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Hi Rakesh and all,
Jerry, you've obviously never tried dried mangos,
which store their taste in backpacks very well! (I bet they'd be over the
top at sea!!)
Rakesh, I will focus on your original post
because, away from the computer, I've been thinking about it all day and have
only just caught the other posts. Anyway, the theoretical issues are
here.
I think your argument is not quite right. The
basic problems, which account for your perception of ontology and category
mistakes, come from thinking of only one kind of predication and one kind of
form. I don't think this was Marx.
Let me start with predication. Usually we
attribute some feature or quality a thing has to it -- the horse is white, the
man is bald, the mango is sweet, etc. We predicate an attribute of a
subject. So we say Socrates is wise and Socrates is brave. He was
not chubby, I take it, but he could have been chubby and he would still be
Socrates. We also say Socrates is human. But now it is not really
accurate to say that the predicate is an attribute Socrates HAS. Instead,
the predicate is something Socrates essentially IS. That is, he could turn
timid and still be Socrates, he could suffer brain damage and still be Socrates,
he could grow chubby and still be Socrates, but he couldn't be not human and
still be Socrates. In other words, being human is a feature that
constitutes Socrates as what he is. It accounts for his causal powers as a
thing of nature -- the fact that he can walk, use language, reason,
etc.
The reason this distinction is so hard to see in
the commodity, is that the only kind of predicate microeconomics knows is the
kind that a good HAS. Goods figure in a subjective utility calculus
because they are new, or waxed, or hip or durable, etc. etc. But for Marx,
value is not something a commodity has; value constitutes a commodity. If
a product of labor doesn't have value, then it is not a commodity. Value
constitutes what a commodity is.
So you argue mangos ought to have certain concrete
attributes, as they sensibly have coming off the tree, but we abstract from
these and make the abstraction some kind of real incarnation of fruit in general
-- a mistaken ontological commitment and a category mistake.
But that is not what is going on in the analysis of
value at all. Instead, and this is the importance of the first pages of
Capital, Marx observes wealth is an immense accumulation of commodities.
Now he wants to know what a commodity is and what accounts for how it behaves,
what accounts for its causal potency. This isn't a matter of canvasing
attributes that a product of labor has and abstracting from them, but instead of
finding out what it is that constitutes the product of labor as a
commodity. This is a structural form of social labor like water is
constituted by a particular structure of 2 hydrogen atoms and and an oxygen
atom. As such, it is very different from the "phenomenal form of
manifestation" of value. Notice the passage you quote from the Theories of
Surplus Value -- "the necessity for commodities to REPRESENT themselves . . .
." Forms that constitute a thing as what it is are a very different sort
of thing from forms that represent something so it can be manifested in a
certain way. So not only are there two kinds of predication; there are
also two kinds of form.
Also, notice, that were mango to be money, it would
not represent fruit in general or fruit in the abstract or be an
abstract-universal of fruit, but it would refer to a particular
historically situated social relation. That is, the thing
that constitutes the value that mango as money represents is a social
relation of fruit producing labor, not some aspect of the natural kind,
"fruit."
I'll stop there so this doesn't get too long and
come back to the distinction between substantial form and phenomenal form, also
essential to understanding the argument you make.
Howard
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- Re: on money, (continued)
- Re: on money, ajit sinha Tue 25 May 2004, 10:51 GMT
- Re: on money, Rakesh Bhandari Tue 25 May 2004, 18:35 GMT
- Re: on money, ajit sinha Wed 26 May 2004, 08:01 GMT
- Re: on money, Paul C Sat 29 May 2004, 20:54 GMT
- Re: on money, Howard Engelskirchen Tue 25 May 2004, 02:49 GMT
- Re: Primitive accumulation, Michael Williams Tue 25 May 2004, 09:25 GMT
- Re: on money, Paul Zarembka Tue 25 May 2004, 12:21 GMT
- Re: on money, Howard Engelskirchen Tue 25 May 2004, 15:51 GMT
- Re: on money, Paul Zarembka Tue 25 May 2004, 16:53 GMT