[PEN-L:1765]

[smavro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Stavros Mavroudeas)]

3
     Thessaloniki, 6-12-1995
     I would like to put forward a rather dissenting view
about  Regulation and Aglietta. I think that any  attempt to
characterise  Regulation one  way  or  another  -  as
radical and/or marxist or as orthodox - is futile  if  it
neglects  its essential features. Regulation witnessed  a
series  of significant transformations - admited even  by
the  regulationists - which dispute, again in  their  own
words  -  the characterisation of a school. A superficial
observation    would,    then,   characterise    it    as
opportunistic.  However, a more informed perspective  can
discover that there is a set of basic characteristics  on
which   Regulation  is  based  and  which  generate   its
subsequent transformations.
        Essentially,    I    argue   that    Regulation?s
transformations,  however  diverse  they  may  appear  in
retrospect, were inherent in the essential content of its
very  first formulations (especially by Aglietta (1979)).
The  essence of Regulation - its spinal column - is  made up
of a "middle-range" methodology combined with a set of
perceived empirical beliefs ("stylised facts")  on  which
the  theory is based and which, in turn, "justifies"  the
theory.   The  "middle-range"  methodology  (see   Merton
(1968)) organises a set of intermediate concepts  on  the
basis  of  the  most  immediate empirical  phenomena  (or
subjective perceptions) and without a general-theoretical
framework,  which is deemed to be either redundant  or  a
distant accessory. A negation (or a distortion beyond any
recognition)  of  Marxist dialectics  is  the  underlying
foundation of this approach. Because of empiricism -  and
the subsequent immediate identification with the concrete -
these  intermediate concepts are of a  pre-theoretical
nature and regect the Marxian approach of the essence via
abstraction.
      Regulation belongs to the breed of the  newer  non
orthodox  "middle-range" theories were born  out  of  the
crisis  of  radical theory after the 1960s. They  started
with   elements   of  the  previously  dominant   general
theoretical traditions which were considered  as  needing
elaboration  and specific application to the periods  and
the  transformations  at  hand.  In  addition,  attention
focused  on  specific  historical  periods  (usually  the
period   after  the  2nd  WW.)  -  assuming  that   major
transformations  took place during  them,  which  changed
radically  the  nature and the operation  of  the  social
system   thereafter.   This  led   to   the   intentional
relativisation  and  relaxation of the  grand-theoretical
aspects and opened the way for the implementation of  the
"middle-range" methodology. There was a recourse  to  the
concrete  and  an  attempt  to  discover  within  it  the
appropriate   new   theoretical  tools  by   substituting
"abstract  general  laws"  with "intermediate  concepts".
With  the  relativisation of the concepts,  there  was  a
relativisation  of the very scope and method  of  theory.
The   "middle-range"  methodology  was,   explicitly   or
implicitly,  accepted  as  the  scientific   method   par
excellence   and  the  need  for  even  a  detached   and
relativised general theoretical framework was  discarded.
"Essentialism", or its scapegoat, - usually in  the  form of
economism - was denounced and "intermediate concepts" were
based  on  a multi-causal framework   unifying  the economy
with  a  number  of  other  factors  (politics, ideology,
culture etc.).
      This  historicist approach took  the  form  of  the
dominant    intellectual   fashion   of    the    period:
institutionalism.  The  majority of  their  "intermediate
concepts"   were  based  on  institutional   forms.   The
attractions  of this were obvious. Firstly,  institutions
and  institutional arrangements, widely  proliferated  in
the  period after the 2nd WW., seemed to encompass  every
aspect  of the life and the perceived transformations  of
that  period.  Secondly, the extensive implementation  of
institutional agreements appeared to provide the  perfect
explanation  for  the  supposed  buy-off  and  structural
incorporation  of  the  whole  working-class   or   major
sections  of  it  within capitalism. Last,  but  not  the
least, the institutional forms provide, perhaps, the most
appropriate  material  for  the  construction  of   their
"intermediate  concepts". Not only are  they  immediately
observable,  but they also have a high and impressionable
profile. On the other hand, they are not a crude,  simple
factor  but  they  are  founded  on  a  wide  variety  of
determining  parameters (such as  the  economy,  culture,
politics, ideology, legal forms, social struggles etc.).
     The theoretical underpinning of this historicism and
institutionalism was informed by the philosophical trends of
the   times.   They  started  with   a   relativised
structuralism  and then followed the familiar  trajectory to
post-structuralism  and  post-modernism.  Structural
forms  are  rejected or weakened and the whole conceptual
framework  is  relativised. The name of the game  becomes
projects  and strategies, fragmentation of the collective
agents  (such  as  classes)  into  more  fluid  and  less
structurally determined factors (such as volatile  social
groups organised on a short or mid-term basis, firms  and
even individuals).
     The other major pillar of Regulation - its "stylised
facts" - is based on a belief of structural disruption of
the operation-as-usual of the capitalist system after the
