Re: Robert Mugabe

["Patrick Bond" <pbond@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Well since you ask and I bet there are no Pen-Lers in Harare just
yet...

There are no critical bios of Mugabe yet. Key things that
progressives have protested about in recent years are his coverup of
ethnic massacres in Matabeleland during the mid 1980s that left at
least 5,000 civilians dead; his tolerance of official corruption; his
equation of homosexuals to pigs/animals/dogs; his imposition of a
brutal structural adjustment programme in 1990 that is not only not
working but has dramatically reduced living standards and longevity;
his condoning of increasingly unfair elections (with ruling party
thuggery commonplace); his continual amendment of the constitution to
restrict freedoms; his massive wastage of resources on prestige
projects and personal perks; his patronage mode of party-building; and I
would add his mystification of politics through the persistent use of
"socialism" to describe his party's ambitions.

The reported 20,000 angry workers at the May Day rally in Harare
today probably agree that their leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, should
replace Muggers. Probably most of Zimbabwe would. But lots of things
can happen before 2000, the next election. Mugabe has not even hinted
at his replacement. He really seems to resent Mandela for having
nearly already cleared out of his office...

I filed this story for Red Pepper magazine, London, and I understand
it is in the May 1998 issue:

The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its
leader, Robert Mugabe, have never been so
unpopular, writes Patrick Bond. At the early April
gathering of the ZANU Youth League, a respected
air force leader, Josiah Tungimirai, told Mugabe,
"Your excellency, the party is in crisis and only
a fool can say otherwise."

Mugabe's last few weeks have been spent
desperately trying to stop internal hemorrhaging,
as a provincial leader and the speaker of the
Zimbabwe parliament publicly crossed the man who
led ZANU to a military victory over white Rhodesia
in 1980, and who has ruled Zimbabwe since.

Stopping the rot within ZANU has been made harder
by the fury directed by civil society against
government. On 3-4 March, a mass work stoppage was
led by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU), whose leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, claimed
80% success in Zimbabwe's major centres.

This followed three days of violent, disorganised
urban riots in late January, catalysed by a 21%
increase in the price of the food staple, maize.
Army troops were called out to safeguard the
poshest streets of Harare and impose order in the
city's bleak "high-density suburbs" (apartheid-
style black townships).

Late last year the unions burst onto the national
political scene with several large protests and a
successful anti-government stayaway -- coordinated
with the help of large firms -- on "Red Tuesday,"
9 December. Peaceful demonstrators were teargassed
and the popular, left-leaning Tsvangirai was
beaten by ZANU-supporting thugs at his office the
next day.

There have been sporadic "IMF riots" in Harare
since 1993, but the recent wave signifies
something more profound, a growing and
unprecedented sentiment that after two decades in
power, ZANU must be voted down in the next (2000)
general election.

Yet it is impossible to count out Mugabe, a
survivor of byzantine 1970s intra-party conflict
and master of divide-and-conquer post-Independence
politics. Last October, for example after
embarrassing downtown protests, ZANU's Liberation
War veterans were rewarded a large once-off grant
and healthy monthly pension, though this was a
budget buster and launched a major investor panic.
And vociferous demands are made repeatedly by a
small, pro-ZANU "indigenous business" lobby still
often shut out of white-controlled markets and
financial institutions. The war vets, a faction of
the petty-bourgeoisie who have access to state
patronage, and a relatively isolated peasantry are
the only solid political support Mugabe can muster
at present.

On the other side of the class divide,
unprecedented militancy thrives within organised
labour, both in the public sector (where in mid-
1996, 160,000 employees walked out and a general
strike was contemplated) and around private sector
wage struggles (in mid-1997, 100,000 workers were
involved in strike action, even extending to
poorly-organised agricultural plantations).
Autonomous, shopfloor-based actions outran the
ability of national union bureaucrats to control
or direct the membership, and the corporatist
strategy mistakenly pursued during the mid-1990s
by the ZCTU quickly became irrelevant.

