Fw: US Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup

[Paul Bullock <paulbullock@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Subject: US Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup

> US Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup
> By Michael Dobbs
> 
Washington Post
> December 30, 2002
> 
> High on the Bush 
administration's list of justifications for war
> against Iraq are 
President Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons,
> nuclear and 
biological programs, and his contacts with international
> terrorists. 
What U.S. officials rarely acknowledge is that these
> offenses date back 
to a period when Hussein was seen in Washington as
> a valued ally. 
> 
> Among the people instrumental in tilting U.S. policy toward 
Baghdad
> during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war was Donald H. Rumsfeld, now 
defense
> secretary, whose December 1983 meeting with Hussein as a 
special
> presidential envoy paved the way for normalization of 
U.S.-Iraqi
> relations. Declassified documents show that Rumsfeld 
traveled to
> Baghdad at a time when Iraq was using chemical weapons on an 
"almost
> daily" basis in defiance of international conventions. 
> 
> The story of U.S. involvement with Saddam Hussein in the years 
before
> his 1990 attack on Kuwait -- which included large-scale 
intelligence
> sharing, supply of cluster bombs through a Chilean front 
company, and
> facilitating Iraq's acquisition of chemical and biological 
precursors
> -- is a topical example of the underside of U.S. 
foreign policy. It
> is a world in which deals can be struck with 
dictators, human rights
> violations sometimes overlooked, and 
accommodations made with arms
> proliferators, all on the principle that 
the "enemy of my enemy is my
> friend." 
> 
> Throughout the 
1980s, Hussein's Iraq was the sworn enemy of Iran,
> then still in the 
throes of an Islamic revolution. U.S. officials saw
> Baghdad as a bulwark 
against militant Shiite extremism and the fall
> of pro-American states 
such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and even Jordan
> -- a Middle East version 
of the "domino theory" in Southeast Asia.
> That was enough to turn 
Hussein into a strategic partner and for U.S.
> diplomats in Baghdad to 
routinely refer to Iraqi forces as "the good
> guys," in contrast to the 
Iranians, who were depicted as "the bad
> guys." 
> 
> A 
review of thousands of declassified government documents and
> interviews 
with former policymakers shows that U.S. intelligence and
> logistical 
support played a crucial role in shoring up Iraqi defenses
> against the 
"human wave" attacks by suicidal Iranian troops. The
> 
administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush authorized the
> 
sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian
> 
applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological
> 
viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague. 
> 
> Opinions 
differ among Middle East experts and former government
> officials about 
the pre-Iraqi tilt, and whether Washington could have
> done more to stop 
the flow to Baghdad of technology for building
> weapons of mass 
destruction. 
> 
> "It was a horrible mistake then, but we have got 
it right now," says
> Kenneth M. Pollack, a former CIA military analyst 
and author of "The
> Threatening Storm," which makes the case for war with 
Iraq. "My
> fellow [CIA] analysts and I were warning at the time that 
Hussein was
> a very nasty character. We were constantly fighting the 
State
> Department." 
> 
> "Fundamentally, the policy was 
justified," argues David Newton, a
> former U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, 
who runs an anti-Hussein radio
> station in Prague. "We were concerned 
that Iraq should not lose the
> war with Iran, because that would have 
threatened Saudi Arabia and
> the Gulf. Our long-term hope was that 
Hussein's government would
> become less repressive and more responsible." 
> 
> What makes present-day Hussein different from the Hussein of 
the
> 1980s, say Middle East experts, is the mellowing of the 
Iranian
> revolution and the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait that 
transformed
> the Iraqi dictator, almost overnight, from awkward ally into 
mortal
> enemy. In addition, the United States itself has changed. As a 
result
> of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington,
> U.S. policymakers take a much more alarmist view of the 
threat posed
> by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
> 
> U.S. Shifts in Iran-Iraq War 
> 
> When the 
Iran-Iraq war began in September 1980, with an Iraqi attack
> across the 
Shatt al Arab waterway that leads to the Persian Gulf, the
> United States 
was a bystander. The United States did not have
> diplomatic relations 
with either Baghdad or Tehran. U.S. officials
> had almost as little 
sympathy for Hussein's dictatorial brand of Arab
> nationalism as for the 
Islamic fundamentalism espoused by Iran's
> Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 
As long as the two countries fought
> their way to a stalemate, nobody in 
Washington was disposed to
> intervene. 
> 
> By the summer of 
1982, however, the strategic picture had changed
> dramatically. After its 
initial gains, Iraq was on the defensive, and
> Iranian troops had 
advanced to within a few miles of Basra, Iraq's
> second largest city. 
U.S. intelligence information suggested the
> Iranians might achieve a 
breakthrough on the Basra front,
> destabilizing Kuwait, the Gulf states, 
and even Saudi Arabia, thereby
> threatening U.S. oil supplies. 
> 
> "You have to understand the geostrategic context, which was 
very
> different from where we are now," said Howard Teicher, a 
former
> National Security Council official, who worked on Iraqi policy 
during
> the Reagan administration. "Realpolitik dictated that we act 
to
> prevent the situation from getting worse." 
> 
> To 
prevent an Iraqi collapse, the Reagan administration supplied
> 
battlefield intelligence on Iranian troop buildups to the Iraqis,
> 
sometimes through third parties such as Saudi Arabia. The U.S. tilt
> 
toward Iraq was enshrined in National Security Decision Directive 
114
> of Nov. 26, 1983, one of the few important Reagan era 
foreign policy
> decisions that still remains classified. According to 
former U.S.
> officials, the directive stated that the United States would 
do
> "whatever was necessary and legal" to prevent Iraq from losing 
the
> war with Iran. 
