[PEN-L:2299] Re: Re: Judith Butler, etc.

[david dorkin <ddorkin@xxxxxxx>]

So tell me; what is your response respond to this posting?

(Since both Chomsky and the subject seem to come up  alot here, I was
wondering if anyone had a comment on this-Thanks)
     Dear Bill,

     Don't know if we met at MIT. I live a pretty crazy life, and
sometimes can barely
     remember whether I've met my children recently. Hope you'll find a
way out of the
     present bad situation.

     On postmodernism, I don't know anything about the Web, and don't
know what
     you saw of mine on postmodernism, so a little hard to comment. But
just keeping
     to what you wrote, I suspect we may be talking about different
things.

     Running through your message, point by point.

     On theory, I don't object to the fact that postmodernism has no
theories (i.e.,
     nothing that could sustain a non-trivial argument). No one else
does either, when
     we turn to human affairs or the kinds of things they are
discussing. What I object to
     is that they proudly claim otherwise. Their productions are put
forth as "grand
     theory," too deep for ordinary mortals to understand -- at least
for me: I don't
     understand it, and am skeptical about whether there is any "theory"
to understand.
     That's a great technique for enhancing one's own privilege while
marginalizing
     the slobs. Does it serve any other function? If so, what? Am I
missing some of the
     great achievements? If so, what?

     On the proof of Fermat's theorem, I have no independent judgment.
Hence the
     word "apparently," which you picked up on quite accurately. I think
we agree.

     On Evelyn Fox Keller, I also find her work very interesting, but
don't see any
     connection to post-modernism (at least, in what both of us find
interesting about
     it).

     As for it's being "a truism of our society that we're robots
programmed by our DNA,
     which then interacts with the environment in such a complicated way
that
     prediction tends to be impossible," and the failure of molecular
biologists to prove
     this, I don't quite know what you mean. That what we do is the
result of some
     complex interaction between our genetic endowment (which may not
all be
     specified in DNA) and the course of experience -- that does seem to
be close to
     truism. What else could play a role? God? That what we do is
completely
     unpredictable is also true. There's been no progress since the
Greeks on this,
     perhaps for quite fundamental reasons (I've written about this
elsewhere, and
     won't repeat). But I don't see what this has to do with molecular
biologists, still
     less with postmodernism.

     Every biologist and other scientist I know of agrees with you that
"it's a still a
     complete mystery how an organism grows out a zygote." For a recent
example,
     take Hazen's article on unsolved problems of science in the current
issue of
     "Technology Review." I think you are pushing an open door on this
one, and it has
     nothing to do with postmodernism.

     You write that "it's good that biologists have actually rejected
the "master
     molecule" talk you still read about in glowing articles in
Scientific American about
     the latest gene which controls trait X, but where the cybernetic
craziness the
     biologists have gone into might be worse -- they've developed an
obfuscatory
     language which allows them to think in same robotic metaphors."

     I don't recognize this from what I read in biology. There is a lot
of fascinating work
     on "master" regulatory genes that seem to appear throughout organic
forms,
     determining the development of body forms, eyes, etc., everywhere.
If that's what
     you are referring to, it seems to be very enlightening and
important. If something
     else, can't comment. But either way, I don't see the connection to
postmodernism.

     Ruth Hubbard's work is also interesting. But I don't see the
connection to
     postmodernism, or to serious biological science. On everything
being a machine,
     surely no scientist should have believed this since Newton refuted
the
     "mechanical philosophy" -- that is, the belief that the inorganic
world is a machine
     -- outraging the scientific establishment (Huygens, Leibniz,
Bernoulli, etc.) and
     himself as well, since he regarded this conclusion as absurd, and
sought (vainly)
     to refute it for the rest of his life, as did Euler, D'Alembert,
and other major figures
     of the 18th century -- and beyond; these efforts underlie the
various ether theories.
     But by this century, Newton's demonstration that NOTHING is a
machine has been
     almost universally accepted among scientists. So again, I don't see
what the issue
     is. Or any connection to postmodernism (which, I admit, I don't
understand).

     On Descartes's "ghost in the machine," that notion made sense in
the time of
     Descartes, and was indeed straight, normal science. But the concept
collapsed
     when Newton exorcised the machine (leaving the ghost intact).
There's been a lot
     of confusion about this since, and maybe postmodernism contributes
more
     confusion (not understanding it, I can't say). But the basic facts
seem to me clear
     enough. I'm unaware of any contribution to these matters by
"ecofeminists," but
     that could well be my ignorance, or inability to understand
postmodernist
     literature.

     Like Keller, I think quite highly of Stuart Kauffman's work, which
is about as
     remote from postmodernism as I can imagine. I don't agree that it
is trivial. And I
     don't read him as claiming that the problem of life is now solved.
Rather, that by
     looking at (quite nontrivial) properties of complex systems, we
might be able to
     get a handle on these mysteries. Sounds reasonable to me.