Minutes of the ZCTU's most recent general council,
on 30 January, were circulated in Harare as
evidence that a new political party may be in the
offing, something Tsvangirai explicitly denies.
According to the minutes, "Workers' issues have
become community issues. As much as linkages and
networking with other civic groups is important,
we should be able to control and direct social
movement to maintain direction. We should be able
to put things on course in case of deviation so as
to maintain legitimacy."

"Deviation" referred to January's urban rioting,
from which the ZCTU distanced itself, which left
nine people dead and damages worth several million
pounds.

More generally, popular alienation from government
has intensified, with civil service corruption
repeatedly unveiled, officials continuing to rig
tenders (e.g., construction of a new Harare
airport), the rise of shady and incongruous
international investment partnerships (especially
with Malaysian firms), and political elites
succumbing to conspicuous consumption (e.g.,
Mugabe's extravagant wedding and honeymoon during
the first civil service strike) though not without
the danger of socio-cultural delegitimisation
(e.g., of former president Canaan Banana, accused
last year of serial sodomy and rape).

Occasional but vicious police clampdowns have not,
so far, deterred public dissent. The opposition
press continues to harangue government. The early
1980s Matabeleland atrocities were constructively
publicised by human rights groups. And there are
inklings of electoral challenges in the emergence
of independent (mainly petty-bourgeois) candidates
and in a widely-supported human-rights campaign to
amend the country's constitution, which Tsvangirai
chairs.

Frustration must be prevalent amongst Zimbabwean
political rulers over their mismanagement of both
state capitalism (1980s) and neo-liberalism
(1990s). One short-term gut reaction was a return
to dirigiste methods, including a land grab of
1,500 large farms controlled mainly by whites. In
December, the agriculture minister, Kumbirai
Kangai, confirmed British aid minister Clare
Short's prediction that the beneficiaries would
include wealthy black elites, not landstarved
peasants.

After an embarrassing exchange of letters in which
Short invoked her Irish ancestry by way of denying
the current British government's obligation to
reimburse Zimbabwe for land reform -- as had been
promised during the Thatcher years -- further
pressure was applied by junior Foreign Office
Minister Tony Lloyd in January. Then the World
Bank, International Monetary Fund and European
Union all announced they would withhold
desperately needed loans and aid until Mugabe
signed a pledge not to increase budgetary
resources for the land exercise, which effectively
killed plans for this year's redistribution.

Zimbabweans continue questioning the character of
the government's land strategy. Dr Rudo Gaidzanwa,
a University of Zimbabwe sociologist, insists that
"The land policy is biased against Black women."
On the other hand, says Dr Sam Moyo, a progressive
geographer, "I want to suggest that despite the
fumbling in policy making, the outcome will be
desirable... There will be no economic loss to the
country, because large commercial farmers retained
their land."

White farmers are, however, embarking on a capital
strike. Agriculture-sector uncertainty has already
exacerbated an economic catastrophe that late last
year included a spectacular crash of the currency
(55% for the year as a whole, but 75% in a few
hours on "Black Friday" -- 14 November --
requiring a temporary central bank bail-out);
dramatic increases in interest rates (6% within
one month, to levels approaching 40% for many
business loans); a plummeting stock market (down
46% by the end of the year from peak August 1997
levels, though subsequently up slightly); renewed
inflation (from 20% during 1997 to 24% in January
with 30% predicted by mid-year), especially for
food; and unprecedented fiscal stress.

The medium term may see Mugabe digging in,
surviving the current economic chaos through an
emergency price freeze on maize, dramatic cuts in
state social spending, the introduction of Value
Added Tax (largely to squeeze an extra 5% or so of
the income of rural consumers who avoid the
general sales tax), as well as panicky, larger-
scale privatizations.

But such actions will create reactions that Mugabe
may not find easy to control, for confidence is
growing inexorably within the populace. Systematic
organisational development -- either progressive,
mass-based and probably still rooted in civil
society, or, given the present balance of forces,
the more likely prospect of a centrist, Zambia-
style coalition aiming to implement full-fledged
neoliberalism in the name of good governance --
cannot be far behind.