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[OPE-L] Development with Dignity: A Case for Full Employment by Amit Bhaduri
You may cite this message only if you
do not disclose who wrote it.
Title: Development with Dignity: A Case for Full
Employment by A
EPW
Reviews
March 11,
2006
An Integrated
Totality
Development with
Dignity: A Case for Full Employment
by Amit
Bhaduri;
National Book Trust, India, 2005;
pp 107, Rs 45.
Prabhat
Patnaik
The dominant
discourse in economics in India today has a surreal air about it. The
economy is claimed to be prospering, even though hundreds of peasants
are committing suicide across the country; the rate of growth is
claimed to have climbed to dizzy levels, even though the unemployment
problem is becoming daily more acute; the economy is claimed to have
successfully broken through the barrier of the "Hindu rate of
growth", even though the rate of employment expansion is lower today
than it was during the "Hindu rate" phase; poverty is claimed to
be getting reduced, even though per capita food absorption in the
country as a whole is down to the level where it was on the eve of the
second world war; and India is claimed to be emerging as an economic
superpower, even though 75 per cent of the rural population
(in 1999-2000) was getting less than 2,400 calories per person per day
compared to 56 per cent in 1973-74. A discipline, whose practitioners
saw themselves, in Keynes' words, as the "conscience keepers" of
the nation, is being sought to be reduced to a ragbag collection
of fanciful notions commonly held by the urban affluent. A discipline
whose intellectual demands are so great that even the physicist Max
Planck was impressed by the difficulty of doing it, is now sought
to be reduced to a set of platitudes which can be repeated ad
nauseam in public.
But all those who
despair at the direction which both the country and the discipline are
taking, should rejoice at the publication of this little book. One of
the most outstanding macroeconomists of the country has put forward a
set of proposals for the pursuit of an economic strategy that would
bring to the people "development with dignity". And in so doing,
he has restored to an extent the dignity which the discipline had lost
by merely becoming part of the great upper class celebration.
The book is noteworthy because Bhaduri suggests an abandonment of the
obsession with the usual catch-phrases, like "growth rate",
"efficiency", "leaving things to the market"; he starts instead
from the other end, namely, the immediate provision of full employment
and the basic needs of the people within a democratic framework. The
catch-phrases just mentioned are supposed to be the instruments for
achieving the basic social goals; typically however they start taking
precedence over these goals themselves whose achievement recedes
further into the future. This dishonesty is rejected by Bhaduri, who
suggests instead a direct and immediate move towards these goals. The
book is devoted to a discussion of how this can be done.
Basic Propositions
His basic propositions can be schematically set out as follows. First,
India must strive for a developmental process that focuses neither on
the growth rate as such, nor on income transfers to the
poor as such; growth and distribution have got to be
integrated as parts of the same process. This interweaving of growth
and distribution cannot be effective, however, unless it
confronts simultaneously the structural inequalities of
Indian society rooted in caste, gender and religious
discrimination.
Second, even if we make the extravagant assumption that the market
arrives at an "efficient" outcome, this outcome relates to a
particular distribution of purchasing power among the market
participants. To pretend that the basic needs of the people would be
met "in due course" through the functioning of the "liberalised"
market is dishonest; a democratic government must assume direct
responsibility for providing the most basic needs of the people such
as food, shelter, clothing, clean water and health care. The point is
not whether the state should follow "pro-" or "anti"-market
policies; the point is to combine the two institutions in the most
imaginative manner to serve the needs of the people within a
democratic polity.
Third, an obsession
with cutting costs to become internationally competitive and achieve a
high growth rate of exports, as a means of increasing the output
growth rate, is equally counterproductive. It leads to the phenomenon
of "jobless growth" which is a hindrance to the removal of poverty
and to meaningful democracy. Improving the purchasing power in the
hands of the people, and enlarging the size of the domestic market,
are ways of breaking out of this syndrome. What is essential is to
achieve an appropriate mix of home and export demand instead of
one-sidedly emphasising the exclusive importance of export demand, for
which measures like labour market flexibility, downsizing of the
labour force and restraint on wages are undertaken, with
invariably adverse consequences for the poor.
