[PEN-L:11164] The definite report on U.S. aircraft over Cuba -- forwarded

[VORST4@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

The following was received from the Canadian organisation Science for
Peace.

      Jesse Vorst, Society for Socialist Studies, Winnipeg, Canada


For information contact lorch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Lee Lorch)
                        or Roberto Yepe <cubaseccion@xxxxxxxxxxx>


Subject: Technical Considerations on US biological aggression against Cuba

Cuba has issued a report with technical considerations that further sustain
charges that a US plane overflying the island's territory, was indeed
responsible for the spread of the Thrips Palmi Plague. The report was
published in Granma on July 1st, 1997. It follows in its entirety:

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE U.S. DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENTS ON THE ACTIONS
CARRIED OUT BY THE U.S. S2R AIRCRAFT WHILE FLYING OVER CUBAN NATIONAL
TERRITORY ON OCTOBER 21st, 1996.

On May 5th this year, the U.N. Secretary General distributed as a U.N.
General Assembly official document (A/52/128, dated 4/29/1997) a Report on
the appearance in Cuba of the Thrips Palmi plague.

The above report makes a thorough description of the facts of the overflight
along the "Giron" corridor, within Cuban territory, by the S2R aircraft,
with registration No. N3093M of the U.S. Civil Aircraft Registry operated
by the U.S. State Department.

The findings of the research, just as concluded by the above mentioned
report, permit to sustain with a high degree of certainty, that the
appearance of the Thrips Palmi in Cuba is related to the spewing of unknown
substances over the national territory by the afore- mentioned U.S. aircraft.

On May 6, the U.S. State Department made statements on the Report presented
by Cuba. In those statements, trying to justify the spraying of substances
over Cuba, it was expressed that the pilot followed prudential air safety
measure to mark his location with smoke and that all small aircraft of this
kind used by the United States are equipped with smoke-generating systems.
It was also stated
that during long flights, the sprinkling system are not operational because
the tanks normally used for the pesticides are used in the case to store the
fuel necessary for the journey.

Such arguments prove thoughtless and unprofessional, as unquestionably
evidenced by the following technical considerations:

Questions relating to the use of the smoke generator as an air traffic
procedure.

- The norms and regulations of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) do no make any reference whatsoever to any regulation
establishing the use of smoke generators to signal the position of flying
aircraft and it is not a known practice.

- The aircraft was flying under an IFR (Instrumental Flight Rules) flight
plan, where the responsibility for the mutual separation of aircraft during
the flight is assumed by the Air Traffic Controller leading them, and not by
the pilots, as the U.S. smoke generator version argues.

- It is absurd for the pilot to have been unsettled to such an extent by
the approach of a Cubana de Aviacion aircraft that he decided to activate
the alleged smoke generator without ever reporting this to the Air Traffic
Controller who was leading him and who was responsible for his separation,
which certainly is a set procedure.

- Also significant is the fact that the approach made him turn on the
alleged smoke generator and there was no related report from the aircraft
captain on arriving at his destination airport, which also certainly is a
set procedure.

- Nor did the pilot report in-flight that he had any technical problem on
board.

Cuba has the radio recordings between the aircraft and the air traffic
controller.

 On the use of the smoke generator.

- In the consulted official publications (Jane's All the World's Aircraft
1992-1993, Aviation Week & Space Technology of 3/16/92), the smoke generator
does not appear as S2R-T65 aircraft standard equipment.

- Small, mid-size, and large commercial aircraft, as well as crop duster
planes manufactured and operated all over the world, are not equipped with
the smoke generator and it is not required by ICAO.

- The only ordinary practice is the installation of smoke generators in
aerobatic aircraft in exhibition flights and other related activities.

On the use of the herbicide tank for carrying fuel.

It is known that this kind of aircraft, as well as other similar ones, can
use the tank normally used for carrying herbicides or other elements, as
fuel tank during long flights. In the case of the N3093M flight on October
21, 1996, there are elements that show the non-use of the herbicide tank to
carry fuel. These can be summarized as follows:

- The flight request submitted to the relevant Cuban authorities says that
it is a ferry flight, which, according to the aeronautical phraseology,
means that this aircraft was carrying no load or, which is the same, the
herbicide tank was empty, since it is the only compartment where this
aircraft carries cargo.

- This aircraft has a usable capacity of 228 gallons (863 liters) in its
fuel tanks, which allows it to fly for approximately 6:30 hours, covering
an approximate distance of 1,300 km, depending on the wind's direction and
strength. That day, according to the forecast, the wind was favorable to the
flight.

>From its takeoff to the moment it left the Havana FIR through the Atuvi
checkpoint, the aircraft flew 5:15, with 15 minutes to go from Atuvi to
Grand Cayman and totalled 5:30 hours for 1,100 km (600 nautical miles).

