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[PEN-L:11431] methodology
- Subject: [PEN-L:11431] methodology
- From: James Devine <jdevine@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 24 Jul 1997 08:47:06 -0700 (PDT)
Ken Hanly writes:> I agree with Jim that induction and deduction can be
complementary in that induction or abduction could be used to generate
hypotheses that can then be tested through deduction of what must be true
if the hypotheses are correct. While the hypothetico-deductive method no
doubt stresses the deductive aspect overmuch and relied too much on
problematic positivist ideas of verification (or falsification with Popper)
it still strikes me as far superior to the model of Lakatos who along with
Kuhn seem to me to be vastly over-rated philosophers of science. While
Kuhn's description of historical paradigm shifts is interesting enough his
epistemological relativism in which he holds ... that there is no body of
neutral judgments to test hypotheses (since all observation is said to be
theory laden - including this observation of Kuhn?) is just plain goofiness
on stilts no matter how popular it may be. Although Lakatos' points out
real problems in Popper's falsificationist view, Popper is by far the more
original thinker.<
I agree with Ken's rejection of Kuhn, but since when is being a "more
original thinker" a key criterion in methodological discussions? (It smacks
of appeal to authority, a logical fallacy.)
Lakatos, to my mind, makes Popper much clearer, getting us far away from
"naive falsificationism" that sees any proposition that isn't falsifiable
as totally bogus. (This is an especial problem since falsificationism
isn't falsifiable.) In every "scientific research program," there's a "hard
core" of propositions that can't be falsified.
And getting beyond Lakatos, this implies that ideology can play an
important role, even in the "hard sciences."
in pen-l solidarity,
Jim Devine jdevine@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ.
7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90045-8410 USA
310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950
"As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain; as far as they are certain, they really do not refer to
reality." -- Albert Einstein.
- Thread context:
- [PEN-L:11435] Mathematics and Formalism,
James Michael Craven Thu 24 Jul 1997, 18:54 GMT
- [PEN-L:11434] FW: BLS Daily Report,
Richardson_D Thu 24 Jul 1997, 18:10 GMT
- [PEN-L:11433] Re: Intuition in Math Reasoning: Keynes & JM Clark,
Laurence Shute Thu 24 Jul 1997, 16:38 GMT
- [PEN-L:11432] opposing the "isms",
James Devine Thu 24 Jul 1997, 15:47 GMT
- [PEN-L:11431] methodology,
James Devine Thu 24 Jul 1997, 15:47 GMT
- [PEN-L:11430] Re: ReTemporary Removal From List,
Michael Perelman Thu 24 Jul 1997, 15:25 GMT
- [PEN-L:11429] ReTemporary Removal From List,
A. S. Fatemi Thu 24 Jul 1997, 13:53 GMT
- [PEN-L:11428] Re: Class and Oppression,
James Michael Craven Thu 24 Jul 1997, 04:55 GMT
- [PEN-L:11427] Re: Objections to Social Security ...,
Michael Eisenscher Thu 24 Jul 1997, 04:33 GMT
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