[PEN-L:4577] Re: RE: Re: RE: Protest against the Bombing

[Michael Eisenscher <meisenscher@xxxxxxx>]

At 10:52 AM 3/26/99 -0500, Max wrote:

>No question that the bombs do not fall on heads of the assassins
>in this situation.  The hope is that the bombing makes life
>sufficiently uncomfortable for those who direct the assassins as
>to encourage a pull-back.  I quite agree that this is a dicey
>proposition.

"Hope" is not a very sound basis for policy; even less so for military
aggression in violation of 1) NATO's Charter, 2) the U.S. Constitution, 3) the
UN Charter, and probably other international treaties and protocols.  The
victims of the bombing will not be those who are the architects of genocide in
Serbia and rather than destroy their moral, it will merely enable them to rally
the population behind them in another surge of nationalistic and patriotic
fervor.  Meanwhile, the bombing does nothing to defuse the enmity between the
Kosovan Albanians and the Serbs, nor does it demilitarize the area, nor does it
impede in any way the fascistic elements among the KLA from committing equally
heinous crimes.

>If the real problem is ineffectiveness in the prevention of
>genocide, then the correct position is that NATO should post a
>garrison on the ground in Kosovo and protect its inhabitants from
>the Serbs and from each other.

Which none of the NATO powers have any intention of doing, with or without
bombing, even if that were the most prudent course.

>> Assuming the US is prepared to bomb for a while (as in Iraq)
>without committing troops, how will this resolve the crisis in
>the Balkans?  Has the campaign of bombing in Iraq altered the
>fundamental realities on the ground?
>>
>
>No, but as I said these situations are better judged separately.
>U.S. policy re: Iraq has clearly been a failure from every
>standpoint.

Okay.  Accepting separate judgment, I point to my argument above which stands
on its own, independent of what I said about the policy in Iraq.  (Although I
think they are in fact related, despite different facts of each situation.)

>> Would Clinton commit troops?  Not if he expects Gore to win the
>next election. Not without substantial political risk.  Would
>England
>and Germany commit troops absent a similar commitment from the
>US?
>Unlikely, don't you think?>
>
>Quite so.  But that's means the U.S./NATO policy is too weak, not
>too aggressive.

Max, this is simply foolish gibberish.  The policy is wrong and immoral; it is
ineffective and counter-productive.  It is also militarily aggressive (can
bombing be otherwise?).

>> Do you think bombs will lead the Serbs to concede Kosovo?  Were
>that to happen, what would be the consequences in neighboring
>Macedonia?  In Russia?  etc.
>
>Inquiring minds want to know.>>
>
>I'd like to know too.  I agree that the strategic ramifications
>of these situations easily overwhelm our foresight.  One can
>easily become paralyzed this way too.

Is your concern about paralysis justification for a committing to a wrong
policy?  Doing something, anything, is not in this circumstance better than
doing nothing if the something actually makes matters worse or complicates
finding a real solution.

>If genocide is a real threat in Kosovo, wouldn't the
>uncertainties logically give way to the more immediate, concrete
>danger?

As others have pointed out, if the primary issue is genocide, there are many
other places in the world where the situation has been as bad or worse where
those voices of protests are hardly heard.  But that begs the issue.
Presenting the issue simply as Serb genocide ignores the fact that the KLA has
been just as prone to commit atrocities when they've had the opportunity.
Bombing the Serbs does nothing to defuse the propensity of forces on either
side to commit heinous and barbarous crimes against humanity.

Michael