(OPE-L) Bertell Ollman's Critique of Systematic Dialectics

["Gerald A. Levy" <Gerald_A_Levy@xxxxxxx>]

   "Marx's Dialectical Method is More Than a Mode of _expression_:

A Critique of Systematic Dialectics" --  in Albritton, Robert and

Simoulidis, John (eds.) (2003) _New Dialectics and Political

Economy_ (Palgrave Macmillan,  pp. 173-184) --  presents a

brief critique of systematic (Marxist) dialectics.  Ollman claims

that he has a "generally favorable bias"  towards systematic

dialectics which led him to present his critique in a "softening

light." 

 

   In this essay Ollman focuses on the writings of Sekine, Albritton,

Arthur and T. Smith whom he believes are "the most important of

these thinkers." (*)  The central claim of the essay is captured

in the title of the contribution:  namely, that systematic dialectical

authors have _reduced_ Marx's dialectical method to a strategy

of presentation. 

 

   The author claims that systematic dialectics privileges

epistemology over ontology, inquiry, "intellectual reconstruction",

exposition and praxis.  Yet, Ollman himself recognizes that "my

own attempts to explain dialectics have also privileged one

moment -- in this case epistemology -- over the others."  He

claims, though, that he (unlike systematic dialectics) has

"always tried to integrate it with the rest." 

 

   Many of the specific claims that Ollman makes about

systematic dialectics are problematic.  E.g. he claims repeatedly

that the focus of  systematic dialectics is on the mode of

exposition employed by Marx in Volume One of _Capital_. 

Systematic dialectics thus fails to consider the "strategies of

presentation" in Marx's other writings, including the drafts for

what became Volumes Two and Three of _Capital_, according

to Ollman.  This is an odd assertion.  _Which_ of the writers

in the systematic dialectical tradition(s) focused _only_ on  the

mode of exposition in Volume One?  The author does not tell us. 

This is simply a claim which will not bear close scrutiny.  There is

an implication here that the "strategies of presentation" in Marx's

other writings, including the other volumes of _Capital_, are

different than that employed in Volume One.  Yet, aren't the

"strategies of presentation" in _all_ of the volumes of _Capital_

and in  his _other_  major writings on political economy (with the

possible exception of his writings on the history  of political

economy, i.e. what became _Theories of Surplus Value_)

essentially similar?

 

   Another central claim by Ollman is that many of  Marx's aims

are not recognized or revealed by systematic dialectics.  Since

"these aims require strategies of presentation that have little to do

with Hegel's conceptual logic ... Volume I contains whole sections

which, according to the proponents of Systematic Dialectics ...

simply do not belong here."  This also is not a very convincing claim. 

To begin with,  he is presuming that the systemic dialecticians believe

that the other "aims" have no merit.  This is an unwarranted presumption.

The question is  not whether Marx's aims -- such as "showing capitalism's

origins in primitive accumulation and its potential for evolving into

communism"  or "mapping the class struggle, and raising workers' class

consciousness" --  have _a_ valid place within Marx's social theory

but rather _where_  and _what_ that place is within the context of

his critique of political economy.   Although Ollman claims that systematic

dialecticians (such as Sekine) can't  grasp _why_  Marx -- among other

topics -- pays "so much attention to the expansion of the working day"

or why he wrote "the 100-plus pages at the end of _Capital_ devoted

 to primitive accumulation", it is Ollman himself  who fails to grasp

all of Marx's aims since (as we discussed on OPE-L just the other day)

the length of _Capital_, Volume One,  was at least partially influenced

by the imperative to make more money since the arrangement was that

he would be paid by the sheet.  He therefore reads both too much and

too little into the reasons why these topics were presented at great

length in _Capital_.

 

   In the conclusion, Ollman repeats his claim that systematic

dialectics errs in "exaggerating the role that conceptual logic plays

in Marx's dialectical method."   Yet,  he qualifies this by then adding

"... with the partial exception of Tony Smith."  Had Ollman gone

beyond just an examination of  hermeneutics and interrogated the

writings of systematic dialecticians on _other_ topics than just how

they interpret Volume One then his conclusion might have been

far more qualified and he might be less puzzled by the "partial

exception of Tony Smith."

 

   The sections of the essay which concern Marx's strategies of

presentation, his dialectical method, and three kinds of abstraction

are certainly worthy of a close examination.   Yet, one is left

pondering to what extent these sections actually form part of a

valid critique of systematic dialectics.   Furthermore, in reply to

his comment that "the problem in which all dialectics ... is addressed

is: how to think adequately about all change, all kinds of change and

interaction, all kinds of interaction", one could observe that "Marx's

Dialectical Method in _Capital_ is More and Less than an

Examination of  Change."  While one can not argue with his claim

that Marx's aims in writing _Capital_ have to be placed in the context

of the aims revealed in his other writings and praxis, one also

needs to recognize that he had _limited_ and _specific_ aims in

writing _Capital_.  The issue then is not whether his other aims have

been ignored but rather where the place of those aims fit within the

project of reconstructing in thought the essential nature of the

bourgeois mode of production.

 

    Although Ollman has spared systematic dialectics a harsh polemic

with his "softening light", one is left wondering whether he shines the

light on the most relevant questions. 

 

In solidarity, Jerry

 

(*) Reuten and  M. Williams, among others, were not included 

among the listing of "most important."  One wonders why,

especially since one of the contributors to this volume is Reuten.

I guess one would have to ask Ollman, but a couple of thoughts

come to mind:

 

    i) Ollman focuses in this essay on interpreting Marx's dialectical

        method, yet Reuten and Williams (1989)  is a work whose

        scope goes well _beyond_ interpreting Marx.  

    ii) Perhaps Ollman thought that a reference to Reuten and Williams

        would make his critique more complex (and lengthy) since it

        might have to note the *differences* in method between Arthur

        and Smith on the one side (materialist dialectics) and Reuten

        and  Williams (transcendental idealism) on another side.