[PEN-L:2681] An article responding to MR's critique of post-Marxism

[Louis Proyect <lnp3@xxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Lou,

Long time no converse. I have attached a reply I wrote to an article that
you posted from MR last year, Christopher Rude?s review of _Globalization
and Its Discontents: The Rise of Postmodern Socialisms_ by Roger Burbach,
Orlando Nunez, and Boris Kagarlitsky. My reply focuses on the author's
attitude towards Marxism, not on the substance of his critique of Burbach
et. al.

I just received a letter from MR this morning rejecting the piece on
grounds of lack of space, despite the fact they found it 'acceptable'. I
have no desire at the present time to delurk on your list, so I didn't want
to post it directly. However, since I first read the article on your list
and you seemed to approve of Rude's article when you posted it, I wanted to
let you see my response. Feel free to use it in any way you wish.

Best wishes,

Howie Chodos

-----

'Unreconstructed' Marxism:
A Critique

Howard Chodos
Postdoctoral Fellow
School of Public Administration
Carleton University

I would like to offer some comments on Christopher Rude's review of
Globalization and Its Discontents: The Rise of Postmodern Socialisms by
Roger Burbach, Orlando Nunez, and Boris Kagarlitsky that appeared in your
November issue. Unusually, I am doing this despite not having read the work
that was under review. Thus, the issue I want to raise is not whether
Burbach et. al., or Rude, or some other commentator, is right with regard
to particular substantive claims about the state of international
capitalism and the class struggle. What does concern me, however, is the
tone, spirit and attitude towards Marxism that the review displayed. I wish
therefore to speak to two interrelated points. First, there is the question
of the standard of argumentation that is required to foster a vibrant
interchange, and second, there is the matter of the attitude to be adopted
to what we can call, for want of a better term, the crisis of Marxism.

In general, Rude's review struck me as being casually dismissive of the
authors' views without offering anything other than a rather dogmatic
reliance on certain key traditional Marxist precepts as an alternative.
>From the outset, Rude establishes his general opinion, not only of the
authors in question, but of all those who think that Marxism has become
outdated. In his view, they are all succumbing to intellectual faddism. He
objects to the authors' characterization of Marxism as being in complete
disarray and their endorsement of the death certificate for the project for
revolution launched by the Communist Manifesto (p. 52). Rude is right that,
formulated in this fashion, these positions seriously overstate the overall
case against Marxism. However, there are important issues at stake here
that must not be ignored in a rush to defend the tradition's honor.

Let me begin with the key question of class. Central to Rude's complaint
against the authors is their contention that globalization has "brought
about a cessation of class conflict throughout the world." (p. 53) In
Rude's view, not only is this a patently inaccurate assessment of the
current situation, but it also leads to privileging movements and struggles
that do not have the potential to radically transform capitalism, namely
the so-called new social movements (i.e. "women's, ethnic rights, gay and
lesbian, disabled, Indians, environmentalists"). Rude raises a number of
reasons as to why these forces are fundamentally different to the working
class, two of which I wish to highlight.

The first is on p. 53, where he affirms that: "With a class-based
opposition to world capitalism no longer viable, presumably opposition
cannot come from within the system but only from without, and non-economic,
cultural issues are pushed to the forefront." My question here is a simple
one. What warrants the assertion that all these other movements are somehow
located "outside" the system? Now, later on Rude himself acknowledges that:

The women's, gay, lesbian, and ethnic rights movements have indeed acted as
the "major ideological protagonists" of social change in recent years. By
showing just how varied and subtle oppression can be, these social
movements have both broadened the left's political agenda and, by exposing
many blind spots, transformed the left's total world view. (p. 55)

Shouldn't this later admission qualify his earlier dismissal of the
non-economic movements located outside the system (wherever that may be)?
Not only does Rude not do that, he goes on to argue that by embracing
non-class forces the authors "appear to have lost a concern for universal
principles altogether." Class would thus seem for Rude to be the only
possible source of universal values, or anti-systemic struggles. He then
points to the fact that "as recent events in Bosnia and Rwanda show,
movements based on race and ethnicity can just as easily produce genocide
as liberation." (p. 56)

The problem with this argument, and it is a decisive one in my view, is
that it can just as easily be made about a number of important
"class-based" movements that we are all too familiar with. Now that we know
the full extent of the crimes committed by regimes such as the Khmer Rouge,
or of the millions who perished in Stalin's Gulag, is it possible to argue
that one can establish a distinction in principle between regimes that act
in the name of class and those that act in the name of some other
principle? In what ways are class-based movements any more inherently
universalizing than those which claim to speak in other voices? As
Marxists, do we not need to temper our prescriptions with a little
humility, and a fair bit of self-criticism?

Without such an attitude, it is easy to succumb to the illusion that one
has offered arguments in support of one's views, when, in fact, one is
relying on unsubstantiated references to supposedly proven truths. Thus,
Rude is able to claim that "events such as the worldwide spread of excess
capacity and severe financial crises (notably Southeast Asia these days)
demonstrate the validity of Marxist analysis." (p. 55) Now it would be too
much to expect that a fully-argued case in support of this contention could
be made in the space of a single review. But it is surprising that Rude
thinks he has proven anything with his casual reference to the Asian crisis.

The same type of problem recurs in his remarks on the role of the state
that follow. It is hard to disagree with Rude when he says that "the simple
fact is that the capitalists need and use the nation state." (p. 55) But
I'm not at all sure that Rude's simple fact takes us very far. Does simply
asserting that the capitalist class exerts a preponderant influence on the
state structure as it is now organized really help illuminate the shifting
relations between nation states, supra-national organizations, and the
various fractions and sectors of international capital? Rude also points to
the decolonization process as one of the central features of the past half
century that has engendered changes in the role of the state. But here,
too, a casual reference to complex historical events about whose
significance there is nothing even approaching a consensus amongst Marxist
analysts, does not move us very far forward.