>From the above data one can figure out that the aircraft could fly as
planned from Cocoa Beach to Grand Cayman on the fuel in its main tanks,
without using the herbicide deposit as fuel tank.

- Even if it is accepted that the herbicide deposit was used as fuel tank,
it would be absurd to accept that it was filled to the top. This deposit has
an approximate capacity of 1,900 liters (500 gallons), a volume almost
twice greater than that of the aircraft's fuel tanks.

To have filled this tank with fuel not necessary for the flight would have
entailed additional weight with the resulting increase of fuel consumption.

If despite all this logical reasoning, it was decided to fill the herbicide
deposit with fuel for this flight, it is doubtful that it was filled with
more than 100 gallons. Technically, it is possible to prepare that deposit
to fill part of it with fuel and the rest with some other substance or element,
thus ensuring the initial consumption of fuel, and then the use of the
substance or element to be sprayed or dusted.

The above technical considerations we have brought forward show how
frivolous the U.S. State Department's statements have been. All of this
goes to show that the U.S. government does not have other elements that
justify the spewing of unknown substances over the Cuban territory.

Cuba reiterates once again its concern for the use of this authorized U.S.
aircarft's overflight of Cuban territory for activities that run counter to
and violate, inter alia, the provisions of the Convention on Biological
Weapons and the Chicago Convention and the annexed documents for the purpose
of causing damage to Cuban agriculture and the population

Cuba denounces biological aggression from the United States

Text of the Cuban report given to the UN secretary-general on the
appearence in our country of the `Trips palmi plague'

I. DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

On 21 October 1996, at 10:08 hours, crew members of scheduled flight CU-170
of Cubana de Aviacion (Cubana Airlines), on board a Fokker-27 aircraft,
flying the Havana-Las Tunas route, upon crossing the Giron air corridor in
the western region of Cuba, noticed a single-engine airplane flying from
north to south, at about 1000 feet (300 meters) above them, apparently
spraying or sprinkling unknown substances - some seven times - in an
intermittent manner.
At that very moment, the Cubana de Aviacion Fokker aircraft was located 25
to 30 kilometers south of Varadero, in Matanzas province, flying at an
altitude of 9000 feet and at a speed of 400 kilometers per hour. According
to scheduled flights, objective radar control and recordings of radio
conversations between the airplanes and ground control when the development
took place, the
airplane flying over the Giron corridor from north to south in a course
perpendicular to the Cubana de Aviacion flight was fumigation aircraft Model
S2R, register N3093M, of the civilian aircraft registry of the United States
of America, operated by the State Department of that country, as stated in
the flight authorization requested to the Institute of Civil Aeronautics of
Cuba, and in accordance with the United States public registry of civilian
aircraft. The above-mentioned airplane had taken off from Patrick United
States Air Force Base, in Cocoa Beach in the state of Florida, bound for
Grand Cayman.
The Cubana pilot immediately reported to flight control on the release of
unknown substances, in the form of a white or grayish mist, by the S2R
airplane. The Cuban air controller established communication with the United
States aircraft and asked whether it was having any technical problem, to
which the pilot's answer was "No". He was also asked about the type of
aircraft he was
flying, answering that it was a single-engine AY-65. That conversation is
recorded on tape.