     I quite agree with you about the serious problems of "ecocrisis."
They are not,
     however, the result of "technology," but of the institutional
structures in which
     technology is used. A hammer can be used to smash someone's skull
in, or to
     build a house. The hammer doesn't care. Technology is typically
neutral; social
     institutions are not. To the (very limited) extent that I
understand what is written
     about these matters in the literature you are referring to, it
seems to attribute to
     technology what should be attributed to institutions of power and
privilege, and
     thus serves to protect these institutions, by shifting attention
away from them. I've
     often suspected that this service to power and privilege may help
account for the
     warm reception given to these doctrines in the ideological
institutions
     (universities, etc.).

     On my comments about how the left intellectuals who used to try to
bring
     understanding of science and mathematics to the general public are
now working
     hard to ensure that these marvellous achievements are reserved for
the rich and
     powerful, you write: "I'd be happy to teach Mathematics to millions
myself, I think
     my subject is overly obfuscatory in an effort to insulate itself
from the scrutiny of
     ordinary people. But I really think what you were complaining about
on this topic
     has to do with a loss of faith in Science, for instance by
leftists. I think Science has
     a lot of problems, rooted in the 1000 year Catholic domination of
Europe."

     For what it's worth, here's my reaction.

     I think it's great that you, and others, should teach mathematics
to millions, and I
     think this can be done in a way that is not "overly obfuscatory" --
say, the way
     Vicky Weisskopf presents advanced physics, readily accessible to
high school
     students. But I'm not "complaining" about anything, surely not what
you say.
     Rather I'm deploring the fact that while people who considered
themselves left
     intellectuals 60 years ago were devoting themselves to the needs
and interests of
     the great mass of the population (for example, by introducing them
to modern
     science and mathematics), many of those who call themselves "left
intellectuals"
     today prefer to feather their own nests while telling the general
public that they
     should not pay attention to what human intelligence and creativity
has achieved,
     but should leave all of this to the powerful and privileged and
join the
     postmodernists in what (to me, at least) is incomprehensible
jargon. All of this is a
     marvellous gift to power, and much to be deplored, in my opinion.

     I could well be wrong. I'm quite open-minded about this. I'll be
convinced as soon
     as someone explains to me some of the new insights that have been
achieved. So
     far, what I read in these domains seems to me either near truism,
long accepted,
     or absurd, incomprehensible, or "obfuscatory" (to borrow your
term). Good for
     careers, and a real service to power. But I don't see any other
function.

     On the problems of science, as actually practised, doubtless there
are many, but I
     don't see that we gain any understanding of these matters from
these sources.
     Rather, just mountains of confusion and misunderstanding. Not that
everything is
     wrong. What little I understand is often true: e.g., the
anti-foundationalism, not
     only true, but truism, and for hundreds of years. That seems to me
the problem:
     either truism, or unintelligible. To be fair, I'm exaggerating.
When one peels away
     the polysyllablic rhetoric, there are often some good ideas, which
could be stated
     quite simply, I think. If so, why not? Merits thought, it seems to
me.

     Noam
On "The `deconstructionist' domain"

     I did have a several hour discussion with Foucault over Dutch TV
about 25 years
     ago. It's in print, if you are interested, and discussed some in
the postmodern
     literature (by Chris Norris, among others). We also spent a
pleasant day together,
     walking in the Dutch countryside. On your question, my own
background in
     linguistics, philosophy, or any other relevant subject puts me in
no position, I'm
     afraid, to comment on the question you raised. What you describe as
     "deconstructionist theory" (I'm sure accurately -- though I admit I
have to wince
     when I hear the good term "theory" misused in this way) is sheer
nonsense if
     taken literally, so I suppose it must have some other
interpretation. What that
     might be, I have no idea. Afraid I can't shed any light on the
matter.

     Noam Chomsky
On Rorty, relativism, etc.

          I don't think this is the place or occasion to go into a
detailed
          discussion of Rorty's book, so I'll keep to your formulation
of the issue
          raised:

          (1) "There is no objective point of reference (God's eye view,
as R
          says) from which we can make a universal judgment (or even
rational
          judgment, i.e., it is still peppered with our own ethnocentric
          conceptions of what we consider rational) regarding the
retention or
          dismissal of that value -- accept on pragmatic grounds, e.g.,
          usefulness to the community."

          (2) "any type of conceptual scheme that is constructed
(including rules
          of rationality) is always going to be relative to the
ethnocentric aspect
          of the particular culture in which we

          are living, which may be completely different from another
culture."

          First, we have to distinguish "rules of rationality" from
empirical
          inquiry (science, history, ordinary life,...).

          Take the former.  Does the proposal assert that there are
cultures in
          which people believe that it is fine to accept outright
contradictions?
          So, putting aside irrelevant questions about vagueness, etc.,
is it
          proposed that there are human societies where people who see
two
          apples in one place and two apples in another place happily
accept
          the conclusion that there are both 4 apples and 93 apples in
these two
          places?  Or peasant societies where people decide to plant on
the
          assumption that

          right now it is both raining hard and not raining at all?  Or
people
          who adopt our calendar and are quite happy with the conclusion
that
          today is Saturday and not Saturday (maybe Thursday)?  Or where
          they believe that (a) the sun is shining, (b) if the sun is
shining it's hot,
          and (c) it's not hot?  Or people whose "rules of rationality"
are that if p
          is true then p is false and its negation is true?