These weaknesses in Rude's presentation are, in my view, symptomatic of an
underlying problem. We have to argue for Marxism, but the question is, how
are we to 'defend' Marxism against its critics of various hues? The first
thing it would make sense to agree upon is what exactly we mean by
'Marxism.' Unfortunately, even a question as basic as this is not at all an
easy one to answer, since just about every major tenet advanced by the
founding fathers has been challenged not only by opponents of the
tradition, but also by many who claim to be its faithful inheritors.  Nor
can we fall back on Lukacs's strategy of proclaiming the Marxist
(dialectical) method as the basis for orthodoxy,  since there are today
probably as many Marxists who repudiate dialectics as those who embrace any
of a considerable array of dialectical interpretations.

We therefore need an approach to Marxism that recognizes its
non-homogeneity, its character as a diverse tradition, and the
impossibility (and undesirability) of even attempting a uniform orthodox
definition. Of course, even if we accept this, we will still eventually
need to know where to draw the line between positions and practices that
are consistent with the tradition, and those which fall on the outside. My
own preference is for an approach that recognizes two things. First, to
call oneself a Marxist is one of the conditions for being one, and second,
Marxists believe that capitalism should be replaced with socialism. These
are obviously very general and inclusive criteria, but I think that
embracing something like them is the best bulwark against the reemergence
of the kind of sectarianism that has so long plagued Marxist theory and
practice.

In order to 'defend' Marxism we will also need to account for its decidedly
mixed record, both theoretical and practical, in the course of the
twentieth century. It seems to me that this is, in fact, the decisive
issue. Until we are able to explain how the emancipatory ideals articulated
by the Marxist tradition were variously perverted in the course of their
implementation, it will be impossible to entertain the hope of having
Marxist analyses regain their ability to inspire and guide movements that
will have sufficient breadth to actually be able to transform global
capitalism.

The starting point, in my view, for coming to terms with this legacy should
be the admission that there exists a prima facie case for thinking that
there is a link between Marxist theory and even the most egregiously
criminal regimes that arose under its banner. In accepting that this is the
key question we need to explore, it is equally important to recognize what
kind of question it is. It is primarily a metatheoretical one, in that it
poses the question of the relationship between theory and practice. The
implication of the metatheoretical nature of this question is that it does
not automatically entail any necessary theoretical conclusions. In other
words, even if we agree that there is some kind of connection between
Marxism and the perversions that have been spawned under its aegis, this
does not, in and of itself, imply that any particular theoretical
proposition associated with the tradition is necessarily in error.

What it does mean is that there is something in the tradition that has
meant that, in particular and recurring circumstances, its liberatory
potential has regularly been highjacked by small groups in power who have
spoken in the name of the majority, but acted in the interests of the few.
This has happened in a sufficient number of cases, under a sufficient
variety of circumstances to require us to delve deeply into all the key
strategic and analytical precepts associated with the tradition. In other
words, we may not yet know what it is in the tradition that keeps allowing
its adherents to bring into being abhorrent dictatorships, but there is
enough evidence to warrant thinking that it must be something fairly serious.

Richard Levins has likened these circumstances to there being a disease
which strikes only a particular species.  I would suggest, as well, that in
order for us to inquire sufficiently deeply into the causes of this disease
we even have to remain open to the possibility that we may not be able to
save the patient. Personally, I do not think that the disease is terminal.
But I also do not believe that there are any theoretical conclusions of the
Marxist tradition that can be taken as given, as proven by practice, or by
any other criterion one should choose to invoke. This means that
understanding the history of Marxism, and what has been wrought in its
name, is one of the key tasks we must undertake in order to be able to
revitalize the tradition.

It is this process that seems to me to be blocked by the underlying
attitude that pervades Rude's review, and that, regardless of the merits of
his critique of Burbach et. al., struck me as the central message of his
text. As long as we implicitly or explicitly invoke Marxist positions as
being beyond challenge we are adopting an attitude that precludes the
rejuvenation of the tradition, regardless of the merit of the positions
that we may be championing. It may very well be true that 'postmodern'
Marxism does not offer a real alternative to those who are seeking ways to
combat global capitalist hegemony, but neither does 'unreconstructed'
Marxism. It is capable exclusively of preaching to the converted, who, in
these times, will never constitute a sufficiently powerful force to
radically transform contemporary social relations. The time for orthodoxies
is past.

Notes


1.  One has only to consider the status of such concepts as the labour
theory of value or the dictatorship or the proletariat to realise that key
aspects of Marxist theory that were once taken as givens are today the
subject of great controversy.

2.  He writes on the first page of "What is Orthodox Marxism?" that:
"Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of
the results of Marx's investigations. It is not the 'belief' in this or
that thesis, nor the exegesis of a 'sacred' book. On the contrary,
orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific conviction
that dialectical materialism is the road to truth and that its methods can
be developed, expanded and deepened only along the lines laid down by its
founders. It is the conviction, moreover, that all attempts to surpass or
'improve' it have led and must lead to over-simplification, triviality and
eclecticism." Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass: The
MIT Press, 1986), p. 1 (emphasis in the original).

3.  See his "Rearming the revolution: the tasks of theory for hard times,"
presented to the Espaces Marx Conference, Paris, May 1998.



Louis Proyect

(http://www.panix.com/~lnp3/marxism.html)