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[PEN-L:4721] NEW PUBLIC ECONOMICS ABSTRACTING JOURNAL - Working Paper Series
- Subject: [PEN-L:4721] NEW PUBLIC ECONOMICS ABSTRACTING JOURNAL - Working Paper Series
- From: Wayne Marr <Wayne_Marr@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 18 Jun 1996 09:53:13 -0700 (PDT)
Colleagues -- If you have any comments -- good or bad --
please contact Michael_Jensen@xxxxxxxx, Martin_Feldstein
@SSRN.Com or me. ;-) Enjoy. Wayne
____________________________________________________________
P U B L I C E C O N O M I C S A B S T R A C T S
Working Paper Series
Volume 1 Number 1: June 18, 1996
Publisher: The Economics Research Network (ERN)
a division of
Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc.,
(SSEP, Inc.) and Social Science Research
Network (SSRN)
Copyright: SSEP, Inc. 1996. All rights reserved.
YOU MAY REDISTRIBUTE THIS JOURNAL
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T A B L E of C O N T E N T S
____________________________________________________________
"Social Security Privatization: A Structure For Analysis"
OLIVIA S. MITCHELL University of Pennsylvania and
NBER
STEPHEN P. ZELDES University of Pennsylvania and
NBER
"Private Income Transfers and Market Incentives"
RALPH CHAMI University of Notre Dame
"Internationally Mobile Firms and Tax Policy"
GUTTORM SCHJELDERUP Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Admin.
KARE P. HAGEN Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Admin.
PETTER OSMUNDSEN Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Admin.
"Post-War British Economic Growth and the Legacy of Keynes"
THOMAS F. COOLEY University of Rochester
LEE E. OHANIAN University of Pennsylvania
"Social Insurance, Incentives and Risk Taking"
HANS-WERNER SINN University of Munich
"Reflections on Ricardian Equivalence"
ROBERT J. BARRO Harvard University and NBER
____________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________
W O R K I N G Paper Abstracts
"Social Security Privatization: A Structure For Analysis"
BY: OLIVIA S. MITCHELL
University of Pennsylvania and NBER
STEPHEN P. ZELDES
University of Pennsylvania and NBER
Paper ID: NBER Working Paper 5512
Date: March 1996
Contact: Olivia S. Mitchell
E-Mail: mitchelo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Postal: Department of Insurance & Risk Management,
3641 Locust Walk, #304, The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
19104-6218
Phone: Not Available
Fax: Not Available
ERN Ref: PUBLIC:WPS96-101
PAPER REQUESTS: NBER Working Papers can be ordered by
e-mail at orders@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, by telephone (617-
868-3900), or by fax (617-868-2742). Written requests
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The NBER Working Papers are available at $5.00 a copy
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continental U.S.). Full or partial subscriptions for
the Working Papers Series are also available. For more
information contact subs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx or
Subscriptions at the above address. NBER Working Papers
are available to corporate contributors free of charge.
This paper identifies the key economic issues that must be
addressed in the debate over a privatized social security
system. We examine a two-pillar plan. The first pillar would
consist of a demogrant: a small indexed pension of the same
dollar amount for all retirees who had contributed to the
system over a full lifetime of work. The second pillar would
consist of a fully-funded individual defined-contribution
account, financed by payroll taxes, held in financial
institutions, and directed by participants. We explore how
such a system would affect the risks households face, how it
would alter the distribution of income, and how it might
influence household behavior, including incentives to work
and save, and portfolio choices. We also examine
macroeconomic issues: how the transition to a private plan
would occur, and what the likely effects would be on national
saving. We conclude that a two-pillar system offers several
positive features, namely a reduction in political risk, an
increase in household portfolio choice, and improved work
incentives. Disadvantages include less redistributiveness and
national risk sharing, and increased administrative costs.
JEL Classification: H55, L33
__________________
"Private Income Transfers and Market Incentives"
BY: RALPH CHAMI
University of Notre Dame
Date: April 1996
Contact: Ralph Chami
E-Mail: relchami@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Postal: Department of Finance and Business Economics,
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN
46556
Phone: (219) 631-8672
Fax: (219) 631-5255
ERN Ref: PUBLIC:WPS96-102
This paper introduces labor supply considerations and labor
earnings uncertainty into a parent-child framework in the
presence of "merit goods". I investigate the implications of
various parental bequest rules on the effort decisions of the
offspring, where the parent cannot perfectly observe her
child's market activities. The asymmetry in information and
preferences gives rise to a moral hazard problem, and as a
result, the parent may not fully insure her child because the
source of risk is not entirely exogenous. However, the
child's effort is higher in the case with a merit good and
parental transfers than in the case without a merit good. On
the other hand, certain empirically observed bequest rules
provide disincentives for high effort, even in the presence
of a merit good. As a result, proper incentives together with
a merit good are needed. Finally, the model raises
interesting issues regarding wealth mobility and public
policy.
