[PEN-L:140] RUSSIAN DISASTERS AND WESTERN COMPLICITY

[Gregory Schwartz <grishas@xxxxxxxx>]

RUSSIAN DISASTERS AND WESTERN COMPLICITY
By Abraham Brumberg

     Ever since Boris Yeltsin took over the reins of government in
Russia in June 1991, Western media, statesmen and Russian experts
have portrayed the new president as the savior of Russia, a man
deeply committed to democratic principles, and defender of human
rights. Above all, he was hailed as a man bold and sagacious enough
to replace the collapsing Soviet economy with a model favored by a
number of Western economists and the IMF, one based on the
monetarist principles of free marketism, nearly total abolition of
price controls, currency devaluation, the loosening of foreign
exchange controls, and rapid privatization (including, apparently,
of airports, hospitals and museums).
     As these lines are written, even the staunchest proponents of
these "economic reforms" have come to recognize that they proved a
fiasco. What will happen, no one can tell. But on thing is clear:
Russia today is a basket case. Hundreds of thousands of workers go
unpaid, destitution is claiming ever larger sectors of Russian
society, public medicine (one of those putative "beneficiaries" of

marketization) is in a state worse than during the last years of
the Soviet regime, a new class of "nouveau riche" has replaced the
old nomenklatura and is living it up on the Riviera and St. Moritz,
domestic production of consumer goods is at a virtual standstill.
For this, Yeltsin is largely to blame--and with Yeltsin, his
Western advisors.
     While the result of the economic devastation brought about by
the so-called 'reforms" are generally acknowledged, the generous
portrait of Yeltsin, though slightly worn around the edges,
persists. It is a curious phenomenon. From early on, Yeltsin's
behavior made it clear that for all his proclaimed "anti-
communism," he remained a typical party apparatchik (which of
course he had been all his life), for whom the modalities of
economic transformation have been secondary to his major concern of
how to maximize his personal power. His penchant for surrounding
himself with old cronies from his years as party secretary in
Sverdlovsk, such as the smarmy Gennadi Burbulis, one-time professor
of "scientific socialism," who kept devising ever new political
strategies for his bss, merited no more attention than yet another
piece of Kremlin gossp. And his uncanny flair for demagogy--e.g at
New York University in 1991, his homage to the "commandments of the
Gospel as the foundation of human morality," a touching religious
sentiment of which there somehow seemed to be no evidence during is
tenure as party functionary--was greeted by the American media with
the solemnity befitting the utterance of a distinguished moral
philosopher.
     The same attitude characterized most Western responses to
Yeltsin's blatant efforts to enhance his personal power--the use of
force to dismantle the parliament (freely and democratically
elected) in October 1993 resulting in about sixty casualties, the
adoption, in a rigged referendum, of a constitution investing the
presidency with immense prerogatives over the legislature, and then
a year later the bloodbath in Chechnya, where tens of thousands of
Chechens were killed and maimed for demanding independence from
Russia, and thousands of Russians, too, lost their lives having
been sent, while still wet around their ears, to do battle with a
seasoned and determined enemy.
     Yeltsin's criminal record in Chechnya, morally
indistinguishable from Sadam Hussein's policies vis-a-vis the Kurds
and his own people, should alone have sufficed for the West to
disown him. Instead, anxious about the fate of their precious
"economic reforms," Western powers continued to prop up the
president, sweeping disagreeable facts under the carpet, and
serving up mendacious arguments to justify themselves.
     Yeltsin's domestic "liberal" votaries contributed to the
deceptions. When I was in Moscow a few years ago, several Russian
friends assured me that had Yeltsin not sent his troops into action
against the parliament, the country would now be languishing under
the yoke of fascists and antisemites--a scenario grounded firmly in
hysteria. What about people like middle-of-the-road reformer
Grigory Yavlinsky? I would inquire. "An arrogant lout," would come

the reply (presumably more so than a beery President given to
lashing out against his critics in unprintable language).
     This then became the justification for supporting Yeltsin to
the hilt--not only because he is a fine choice, but also because
there are no other credible candidates. So self-mesmerizing is this
notion that President Clnton in effect told the Russians in Moscow
that they must back Yeltsin's candidate for prime minister, Viktor
Chernomyrdin, or risk the end of Western economic aid. One can only
wonder how the United States would react if Moscow sent a message
to the US Congress urging it, say, to impeach Clinton.
     Of course, not every Western commentator went along with
conventional wisdom. Some have urged an end to unalloyed approval
of disastrous policies, no more financial aid unless Russia
reinstated temporary price controls, invested in the production of
consumer goods, reasserted control over foreign trade, installed a
soal welfare net, and other measures. But their warnings and advice
went unheeded.
     No one can be so foolhardly as to predict what will happen in
the new few weeks or months. But the West must cease placing all
theblame on the Communists (themselves a motley force) and demand
a true search for alternatives. And that can only start with a
merciless reappraisal of past mistakes.



--
Gregory Schwartz
Department of Political Science
York University
4700 Keele St.
Toronto, Ontario
M3J 1P3
Canada

Tel: (416) 736-5265
Fax: (416) 736-5686
Web: http://www.yorku.ca/dept/polisci