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[PEN-L:4656] Kosovo FWd
Look at the following: An interesting similarity to the stuff Doug
posted from the Trotskyite web paper -- fascinating analysis once you
filter out the boiler plate. In this case the boilerplate is not
Trotksyite blather but the assumption U.S. intentions are always
virtuous...
I of course am offering it in support of my position that intervention
in these circumstances (bombs or ground troops) never had much chance
of saving lives. I lack the military knowledge of George Friedman, and
so cannot tell you whether this is nut stuff or solid journalism. I
opposed U.S. intervention on the less sophisticated basis that when
Jack the Ripper wields his scalpel the result is more likely to be
murder than surgery. (The U.S. being the Jack the Ripper in this
analogy)
BTW, to those who say that the Serbian government has to he held
responsible for the massacres they are committing -- I agree. But,
that does not remove U.S. responsibility. Provoking a murderer by an
action which also has no chance of stopping him is generally
considered a poor policy -- especially when your provocation includes
the killing of innocent people related to the murderer.
=====================
>From Salon Magazine, March 30 1999 http://www.salonmagazine.com/news/
(But will have a different URL soon. If you cannot find go to top page
http://www.salonmagazine.com/).
====================
Endgame?
AS THE CRISIS SPIRALS OUT OF CONTROL, EVERYBODY SCRAMBLES FOR A QUICK
sOLUTION. EVERYBODY BUT MILOSEVIC.
BY JEFF STEIN
"We can't help every country in every situation," Defense Secretary
William Cohen said the other day. No kidding, says a growing chorus of
critics, who are watching NATO airstrikes worsen the Kosovo crisis
they were intended to solve. Among those critics is George Friedman,
co-author (with his wife, Meredith,) of such books as "The
Intelligence Edge," "The Future of War" and "The Coming War with
Japan." The former director of Louisiana State University's Center for
Geopolitical Studies, Friedman in 1996 founded Strafor Inc., one of
the fastest-moving sources of information on global events, including
the Kosovo crisis.
NATO's bombing campaign has been "ridiculous," Friedman scoffs,
pathetically under-strength for the mission of fending off Serbian
ground units in Kosovo, not to mention bending Yugoslav strongman
Slobodan Milosovic to its will. Friedman flatly rules out a ground
invasion of Kosovo to rescue what's left of the hapless ethnic
Albanians there, for the simple reason that NATO doesn't have the
tools to pull it off, he says.
Salon interviewed Friedman from his company offices in Austin, Texas,
as the crisis deepened, with tens of thousands of refugees fleeing
Kosovo, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov calling for genocide
trials -- against NATO leaders, not Milosevic -- and India threatening
to form a tripartite alliance with China and Russia.
Q)With all our-high tech gadgetry and air superiority, many people are
asking why we can't destroy Serbian forces in Kosovo.
A)We haven't got enough firepower. NATO's only got about 166 ground
attack aircraft in the operation -- totally inadequate for the type of
mission that's been defined. For example, we have between 12 and 16
A-10 antitank planes in theater. If we assume 70 percent availability,
and two sorties a day each, that's a pretty big country to cover.
Remember in Desert Storm, it took us six months to build up our air
power, and then a six-week campaign with about five times as many
aircraft.
Q)Are you saying no amount of bombing -- all of NATO's might -- can
wring victory from this situation?
A)No, I'm saying there is an amount of bombing, but we don't have the
aircraft anyway near there to do it, and it would take us two to three
months to get there. It's not that the United States lacks sufficient
force to carry out the mission. The problem is that they have not
taken the time to deploy those forces, and for the first time since
the Second World War, the United States is simultaneously involved in
a second air campaign, over Iraq. We just don't have the resources to
do it.
Q)On your Web site, you've pointed out that the Serbs can bring
withering anti-aircraft fire against low-flying )NATO ground support
planes in Kosovo. Have they been using it at all?
A)This is a very interesting point. They are holding back almost all
of their fire, and, I think, waiting to go out with a crescendo,
perhaps opening up suddenly with all their forces on the ground. Their
main concern has always been the security of their forces operating in
Kosovo. From their point of view, however, the number of NATO aircraft
operating in Kosovo is so low they're hardly worth noticing -- 12
A-10s is a joke, that's not a mission.
Q)And you don't think NATO will -- or should -- send in ground troops?
A)Not unless they want to die. You've got 20,000 crack Yugoslav troops
guarding the two mountain-pass roads into Kosovo. Any attempt to
dislodge those troops would cause thousands of casualties on our side
and the mission would probably fail.