          If so, it would be interesting to have some examples cited, or
even an
          abstract account of what belief systems would be like under
such
          circumstances.

          There surely are questions that can be raised (and have been,
by
          Putnam, who you mention, in particular).  For example, for
quantum
          mechanics, should we adopt 2-valued or higher-valued logic?
Should
          we accept the axiom of choice (in set theory)?

          Etc.  But these questions are raised within our structure of
rationality
          (which, as far as is known, is everyone's, a species
character).

          Take the second possibility: what is in question is science
and other
          forms of empirical inquiry.  But here there has been little
serious
          disagreement since the 17th century.  Within our scientific
tradition
          (the one that is supposed to fail to recognize its
ethnocentricity) it's
          been rather widely agreed that experience itself is determined
by
          modes of cognition (partly innate, partly modified by
experience), and
          that there

          can be no firm and certain foundations for the conclusions of
          science.  Here we move to questions of textual interpretation,
but I
          think if you look, you'll find that while debates about these
matters
          have a good deal of intellectual interest, they are based on
largely
          shared ground that is not subject to the kind of critique to
which you
          refer (even if one can give a coherent version of that
critique, which
          does not seem easy to me).

          Specifically, it is commonly assumed (in the modern period, in
a
          spectrum ranging from Carnap to Quine, for example) that the
          framework for scientific inquiry is adopted on "pragmatic
grounds."
          But by "pragmatic grounds," no one means "usefulness to the
          community." Suppose, for example, we conclude that it would be
          useful to the community if drivers would stay below 60mph, and
we
          could get them to do so by convincing them that if they go
above 60,
          they'll get incurable cancer, or Earth will be hit by a huge
asteroid, or
          they'll go to Hell.  Do you know anyone -- in this culture, or
any other
          culture -- who would conclude that it is therefore true that
they'll get
          incurable cancer, etc.?

          Doubtless it would be useful to the community if global
warming
          could be controlled by prayer.  Do you know anyone who
concludes,
          on these grounds, that it is true that global warming can be
controlled
          by prayer?

          You raise the question: "is there any foundation upon which we
can
          retain the rules of rational thinking, etc., that would
by-pass such
          relativism?" The question seems to me unanswerable, until some
          coherent version is proposed of the kind of "relativism" we
are
          supposed to by-pass.  In what I've read of the "postmodern
writers,"
          I've seen no hint of that, though I should make clear that I
have read
          very little, for reasons I've probably already mentioned.

          Noam Chomsky



Gerald Levy wrote:
>
> Barkley asks:
>
> > Are you happy now, Jerry?
>
> Not yet.
>
> Had a published "review" of your book been authored by someone who
> admitted (afterwards) that s/he only read the dust jacket, would your
> response be so cavalier?
>
> I doubt it.
>
> What makes this fraud *more* important than the "Social Text affair" is
> what it says about how certain "Marxists" communicate with each other.
>
> Let's take a step back and ask ourselves how this *FRAUD* began.
>
> Proyect didn't like the "Rethinking Marxism" conference based *ONLY* on
> has reading of the conference schedule. I.e. the TITLES alone of
> presentations led to his condemnation.
>
> This, by itself, is *at best* unsound, unscholarly and uncomradely
> practice.
>
> In a similar way, what are we to make of Jim Craven's comments about
> Judith Butler?
>
> Craven says "I have only read portions" of Butler's writings and "I have
> not read her work fully". Fair enough. Yet, why do you then go on to
> present a "critique"?  Aren't scholars obligated to be less
> impressionistic and more rigorous?
>
> (btw, I think the appropriate response to Craven's post should be: tell us
> what you think *after* you have read her writings).
>
> Of course, Proyect was much worse since he knowingly perpetrated a fraud
> on the readers of a radical publication. Not only was his mind made up
> before the first session, but he was drunk and indifferent to the
> proceedings. This was because he didn't need to be sober or attend since
> the review was -- for all intense and purposes -- written before the
> conference began. The fix was in.
>
> Yet, this slash and burn mentality has become the norm for how many
> "Marxists" communicate with each other. Don't bother reading what others
> write. Don't bother listening to what others say. Don't respond to the
> arguments that are actually put forward -- invent "straw men" instead.
> Then claim that anyone who disagrees with you is a a
> counter-revolutionary agent (or similar libel). [Note the inference about
> Mattick Sr. and Rakesh last week]. This is a mentality which
> says -- win [the argument] at all costs no matter what the price in terms
> of the truth. It is, in brief, the scourge of unprincipled dogmatism. And
> it is a major reason why many leftists who are not Marxists look at
> "Marxists" with contempt.
>
> Jerry