(OPE-L) Further references to "Vorstellung"

["Gerald A. Levy" <Gerald_A_Levy@xxxxxxx>]

Title: Re: (OPE-L) logical order and historical order

Howard and others: previously I wrote --

 

[NB: in a post responding to Rakesh, dated 2/11, I mentioned

"Vorstellung".  Note that in the "Introduction" to the

_Grundrisse_ where Marx explains what is wrong with the

starting point of the population he writes that "this would be a

chaotic conception [Vorstellung] of the whole .... "(Nicolaus

translation, p. 100).  There is also a reference to "Vorstellung"

in the _Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' (Cambridge,

CUP, 1970, p. 69).  In the latter context, it is written as part

of a critique of Hegel's concept of the state: for Hegel "the

state is a mere representation [eine blosse Vorstellung]"

(emphasis in original, JL).]

 

Also: there are also (at least) a couple of places in the

"Marginal  Notes on Wagner" where "Vostellung"  is written:

 

1) "But this linguistic designation simply expresses as an

image [Vorstellung] what repeated confirmation has made an

experience, namely that certain external things serve to satisfy

the needs of men already living [language makes this a necessary

presupposition]".

 

2) "If one calls this situation, the fact that men do not treat such

things practically as means towards the satisfaction of their needs

but also designate them in their imaginations [Vorstellung] and

later in language ...." (_Theoretical Practice_, Issue 5, Spring 1972,

p 46 for both quotes).

 

Commentary: in Hegel, "Vorstellung" is a form of "ordinary thinking"

which is a mere mental picture which lacks necessity and universality.

What is wrong with "the population" as the starting point in a systematic

dialectical presentation is that while it represents "ordinary thinking" or

"common sense",  the necessary determinations of the subject matter

(the CMP) can not be grasped using that as a point of departure.

Yet, from the standpoint of "ordinary thinking" what starting point for

comprehending  social organization makes more  "common sense"

than do begin with people?   In a similar way, from the point of

"ordinary thinking" what makes more "common sense" when attempting

to grasp a historically constituted subject than to follow the historical

sequence of the development of that subject?  The reason, therefore,

why  the logical ordering is different from the historical ordering is that

if we were to follow the latter "common sense" approach we could not

grasp the essential nature of the subject since that requires abstraction

rather than a mere progression of mental pictures.  Nonetheless, there

are times in Marx's presentation when the progression of logical categories

seems to mirror the progression of historical forms.  As I asserted before,

which Howard took exception to, this is "OK" but not essential for Marx's

reconstruction of the subject matter in thought.  After all, there are times

when what is presented through the process of abstraction happens to be

the same as what "ordinary thought" and "common sense" tell us, but it

is not essential.  This is also important because there are realities of the

CMP which simply do not make "common sense" and can not be grasped

through ordinary thinking: indeed, there are 'results' which are sometimes

the reverse of what 'common sense' tells us.  E.g. 'common sense' tells

us that through the process of exchanging equivalents, there is no

exploitation.  Yet,  Marx's theory penetrated beyond the surface appearance

to reveal the inner nature of the relation that violates ordinary thinking.

 

In solidarity, Jerry