credentials. Had it not been part of Czechoslovakia it is
unlikely that it would be considered at this point for EU membership.
Beyond this tranche of countries it is hard to see many likely candidates
for EU membership in the next decade. Until peace reigns in the Balkans,
incorporating any Balkan state could be risky, as it could be involved in a
widened war. This certainly is the case of most of the republics of the
former Yugoslavia. Nor is there much progress toward liberal democracy in
other Balkan countries, although Bulgaria has shown good sense in dealing
with its minority problems. Slovenia is economically developed, but it is
not clear whether it should be rewarded for having pulled the plug out of
Yugoslavia and unleashing civil war. Rumania seems not to have undergone
much genuine reform at all. The Baltics remain a problem because of the
continuing problem of Russian minorities.

It is fair to say that EU membership can consolidate democracy. But
affording EU membership to states not yet far advanced toward democracy or
harboring territorial disputes with neighbors or unresolved national
minority questions runs the risk of importing these problems into the EU.
Even the admission of the strongest candidates poses serious risks if the
decision making mechanism of the EU is not reformed and until there is a
consensus on the direction the EU is supposed to take. The more states are
admitted, the more difficult it will be to change the institutional
structure and the more dysfunctional the present structure will be. One
danger is that once admitted, new states will immediately be relegated to
the bottom tier of a multispeed Europe, which will have to be multispeed in
part because of their admission. The upcoming IGC will have to resolve
issues of institutional structure that logically should have been dealt
with before any enlargement.

Beyond the political dimension, expansion to the east involves equally
serious problems of economic integration. Both in terms of industrial
development and income levels, a large gap exists between Western Europe
and countries that stayed behind the Iron Curtain for decades. The least
troubling and most optimistic case is the Czech Republic, the best economic
performer in Eastern Europe: its per capita income is just over $7,000,
putting the country in first place among all non-EU states in Europe. Yet,
compared to EU income levels, the Czech standard of living is very low: it
barely reaches one-half of average EU income, significantly lower than that
of Greece and Portugal, the EU's least well-off member states (both have
average incomes around $9,000).

The Czech Republic situation is similar to that of Slovenia (a new state
but located in a region with a strong industrial tradition). Slovakia,
Hungary, Belarus, and Estonia may be grouped together in a tier below, with
income levels around $5,500. The former Yugoslavia might also have been
placed in the same group; Croatia and, to a lesser extent, Serbia and
Montenegro were relatively well off before the dissolution of the Yugoslav
state. But all other former members of the now-defunct Warsaw Pact are
countries of even lesser means, with average incomes inordinately low in
comparison to EU levels. The economies of Poland, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and
Romania show signs of improvement but will remain fragile in the transition
to decentralization and open market rules. By any measure, these countries
do not have the economic credentials to be considered candidates for
admission to the EU any time soon. Nor are their evolving political
institutions stable enough to contribute to inter-European cooperation in
the realm of foreign policy and security. Admission to the EU would amount
to virtual guarantee of significant income transfers (at high cost) from
Western Europe in exchange for future (unspecified if not insignificant)
political benefits.

However, the need to develop stronger ties between Western Europe and its
eastern neighbors cannot be overlooked. Short of enlargement by formal
expansion through admission of new states, it is possible to meet that need
through interim measures such as association agreements. This course of
action has already received policy priority, is feasible, and can benefit
all sides. Greater economic integration can lead to political integration
between east and west in Europe, in much the same way that it has
facilitated political integration throughout the EU in the post- World War
II period. Despite its cumbersomeness and slow speed, EU enlargement
through economic integration has been successful for Europe. The recent
admission of former EFTA countries adds to the body of strong evidence that
long-term association agreements promote de facto economic and political
integration, leading naturally to EU membership. Of even greater
significance is the success with which association agreements paved the way
for admission into the EU of Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the l980s. Not
only were these countries relatively poor, but their political record had
been marked by military dictatorships in the post-World War II period. By
comparison, the countries to the east of the EU are less well off in
material terms and significantly more burdened by the experience of
Communist rule. Enlargement of the EU to the east may be out the question
for now but could become possible in the future, even though it might
require long-term association agreements.(Note 5)

Political considerations will probably lead to the admission of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland by early in the next decade. In the long
term, inclusion of these states and of other states in the East later on
will pave the way for enormous expansion of European trade and economic
growth. Initially and for some time, however, the economic and financial
costs to the EU will be far greater than the benefits. Enlargement to the
East may help solve Europe's economic problems in the future but will
certainly exacerbate them in the next decade.