JEL Classification: D1, D64, D82
__________________
"Internationally Mobile Firms and Tax Policy"
BY: GUTTORM SCHJELDERUP
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Admin.
KARE P. HAGEN
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Admin.
PETTER OSMUNDSEN
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Admin.
Paper ID: CES Working Paper No. 96
Date: November 1995
Contact: Guttorm Schjelderup
E-Mail: guttorm.schjelderup@xxxxxx
Postal: Institute of Economics, Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration,
Helleveien 30, 5035 Bergen-Sandviken, Norway
Phone: 47-55-959238
Fax: 47-55-959543
ERN Ref: PUBLIC:WPS96-103
This paper attempts to analyze how the government from a
social point of view should handle firms that demand
preferential tax treatment on grounds of being
internationally mobile. A revelation mechanism is constructed
taking into account that migration decisions by firms have
negative fiscal effects and also affect national industrial
clusters. Some important and seemingly counter intuitive
results are: (1) Information rent is acquired by immobile
(inefficient) firms; (2) The optimal allocation is
implementable within the framework of a corporate income tax
system, where mobile firms will self-select more unfavorable
depreciation allowances as compared to immobile firms; and
(3) In relative terms, the immobile sector will expand at the
expense of the mobile sector.
JEL Classification: H25, F22
__________________
"Post-War British Economic Growth and the Legacy of Keynes"
BY: THOMAS F. COOLEY
University of Rochester
LEE E. OHANIAN
University of Pennsylvania
Paper ID: Simon School Working Paper MP 95-04
Date: Undated
Contact: Thomas F. Cooley
E-Mail: Cooleyto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Postal: W.E. Simon Graduate School of Business,
University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627
Phone: (716) 275-8380
Fax: Not Available
ERN Ref: PUBLIC:WPS96-104
PAPER REQUESTS: Contact the Office of Public
Affairs/Working Papers Office, William E. Simon
Graduate School of Business Administration, University
of Rochester, 20352 Carol G. Simon Hall, Rochester, NY
14627. Phone: (716) 275-8378. Fax: (716) 275-9331.
E-Mail: McWilliams@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
The policies used by Britain to finance World War II
represented a dramatic departure from the policies used to
finance earlier wars and were very different from the
policies used by the United States. Britain relied much more
heavily on the taxation of factor incomes. In this paper we
describe the magnitude of the public finance problem faced by
Britain and examine the origins of the fiscal policies that
were adopted. We analyze these policies using the perspective
of an endogenous growth model. We use the model to contrast
the policies actually used with tax smoothing policies and
the policies advocated by John Maynard Keynes.
JEL Classification: H56, N44
__________________
"Social Insurance, Incentives and Risk Taking"
BY: HANS-WERNER SINN
University of Munich
Paper ID: CES Working Paper No. 102
Date: January 1996
Contact: Hans-Werner Sinn
E-Mail: office@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Postal: CES, University of Munich, Schackstrasse 4,
80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: ++49-89-2180-2748
Fax: ++49-89-397303
ERN Ref: PUBLIC:WPS96-105
From the perspective of parents, redistributive taxation can
be seen as social insurance for their children, for which no
private alternative exists. Because private insurance comes
too late during a person's life, it cannot cover the same
risks as social insurance. Empirically, 85% of social
insurance covers risks for which no private insurance would
have been available. Redistributive taxation can be
efficiency enhancing, because it creates safety and because
it stimulates income generating risk taking. However, it
also brings about detrimental moral hazard effects. Both the
enhancement of risk taking and the moral hazard effects tend
to increase the inequality in the economy, and, under
constant returns to risk taking, this increase is likely to
be strong enough even to make the net-of-tax income
distribution more unequal. Optimal redistributive taxation
will either imply that the pie becomes bigger when there is
less inequality in pre-tax incomes or that more
redistribution creates more post-tax inequality. The welfare
state will encounter severe risks when free migration of
people, goods, and factors of production becomes possible.
Basing redistributive taxation on a nationality principle may
help overcome some of these risks.