2nd   WW.  which  resulted  to  a  new  state-of-affairs:
Fordism. Similarly, the period between the two world wars
(and  especially the decade of the 1920s)  is  considered
the germinating period and also the harbinger of Fordism.
Thus,  the  set of stylised facts is derived by comparing
the  interwar years and the post-2nd W.W. epoch.  Lipietz
(1986,  p.18) and De Vroey (1984) give detailed  accounts of
these stylised facts.
      At  the heart of all these theories lies the notion of
an historically contingent correspondence between the ways
the  production  process  is  organised,  the  ways incomes
are   distributed,  the   institutional   forms regulating
the operation of the system nationally  and/or
internationally   and  the  ideology   legitimising   it.
Institutional forms assume an explanatory primacy,  since
these  theories  usually assume that they  encompass  and
express the totality of all these historically contingent
parameters.  This historically contingent  correspondence is
not  referred to some essential law of the capitalist mode
of   production  but  stands  on  its          own.   The
determinations necessary to explain and theorise each one of
these historically contingent correspondences have to be
devised ex post.
      Regulation  expresses these perceived  historically
specific structural transformations - which are empirical
perceptions  of pre-theoretical nature - as  indisputable
empirical facts and organises them as stylised facts.  In
fact, the stylised facts represent an eclecticist reading of
historical   reality,  underpinned   by        a   hidden
theoretical  framework (organised on the  basis  of  this
historically contingent correspondence mentioned before).
They,  then,  enable the creation of an explicit  theory.
This  is  based  on  a set of concepts  (of  intermediate
status)   and  a  periodisation  of  capitalism.   As   a
consequence, these concepts and periodisation  vindicate, in
a circular way, the initiating empirical perceptions.
      There  is  ample  proof of the  hidden  theoretical
intuitions   behind  Regulation's  stylised  facts.   The
crucial  emphasis on mass consumption and  the  empirical
perceptions about the forms, the extent and the timing of
the  commoditisation  of working-class'  consumption  are
underpinned  by the belief that - at least for  the  pre
Fordist  period  - the main constraint in capitalism  was
the  size  of  the  market and the  realisation  problem.
Similarly,  Taylorism and Fordism are  based  on  certain
theoretical  perceptions about the  organisation  of  the
labour-process.  Collective bargaining  and  the  alleged
linkage of wage increases to rises in labour productivity
imply   elements  of  a  theory  of  wages  and  of   the
relationship between capital and labour as well as  among
sections  of  labour. The alleged social compromise,  the
social contract on which Fordism is supposed to be based,
bears upon certain institutionalist perceptions. Finally,
the  emphasis on the role of credit money and the  timing of
its  alleged establishment is underpinned by  certain
beliefs about the relation between commodities and money.
Dumenil and Levy (1988) and Brenner and Glick (1991) have
given   convincing   regections  of   the   regulationist
empirical perceptions.
      On  the  basis of the above, Regulation?s evolution
can  be  periodised in three distinct  periods.  A  first
period  during which Regulation was born and Marxism  was
professed as its general-theoretical framework. A  second
period  when  the "middle-range" approach, latent  during
the first stage, was openly declared and the necessity of a
general  theory  (let  alone  Marxism)  was  rejected.
Eventually,  the  present period  is  one  in  which  the
conflict   between  Regulation's  spread  in  scope   and
popularity  and  its  lack  of a comprehensive,  general
theoretical framework has led to a crisis of identity.
     It is worth noticing that, although Aglietta?s first
work  - even in the New Left Book version, let alone  his
thesis  -  is considered by many as a specie of  its  own
(i.e. of proposing the most coherently marxist version of
Regulation),  it  is Aglietta - in his  later  work  with
Orlean  and  Brender - that exhibited the  most  explicit
differentiation from the marxist tradition. I think  that
this  was  not only because of the influence of  external
events  -  and,  by the way Bellofiore?s  explanation  is
extremely  accurate on this aspect - but also because  of
views  inherent  in his very first work.  In  short,  the
present end of his theoretical journey is rooted  in  his
initial theses.

REFERENCES
Aglietta  M. (1979), ?A Theory of Capitalist Regulation?,
New Left Books
Aglietta M.-Brender A. (1984), "Les metamorphoses de la
societe salariale", Calman-Levy
Aglietta  M.-Orlean  A.  (1982),  "La  violence  de  la
monnaie", PUF
Brenner  R.-Glick M. (1991), ?The Regulation  School  and
the West?s Economic Impasse?, New Left Review no.188
De    Vroey    M.   (1984),   ""A   Regulation   Approach
interpretation  of the contemporary crisis",   Capital  &
Class no.23
Dumenil  G.-Levy  D. (1988), "What can we  learn  from  a
century  of  history  of  the U.S. economy",  mimeo,
Barcelona Conference on Regulation Theory
Merton  R.  (1968), "Social Theory and Social Structure",
The Free Press

-------------------------------------------
Stavros D. Mavroudeas
Dept. of Economic Studies
University of Macedonia
156 Egnatia
P.O.Box 1591
54006 Thessaloniki
GREECE

e-mail:   smavro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
tel: +30(31)891779  office
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