BUT IS THE POLITICAL WILL THERE?

The above conclusions are based on relatively optimistic assumptions about
the future: namely, that no political and security problems emerge that
significantly threaten European interests and the European economy. Such
threats might include revival of the conflict in Bosnia and spillover to
other areas, such as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or Kosovo,
perhaps leading to a regional war; the continued weakening of reformist
forces in Russia, resulting in a nationalist and expansionist foreign
policy; a war in the Middle East affecting oil supplies; or continued
distancing of the United States from Europe to the point that American
security guarantees lose their credibility. Clearly, such external factors
could provoke a crisis in the European economy, making our predictions of
future sources of economic growth questionable. U.S. involvement in Bosnia
and the Dayton peace accords have obviated the immediate threat of an
aggravated Balkan crisis. The weak and divided response of Western Europe
to the crisis from its outset, which in turn was partly a result of
ambivalent European leadership and the domestic preoccupation's already
discussed, was a key factor for U.S. intervention. There is no guarantee,
however, that the peace settlement will long survive the end of the NATO
peacekeeping mission, and that, if it does not, Europe will be any better
equipped to respond to a renewed crisis than last time.

But a far more obvious threat to Europe's economic future is whether Europe
will have the political will to move resolutely toward EU institutional
reform at the upcoming IGC meeting, on which economic growth depends. The
European Union looks like the Ptolemaic system of the universe before the
advent of Copernicus, with its ponderous system of circles within circles.
Enlargement of the EU only makes it more cumbersome. Widening has preceded
adequate deepening. The structure of the EU reflects the underlying
ambivalence of European states about yielding sovereignty in areas
particularly sensitive to them.

What is alarming is that expectations for the IGC are being cut back. It is
not surprising that the British Government is wary about majority voting
and "federalism" in general. France under Chirac is uncomfortable about the
increasingly clear signals from Bonn that Germany will insist on additional
movement toward federalism in exchange for EMU. The French seem to have
forgotten that the primary purpose of their historical European policy was
to irreversibly moor Germany to European institutions. Paradoxically, they
are now resisting Germany's demand to be further tied down.

It is almost certain that the EU will come up with some kind of package
addressing institutional reform by 1997; after all, the IGC cannot be
allowed to fail. The question is whether the politically acceptable package
will also prove workable. The need to compromise between different visions
of Europe may produce a Europe without vision. The states of Europe lack
the reality of power they once possessed to act effectively on the national
level, or the will to make Europe really succeed; the whole seems to be
less than the sum of its parts. Europe awaits its Copernican revolution.
Whether the leadership necessary to make that revolution presents
itself--under the admittedly difficult economic and political circumstances
just described--may be the critical factor in determining whether the EU
will survive as a viable institution and whether Europe will play the kind
of role to which its wealth, population, and history would seem to destine
it.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Steven Philip Kramer is Professor of History at the Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, National Defense University. Dr. Kramer has taught
contemporary European history and government at the University of New
Mexico and Georgetown University, served as a Council of Foreign Relations
Fellow in the Department of State, and directed the Face-to-Face program of
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has also been a John J.
McCloy Distinguished Fellow in Residence at the American Institute for
Contemporary German Studies and a Fellow at the Institute for the Study of
Diplomacy at Georgetown. He has written widely on European politics and
culture. His most recent book is Does France Still Count: The French Role
in the New Europe (1994).

Professor Kramer received a B.A. from Brandeis University and a Ph.D. from
Princeton University.

Irene Kyriakopoulos is Professor of Economics at the Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, National Defense University. Dr. Kyriakopoulos teaches
economics of strategy and resources management and directs a course on the
political economy of the European Union. She has served as Research
Associate on the staff of The Brookings Institution, as a member of the
Economics faculty of The George Washington University and as Faculty Fellow
at the Office of Personnel Management. Her research interests and
activities have focused on defense economics, European integration and the
economic dimension of international security. Her latest publication is
"Economic Integration as a Model for Security Cooperation," in Reiner K.
Huber and Rudolf Avenhaus, eds., Models for Security Policy in the
Post-Cold War Era (1996).

Professor Kyriakopoulos received a B.S. from the University of Maryland and
a Ph.D. from The George Washington University.


Louis Proyect

(http://www.panix.com/~lnp3/marxism.html)