JEL Classification: H2
__________________
"Reflections on Ricardian Equivalence"
BY: ROBERT J. BARRO
Harvard University and NBER
Paper ID: NBER Working Paper 5502
Date: March 1996
Contact: Robert J. Barro
E-Mail: barro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Postal: Department of Economics, Littauer Center 120,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138
Phone: Not Available
Fax: Not Available
ERN Ref: PUBLIC:WPS96-106
PAPER REQUESTS: NBER Working Papers can be ordered by
e-mail at orders@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, by telephone (617-
868-3900), or by fax (617-868-2742). Written requests
for working papers can be made to Working Papers, NBER,
1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138.
The NBER Working Papers are available at $5.00 a copy
(plus $10.00 per order for all locations outside the
continental U.S.). Full or partial subscriptions for
the Working Papers Series are also available. For more
information contact subs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx or
Subscriptions at the above address. NBER Working Papers
are available to corporate contributors free of charge.
The Ricardian equivalence proposition for public debt in my
1974 JPE paper is related to the discussions in Ricardo's
Funding System, Smith's Wealth of Nations, and a number of
treatments in macroeconomics from the 1950s to the 1970s.
Useful extensions of the basic invariance proposition involve
tax smoothing (in the context of distorting taxation) and the
determinants of the maturity and other characteristics of the
debt structure (in an environment of uncertainty).
JEL Classification: H63, H2
____________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________
A D V I S O R Y B O A R D
PUBLIC ECONOMICS ABSTRACTS
A. B. ATKINSON
Warden, Nuffield College, Oxford; Editor, Journal of
Public Economics.
ALAN AUERBACH
Robert D. Burch Prof. of Economics and Law and Director,
Burch Center for Tax Policy and Public Finance, U. of
California, Berkeley.
PETER DIAMOND
Paul A. Samuelson Prof. of Economics, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
MARTIN FELDSTEIN
George F. Baker Prof. of Economics, Harvard U; President,
NBER.
DON FULLERTON
Addison Baker Duncan Centennial Prof. of Economics,
U. of Texas at Austin.
ROGER GORDON
Prof. of Economics, U. of Michigan; Co-Editor, Journal
of Public Economics.
MARK H.MOORE
Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Prof. of Criminal Justice
Policy and Management, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard U.
JAMES POTERBA
Mitsui Prof. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; Program Director in Public Economics, NBER;
Co-Editor, Journal of Public Economics.
HARVEY S. ROSEN
John L. Weinberg Prof. of Economics and Business
Policy and Co-Director of the Center for Economic Policy
Studies at Princeton U.
JOHN SHOVEN
Dean of Humanities and Sciences and Charles R. Schwab Prof.
of Economics, Stanford U.
HANS-WERNER SINN
Prof. of Economics and Public Finance, Director of CES,
U. of Munich. Editor, Economic Policy, Finanzarchiv,
Beitr=E4ge zur Finanzwissenschaft.
JOEL SLEMROD
Paul W. McCracken Collegiate Prof. of Business Economics
and Public Policy and Director of the Office of Tax Policy
Research, U. of Michigan. Editor, National Tax Journal.
JOHN WHALLEY
Prof. of Economics, and Director, Centre for the Study of
International Economic Relations, U. of Western Ontario,
Canada; and Prof. of International and Development
Economics, and Director, Development and International
Economic Research Centre, U. of Warwick, England.
MARK WOLFSON
Dean Witter Prof., Graduate School of Business, Stanford U.
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- Thread context:
- [PEN-L:4725] Re: Labor party environmental plank,
Laurie Dougherty Tue 18 Jun 1996, 18:59 GMT
- [PEN-L:4724] Re: Sumitomo,
Doug Henwood Tue 18 Jun 1996, 18:58 GMT
- [PEN-L:4723] Re: collective goods problem, cont.,
C.N.Gomersall Tue 18 Jun 1996, 17:14 GMT
- [PEN-L:4722] Re: "indirect government",
Michael Perelman Tue 18 Jun 1996, 16:54 GMT
- [PEN-L:4721] NEW PUBLIC ECONOMICS ABSTRACTING JOURNAL - Working Paper Series,
Wayne Marr Tue 18 Jun 1996, 16:53 GMT
- [PEN-L:4720] "indirect government",
C.N.Gomersall Tue 18 Jun 1996, 16:41 GMT
- [PEN-L:4719] collective goods problem once again,
JDevine Tue 18 Jun 1996, 16:29 GMT
- [PEN-L:4718] Sumitomo,
JDevine Tue 18 Jun 1996, 15:45 GMT
- [PEN-L:4717] Re: collective goods problem, cont.,
Sandy Thompson Tue 18 Jun 1996, 15:02 GMT
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