Q)What would NATO troops face if they cross into Kosovo from
Macedonia?
A)We're talking 20,000 to 30,000 Serb troops operating internally in
Kosovo, and another 20,000 on the Macedonia frontier. I mean, this is
ludicrous from a military point of view: We were not ready for this
air campaign, in truth, and certainly not an invasion.
Q)NATO wasn't prepared for this operation?
A)No. The Clinton administration believed that Milosevic would permit
Serbia to be dismembered because of the threat of air power. We once
more have done what we do in every war: We totally underestimate the
intelligence of our opponent. We did it with the Japanese, the Viet
Cong, with Saddam and now with Milosevic. He wouldn't dare challenge
the United States, we thought. Well, why not?
Q)During the war in Bosnia, airstrikes made Milosevic back off
quickly. Why didn't he back off this time?
A)As with the Vietnamese, we didn't understand that he was dealing
with the fundamental survival of the nation. When we hit them in
Bosnia, that was a peripheral issue. Now we are dealing with
dismemberment of the country. What I'm getting from people in
Yugoslavia is, "When the majority of Serbs wanted to secede from
Bosnia and join Yugoslavia, you bombed us to prevent that. When the
majority of Albanians want to withdraw from Kosovo, you bomb us to
permit that. The only common theme is that you want to destroy
Serbia." They say, "Look, first you're going to take Kosovo, then
you're going to take Vodjovino," which is primarily Hungarian. "You
are dismembering Serbia." Now, that's not the American intention,
that's not the American plan, but it's now the Serbian thinking.
Q)Some critics say we should be outright backing the KLA.
A)We're doing it already.
Q)To what degree?
A)Well, there are reports, for example, that British SAS (Special Air
Service) Forces have entered Kosovo. There also are reports that U.S.
Special Forces are operating there. The doctrine of both is never to
enter these areas except in conjunction with indigenous forces, which
in this case is the KLA.
Q)How much credibility do you give those reports?
A)I have no doubt we have special forces operating in Kosovo. Past
behavior would indicate that we would be in there to conduct
on-the-ground intelligence, battle damage assessment and targeting
capabilities with lasers. So I would be stunned if we went into this
without those capabilities.
Q)There have also been reports that the mission led by U.S. Ambassador
William Walker in January to investigate mass murders secretly left
behind electronic ground locator devices on potential air targets.
I am sure -- I hope -- that we have worked for the past several months
to put both an intelligence infrastructure and personnel on the
ground. And that would mean that we are cooperating with the KLA,
because to move around the country would require their help. I don't
have any secret information to that effect, but I'd bet the house on
it.
Q)In the present situation, can our Green Berets or similar units be
effective against the Serbs?
A)They can certainly harass the Serbs.
Q)There's no realistic way the KLA can defeat the Serbian army?
A)There's no way, even with American air power. If somebody wanted
Kosovo to be independent, they should've started a year ago, smuggling
in weapons to the KLA. Now people want a three-day solution, and it's
not possible.
Q)When the U.S. military was first resisting involvement in the
Balkans back in 1993, there was a joke about the Pentagon hanging a
big banner around the building saying, "We do deserts, not mountains."
Is that the problem?
A)We do Arabs, we don't do Serbs. I really have to say that. One of
the reason the Israelis are so successful is that they get to fight
the Syrians and the Egyptians. I don't know how well they'd do against
the Serbs. The Serbs fought the Waffen SS to a standstill in World War
II. The Russians invaded Hungary, but they wouldn't touch Yugoslavia.
And don't forget, most of the Yugoslav officers were trained by us, in
the 1970s and '80s. I saw them at Fort Leavenworth and other places.
Q)It seems the White House went off half-cocked on this one.
A)What happened was, the administration was convinced Milosevic was
bluffing, that as soon as the bombs started to fall, he would buckle.
No matter what anybody told them -- including us, that it was crazy --
they believed he would not accept an air campaign. So they launched
into an air campaign that they were unable to carry out.
Q)There seems to be a parallel here with Somalia, where the White
House stormed in with its heart, instead of its head.
A)The variable to focus on here is the illusion of air power. In
Vietnam we believed that the North Vietnamese would give up the dream
of a united Vietnam in order to avoid a bombing campaign. Instead,
they stepped up the tempo and increased our losses, which we found
unacceptable. The precise message Milosevic got from that is that the
only thing we're willing to do against him is an air campaign, and
we're not serious. Once again a Democratic administration has set a
strategic goal, and when the military people told them the cost,
instead of backing off from the goal, they decided to do it on the
cheap. They can't afford the price now, so they're pretending the
price they can afford to pay will do the job.
