Re: ripening contradictions?

["William S. Lear" <rael@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Wed, November 12, 1997 at 10:04:19 (-0500) Doug Henwood writes:
>Today's Financial Times has a think piece by reporters Bruce Clark and
>Nancy Dunne reflecting on the failure of fast track. As they say, this
>setback to the free traders' agenda "coincides with the appearance of three
>other dark clouds...on the global horizon": the collapse of Asian
>currencies and stock markets, international reluctance ot go along with
>Washington's policy of "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq, and the
>inevitably acrimonious Kyoto global warming conference.
>
>The authors don't draw this conclusion, but those three clouds, plus the
>fourth, the fast-track defeat, look like the ripening contradictions of the
>hypercapitalism of the last 20 years.

Let me play a half-serious Doubting Thomas to some very good
observations by Doug.

First, I'm very leery of "ripening contradictions", as I remember
hearing about those continually for the past umpteen years, and
somehow, capitalism always seems to right itself.  Fast track was not
a defeat for capitalism itself, it was more like a mild rebuke to a
particular coalition of the capitalist class.

>                                      If the Asian "miracle" is over, then
>the export model is in need of a serious rethink;

That's a big "if", which if it nevertheless comes to pass, might be
replaced by yet another "miracle", or even dispensed with altogether.
Capital's ability to exploit won't be deterred by minor setbacks, it
will take major divisions within the capitalist class (which actually
may be set in motion by the end of "miracles").

Also, as you have pointed out, hasn't the real level of
"globalization" been relatively constant over the past 20 years?  Or
is this something entirely different?  What fraction of our GNP
is directed toward Asia?  What are the fractions of capital flows (if
this is even the right question)?  What, in real terms, would we (the
capos) lose should Asia really go down the tubes?

>                                                  if the U.S. can't get its
>allies to sign onto a bombing run over Baghdad or the continued isolation
>of Iran, then the New World Order of 1991 seems a lot more disorderly;

The New World Order was built on pretty much the same international
opinion.  The U.S. essentially bribed and threatened the rest of the
world to go along with us in 1991, and the other G7 countries (except
for our loyal puppy, Great Britain) basically washed their hands of
things.  We've been outvoted 150-2 in the UN for at least 20 years on
issues like this, and it hasn't seemed to hamper us too much.

>                                                                       and
>if some approach to greenhouse gas reduction can't be crafted, then life
>itself is in danger.

This is the one which has me the most worried, because I think the
problem will continue to grow, and that it could mean an immense
crisis, particularly in the US, based so heavily as it is on
automobile transportation.  On the other hand, new technologies have a
way of appearing when they are needed most.  There has been little
real effort on the part of the capos to address this.  Given their
immense resources (real human beings under their control, immense sums
of cash), I can envision even this problem being solved, and hell,
even a profit turned on it.

>                     That, plus a growing political backlash against free
>trade and capital mobility, all suggest some major political quake is
>underway. Don't know what it all means yet, but something's happening.

The real question is, Where is this backlash located?  Sure, the
population is not fooled, and has rarely been, about for whom the
political system (or economic system) works.  But, to the extent that
this opinion is outside of the functioning political system, and that
the "golden rule" applies here, we need to look at the elite
coalitions and how they might be fracturing over this.  That is not to
say, of course, that the usual rules of the Left don't apply
(organize, teach, think, etc.) and that we should sit on our thumbs.
But, if we really are talking about a "political quake", that is,
something which is likely to shift the political system itself, then
I'd say, at least in the short run, we'll have to keep a very sharp
eye out on the various capo coalitions.  Tom Ferguson's work here is
unparalleled and I think it would very nicely compliment much sensible
Marx-inspired work on class discontents, etc.

Finally, I recognize the glee one might feel in seeing the system
creak and groan---I share it, too.  But I think we also ought to ask
ourselves what will happen when it comes to a crashing halt, or if it
significantly breaks down.  Particularly in the U.S., I fear that
nothing like a "popular" revolution will take place.  The level of
religious fundamentalism in this country is immense, and increasing,
fanned by the entire spectrum of responsible opinion and money.  We
are, in Chomsky's words, "a dissolved society", and should something
momentous come to pass in the workings of the machine, we will all be
in deep trouble.


Bill