On 18 December 1996, the first signs of the presence of a Thrips plague
appeared in Matanzas province, at potato plantations of the Diamand variety,
sowed 38 days before on the Lenin State Horticultural Farm, in Jovellanos
municipality. Samples of these organisms were sent to the Central Quarantine
Laboratory of the National Pest Control Center.
On 26 December 1996, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a note
of complaint to the United States Interest Section in Havana regarding the
incident that had occurred in the Giron corridor, urging the United States
party to take appropriate measures aimed at the clarification of the event.
On 12 February 1997, the United States Interest Section in Havana handed
over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba a reply to that note stating
that on the day of the incident, the United States pilot had, during his
flight, seen a Cuban commercial airplane flying below, and as he was not
certain of having been seen, "following caution and safety procedures, and
with the purpose of
securing a positive visual contact, the pilot used the `smoke generator' of
his aircraft, in order to indicate its location" adding that "the smoke
vanished and no fluid was poured from the airplane."
On 14 February 1997, the Central Quarantine Laboratory confirmed that the
insect examined was the Thrips palmi karav, exotic to Cuban territory until
that moment.
The Thrips palmi is indigenous to Asia. Since 1985 it has scattered across
certain Caribbean zones, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and
Jamaica. It is a polyphagous phytophagan that infects practically all crops,
weeds and ornamental plants. It is reported to be a vector of viruses such
as that known as TSWV. It is an insect of difficult diagnosis, unknown to
the majority of Cuban specialists. It is self-propagated within a field, and
into neighboring ones, disseminating mostly when seedlings, fruits and
vegetable material, including topsoil, are moved from one place to another.
It also scatters by aerial means, particularly its larvae. It is resistant
to temperature changes. Its reproductive cycle lasts between 15 and 21 days,
depending on the host plant.
Taking into account the levels of highest density of the insect population,
it could be ascertained that the primary source of the outbreak was located
on the above-mentioned Lenin State Horticultural Farm. Smaller outbreaks
were pinpointed in fields close to the villages of Maximo Gomez and
Bolondron, also in Matanzas province, a few kilometers away from the main
source.
In the first half of January 1997, outbreaks of the same insect were spotted
in municipalities south of Havana province, bordering Matanzas, affecting
corn, beans, squash, cucumbers and other crops.
Once the insect was identified, the government of Cuba adopted a program of
emergency measures to fight it, including chemical control, through the
purchase of pesticides, which, in spite of their high cost, have not
achieved effective results.
At the end of March 1997, the government of Cuba, complying with
international regulations, informed the United Nations secretary-general and
the Center for Disarmament about the presence of Thrips palmi karav in its
territory, and notified this finding to the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) to which Cuba applied for technical and
financial assistance to fight the pest.
At present, Thrips palmi has spread virtually throughout Matanzas and Havana
provinces, in two municipalities of Cienfuegos province, in some
municipalities of Pinar del Rio province and in the Isle of Youth. Its
presence has not been detected in the central and eastern provinces of the
country.

II. RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATIONS

The S2R aircraft, register N3093M, is used by the State Department of the
United States in the struggle against drug trafficking, to destroy crops.
The aircraft utilizes two sprinkling systems: one for the use of aerosols
and liquid particles and another for dropping solid particles. No smoke
generator is known to be installed aboard this aircraft.
The specialists appointed by the Cuban party to clarify the event considered
unlikely a voluntary or involuntary leakage of fuel or oil, which is
confirmed by the answer given by the United States airplane pilot himself to
the Cuban air controller.
The argument used by the United States party in its note of reply regarding
the smoke release, appears, from the technical point of view, weak and in
contradiction with the conversation held during the flight. On the other
hand, it is not a standard procedure established for this kind of situation.
The pilot of the Cubana de Aviacion Fokker asserts on the basis of his
visual observation
and his previous experience as a pilot of fumigation airplanes, that the
release made by the United States aircraft was not of smoke but of a substance.
Bearing in mind the place where the unknown substance was released, it can
be established that the area with the greatest risk of infection is a zone
covering 15 to 20 kilometers to the west and 20 to 25 kilometers to the east
of the Giron air corridor, although the whole territory of Matanzas province
is considered a probable infected zone. These zones match those actually
infected both by the primary and secondary outbreaks.
Considering the insect population found on 18 December 1996, at the main
source of the outbreak, specialists of the Cuban National Pest Control
Center estimated the beginning of the plague to date back to three or four
previous generations. Bearing in mind the reproductive cycle of this insect,
the beginning of the infection can be ascertained as approximately 21
October 1996, which was
precisely the date when the United States S2R aircraft flew over this point.
Mindful of the distribution of the agent in countries like Haiti, the
Dominican Republic and Jamaica, it would be expected that any natural
occurrence would be in the eastern region of Cuba, the closest to those
countries. Its appearance more than 600 kilometers away from that region is,
therefore, odd and suspicious.
Although at first sight it could be expected that the flight altitude of the
S2R aircraft is not the most appropriate for the dissemination of biological
agents, information is available regarding experiments made by U.S. citizens
themselves in which that type of agent was dropped from even higher
altitudes. On the other hand, the enduring features of the insect, mainly in
its larva state, make its survival possible at these altitudes. Because it
is a polyphagous phytophagan that strikes and severely damages practically
every crop, and that it is also resistant to a considerable variety of
pesticides, the Thrips palmi can be considered as an ideal biological agent
which is able to inflict heavy damage on agricultural food crops. In a
document entitled "Report of the Subgroup for
Investigation of Claims of Use or Escape of Agents which Constitute
Biological or Toxin Weapons", of 29 February 1996, prepared by the
Federation of American Scientists, Thrips palmi is included among the
invertebrates that could come within the purview of the Convention on
Biological Weapons.
In this particular case, the behavior of the plague in Cuba shows a
polyphagia bigger than the one described in scientific literature.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the facts and the results of the investigations allow us to
relate, with a high degree of accuracy, the appearance of Thrips palmi in
Matanzas province with the dropping, on 21 October 1996, of an unknown
substance by an aircraft operated by the United States State Department.
There is reliable evidence that Cuba has once again been the target of
biological aggression.