Q)What's the endgame?
A)A face-saving cease-fire.
Q)Which will come when? After the Serbs have killed or run all the
Albanians out of Kosovo?
A)Which will come when the Russians and the French decide to make
Belgrade accept the cease-fire. Right now, Belgrade thinks it has time
on its side -- they're the belligerent ones now. When the Russians
came to Belgrade last night they called them "scum." Washington
doesn't have time. Washington has gone to Primakov and said, "What
will it take to get you to help us end this?" And Primakov said, the
[International Monetary Fund].
Q)We paid in advance?
A)There will be a lot more money involved, believe me. This is far
from the last tranche.
So what's next in this stalemate?
The Serbs are running against the clock. There's going to be a
cease-fire somewhere in the next 72 hours. The Russians got their IMF
loan, and they're sending Primakov. Chirac is sending his delegation.
The Serbs are now at the endgame where they've got to close this thing
down. What the Serbs are attempting to do is to clear out as much of
Kosovo as they can to create a situation on the ground, after the
cease-fire, that gives them what they want ... which is to retain
Kosovo. Their reading of it is that the basic problem is demographic,
and they're busy readjusting the demographics. As we move toward a
cease-fire, the tempo speeds up. The Serbs will increase their
brutality.
Q)Do you expect the Russians or the French to help NATO out of this
mess?
A)Neither the Russians nor the French are particular eager to save the
American hash. This administration is looking very stupid right now,
and the Russians and the French are delighted to let us dangle slowly,
slowly in the wind. Both the Russians and the French want this to end,
but with as much embarrassment to the Americans as possible. The
Germans want this over, too. Any American call to attack into Kosovo
would involve German troops fighting in Serbia again. For God's sake,
this is a Social Democratic government backed by the Greens. So the
Germans want this over soon, and so do the Italians.
Q)What will a cease-fire look like?
A)There will be a peace-keeping force. The United States will not be
included in it, Germany will not be included in it, Great Britain will
not be included in it. The NATO members in it will be the French, I
suspect, and the Ukrainians and the Greeks.
Q)You sound pretty optimistic that it will be over soon, because it's
in everybody's interest.
A)The United States has been militarily stalemated, which in this case
is the same thing as saying it's been militarily defeated. The United
States does not have an escalation option, therefore it has to end it.
Q)What do you make of India saying it might enter into a tripartite
alliance with China and Russia because of the bombing?
A)It's extremely important. What you're seeing here is the whole world
basically saying the United States has lost its mind, that it's
randomly going around entering into crises, and God knows what's next.
The Indians are taking a look at the way the balance of power is
shaping up in the rest of the world, and they're seeing two great
alliances: the U.S. and England, and everybody else. They'd rather be
with everybody else.
Q)What's the obit on this operation going to read?
A)The Albanians will be mostly displaced to Albania. They will be
slowly let in, and the Russians and the French will preside over the
entire operation. And three weeks later Bill Clinton will have another
moral cause.
SALON | March 30, 1999
Jeff Stein writes about national security issues from Washington.
- Thread context:
- [PEN-L:4659] Re: military Keynesianism,
Tom Walker Tue 30 Mar 1999, 17:39 GMT
- [PEN-L:4658] Re: Moral Blindness of Serb "liberals",
Wojtek Sokolowski Tue 30 Mar 1999, 16:00 GMT
- [PEN-L:4657] prepare public opinion for ground war,
Frank Durgin Tue 30 Mar 1999, 13:32 GMT
- [PEN-L:4652] RE: Re: RE: Re: On Military Keynesianism,
Max Sawicky Tue 30 Mar 1999, 05:43 GMT
- [PEN-L:4656] Kosovo FWd,
Gar Lipow Tue 30 Mar 1999, 04:52 GMT
- [PEN-L:4655] Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: On Military Keynesianism,
Jim Devine Tue 30 Mar 1999, 03:54 GMT
- [PEN-L:4654] The Budget and Kosovo,
Michael Perelman Tue 30 Mar 1999, 03:35 GMT
- [PEN-L:4653] Re: Re: Re: Re: War & 'Public Relations,' or, 'Kuwaiti Babi,
ts99u-1.cc.umanitoba.ca [130.179.154.224] Tue 30 Mar 1999, 03:05 GMT
- [PEN-L:4651] Kosovo: Internet Information Resources,
Nathan Newman Tue 30 Mar 1999, 01:36 GMT
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