Fourth, it is essential to overturn the criterion that should be used
in deciding the optimal policy mix. It is not the degree of
international competitiveness or the magnitude of growth rate that
should be our yardstick in deciding on policy but the provision of a
legal minimum wage with socially productive work at full employment,
and the only organisational form within which this can be achieved is
through decentralisation to the elected bodies at the village and town
level.
Fifth, the argument that the "government cannot do it", which
derives from the presumed absence of resources with the government, is
completely erroneous. In any economy where unutilised capacity, unsold
foodgrain stocks, unused foreign exchange reserves and unemployed
labour coexist, the government can safely undertake larger fiscal
deficits without causing any inflation. And if the worry is about the
debt servicing obligations set up by such deficits, then it is better
to print money than to emit interest-bearing debt. The Fiscal
Responsibility and Budget Management Act which advocates a uniform cap
on fiscal deficits in all seasons is a piece of unwarranted
legislation that should be abandoned.
Sixth, enforcing accountability on the government can be done through
decentralisation of decision-making, where the poor, armed with the
right to information, can keep a vigil over the deployment of
resources earmarked for their benefit; but the presumed absence of
accountability and infirmities of the government cannot be made
excuses for preventing the government from undertaking measures to
achieve development with dignity.
The fifth point mentioned above deserves special notice and defines
the theoretical setting of his approach. The orthodox theory
underlying neoliberalism necessarily presumes, without always saying
so, a perennial state of "full employment", in the sense of the
absence of any demand constraint. The case for balancing the budget is
derived from this presumption. Any non-monetised government borrowing,
it is claimed, can only give rise to a "crowding out" of private
investment, and hence a lowering of efficiency in the economy; and
"monetised" government borrowing can only cause inflation.
'Humbug of Finance'
The argument that government borrowing from the "market" crowds
out private investment is not a new one. It was advanced in 1929 by
the British Treasury against Lloyd George's proposal, put forward on
Keynes' suggestion, for setting up public works, financed by
government borrowing, for overcoming unemployment which, even then,
had stood at 10 per cent. The Treasury white paper had argued that in
an economy at any time there was a "fixed pool" of savings; and if
the government took more of it through its borrowing, then less
remained for private investment and net capital exports.
If one gets away from the "fixed pool" idea, and takes savings to
be a positive function of the interest rate, then the Treasury
argument has to be modified. "Crowding out" in such a case would
not be complete but only partial. The interest rate would rise to a
point, on account of government borrowing, where there would be some
"crowding out" and some increase in savings; the two together would
equal the amount of fiscal deficit.
The fallacy of this argument lay in the fact that savings also depend
upon the level of income. If savings are taken as a "fixed pool"
or as a function of the interest rate alone, then the implicit
assumption is that income, and hence employment, is given and
non-augmentable, i e, the economy is at full employment. The Treasury
view in short was arguing against a policy of overcoming unemployment
through fiscal deficit, by assuming that unemployment did not exist at
all!
As against the
Treasury view, Richard Kahn had argued in his famous 1931 article that
an increase in the fiscal deficit, far from "crowding out" private
investment (we ignore net capital exports), generated through a
"multiplier" process, at any given interest rate, a larger
output and employment in the economy, such that private savings
at this larger output exceeds private investment by an amount exactly
equal to the fiscal deficit. Indeed, private investment is likely to
increase within this period itself, or in subsequent periods, on
account of the larger output, in which case we have "crowding in"
rather than "crowding out".
Even at full employment, a fiscal deficit still "finances itself"
through inflationary forced savings from the working masses (coming to
the hands of the capitalists through a "profit inflation" and
generating an excess of private savings over private investment), so
that the question of "crowding out" does not arise even here. But
in a demand constrained system a larger fiscal deficit causes neither
any inflation nor any "crowding out", no matter how it is financed
(whether through printing money or through "market borrowing"). To
perpetuate poverty and unemployment in this situation in deference to
an absurd and erroneous theory (which Joan Robinson had called the
"humbug of finance") is totally unacceptable. This point has been
made by several writers belonging to the Left. But the fact that a
macroeconomist of Bhaduri's eminence is emphasising this, should be
a matter of gratification.
The havoc wreaked by the "humbug of finance" is evident most
clearly in the recent administration of the food economy. Despite
reduced grain output growth, excess public stocks of foodgrains
started building up from 1998 as purchasing power fell owing to
expenditure cuts by the government. By July 2002, we had 64 million
tonnes of foodgrain stocks, of which 40 million tonnes were surplus
stocks. If the government had put purchasing power in the hands of the
rural poor through employment works financed by deficit financing,
then a substantial amount of it would have come back to government
agencies like the FCI; whatever was spent on private sector products
would have generated larger output in the private sector without
causing any inflation. In short, the question of there being any
"crowding out" or inflation on account of deficit-financed
employment-generation projects simply did not arise. And yet the
government undertook no significant additional employment generation
for fear of enlarging the fiscal deficit; and foodstocks
continued to rot in the government godowns, until 19 million tonnes
were dumped at prices below those charged to the BPL population at
home on the international market, where they were used as animal feed
in the advanced countries.
Overall Logic
The different suggestions made by Bhaduri are interrelated; they
constitute an integrated totality, not a mere list from which some may
be arbitrarily picked, while others are left out "for the time
being". And this integrated totality can be realised only
through the agency of the state, albeit a democratic state
driven by the will of the people. Three questionswhich
immediately arise are left unanswered, perhaps for good reason.
The first relates to the political process through which the state can
acquire such an agency role. The author's reasoning here could well
be as follows. The state can be made to acquire an agency role,
through the intervention of the people in a democratic polity,
provided such intervention is not snuffed out through theoretical
obfuscations like "There is no alternative", "The state has no
resources for the provision of basic needs", "The economy cannot
afford to compromise on efficiency" and so on. The first task in the
process of activating popular intervention therefore is to impart some
clarity on theoretical issues by blowing away such obfuscations, which
is what the book tries to do.
The second relates not to any political process but simply to the
characteristics of a regime where the state can play such an agency
role. For instance, can the state play an agency role of the sort that
the author visualises without imposing tighter controls over capital
flows? And how tight should these controls be? What sort of trade
controls may be necessary? To be sure, there cannot be one particular
regime frozen in time within which "development with dignity" can
be striven for; the requisite regime itself will have to keep
evolving, as well as the programme, in a recursive manner as newer
problems arise and newer challenges faced along the path of
"development with dignity". Nonetheless the initial requirements in
terms of regime characteristics can be analytically explored, though
getting into these issues would perhaps have taken the author beyond
the self-imposed limits of the book.
The third question
is this: if instead of the integrated totality suggested by the author
there is an attempt at implementing bits and pieces of it, would it
necessarily represent advance? To my mind the answer is clearly
"no", and the point can be illustrated with reference to
decentralisation. If decision-making is decentralised to lower-level
elected bodies without a corresponding devolution of resources, then
it is likely that these bodies would actually turn to foreign donors
like the ADB and the World Bank for funds, which, instead of creating
conditions for the autonomy of the state (of which these bodies are
very much a part) and hence its agency role, would have precisely
the opposite effect of enfeebling and dismantling the state, making it
even more incapable of undertaking any agency role. Instead of
economic decentralisation we would have had economic
disintegration. The author's argument in other words has an overall
logic underlying it; to read it mechanically, simply as a list of
things to be done, would be erroneous and grossly unfair.
A reviewer always runs the risk of looking in a book not for what the
author is concerned with, but for what he himself is concerned with -
a tendency which can be unfair to the author. Instead of pursuing my
own hobby horses further, I should conclude therefore by saying that
this is a "must read" book for anybody concerned with the Indian
economy. It is the first in a series of similar monographs being
planned by the National Book Trust (NBT). The NBT must be
congratulated on this venture.
Email: ppat@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Available
EPW on CD
2003 and 2004
CURRENT STATISTICS
Macroeconomic
Indicators (11 March 2006)
Money Market
Rates of Interest
S
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2001 The Economic and Political Weekly. All rights
reserved.
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