> 
> The presidential directive was 
issued amid a flurry of reports that
> Iraqi forces were using chemical 
weapons in their attempts to hold
> back the Iranians. In principle, 
Washington was strongly opposed to
> chemical warfare, a practice outlawed 
by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In
> practice, U.S. condemnation of Iraqi use 
of chemical weapons ranked
> relatively low on the scale of administration 
priorities,
> particularly compared with the all-important goal of 
preventing an
> Iranian victory. 
> 
> Thus, on Nov. 1, 1983, 
a senior State Department official, Jonathan
> T. Howe, told Secretary of 
State George P. Shultz that intelligence
> reports showed that Iraqi 
troops were resorting to "almost daily use
> of CW" against the Iranians. 
But the Reagan administration had
> already committed itself to a 
large-scale diplomatic and political
> overture to Baghdad, culminating in 
several visits by the president's
> recently appointed special envoy to 
the Middle East, Donald H.
> Rumsfeld. 
> 
> Secret talking 
points prepared for the first Rumsfeld visit to
> Baghdad enshrined some 
of the language from NSDD 114, including the
> statement that the United 
States would regard "any major reversal of
> Iraq's fortunes as a 
strategic defeat for the West." When Rumsfeld
> finally met with Hussein 
on Dec. 20, he told the Iraqi leader that
> Washington was ready for a 
resumption of full diplomatic relations,
> according to a State Department 
report of the conversation. Iraqi
> leaders later described themselves as 
"extremely pleased" with the
> Rumsfeld visit, which had "elevated 
U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new
> level." 
> 
> In a September 
interview with CNN, Rumsfeld said he "cautioned"
> Hussein about the use 
of chemical weapons, a claim at odds with
> declassified State Department 
notes of his 90-minute meeting with the
> Iraqi leader. A Pentagon 
spokesman, Brian Whitman, now says that
> Rumsfeld raised the issue not 
with Hussein, but with Iraqi foreign
> minister Tariq Aziz. The State 
Department notes show that he
> mentioned it largely in passing as one of 
several matters that
> "inhibited" U.S. efforts to assist Iraq. 
> 
> Rumsfeld has also said he had "nothing to do" with helping Iraq 
in
> its war against Iran. Although former U.S. officials agree 
that
> Rumsfeld was not one of the architects of the Reagan 
administration's
> tilt toward Iraq -- he was a private citizen when he 
was appointed
> Middle East envoy -- the documents show that his visits to 
Baghdad
> led to closer U.S.-Iraqi cooperation on a wide variety of 
fronts.
> Washington was willing to resume diplomatic relations 
immediately,
> but Hussein insisted on delaying such a step until the 
following
> year. 
> 
> As part of its opening to Baghdad, the 
Reagan administration removed
> Iraq from the State Department terrorism 
list in February 1982,
> despite heated objections from Congress. Without 
such a move, Teicher
> says, it would have been "impossible to take even 
the modest steps we
> were contemplating" to channel assistance to 
Baghdad. Iraq -- along
> with Syria, Libya and South Yemen -- was one of 
four original
> countries on the list, which was first drawn up in 1979. 
> 
> Some former U.S. officials say that removing Iraq from the 
terrorism
> list provided an incentive to Hussein to expel the 
Palestinian
> guerrilla leader Abu Nidal from Baghdad in 1983. On the 
other hand,
> Iraq continued to play host to alleged terrorists throughout 
the
> '80s. The most notable was Abu Abbas, leader of the 
Palestine
> Liberation Front, who found refuge in Baghdad after being 
expelled
> from Tunis for masterminding the 1985 hijacking of the cruise 
ship
> Achille Lauro, which resulted in the killing of an elderly 
American
> tourist. 
> 
> Iraq Lobbies for Arms 
> 
> While Rumsfeld was talking to Hussein and Aziz in Baghdad, 
Iraqi
> diplomats and weapons merchants were fanning out across 
Western
> capitals for a diplomatic charm offensive-cum-arms buying spree. 
In
> Washington, the key figure was the Iraqi chargé d'affaires, 
Nizar
> Hamdoon, a fluent English speaker who impressed Reagan 
administration
> officials as one of the most skillful lobbyists in town. 
> 
> "He arrived with a blue shirt and a white tie, straight out of 
the
> mafia," recalled Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East specialist in 
the
> Reagan White House. "Within six months, he was hosting suave 
dinner
> parties at his residence, which he parlayed into a 
formidable
> lobbying effort. He was particularly effective with the 
American
> Jewish community." 
> 
> One of Hamdoon's favorite 
props, says Kemp, was a green Islamic scarf
> allegedly found on the body 
of an Iranian soldier. The scarf was
> decorated with a map of the Middle 
East showing a series of arrows
> pointing toward Jerusalem. Hamdoon used 
to "parade the scarf" to
> conferences and congressional hearings as proof 
that an Iranian
> victory over Iraq would result in "Israel becoming a 
victim along
> with the Arabs." 
> 
> According to a sworn 
court affidavit prepared by Teicher in 1995, the
> United States "actively 
supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying
> the Iraqis with billions of 
dollars of credits, by providing military
> intelligence and advice to the 
Iraqis, and by closely monitoring
> third country arms sales to Iraq to 
make sure Iraq had the military
> weaponry required." Teicher said 
in the affidavit that former CIA
> director William Casey used a Chilean 
company, Cardoen, to supply
> Iraq with cluster bombs that could be used 
to disrupt the Iranian
> human wave attacks. Teicher refuses to discuss 
the affidavit. 
> 
> At the same time the Reagan 
administration was facilitating the
> supply of weapons and military 
components to Baghdad, it was
> attempting to cut off supplies to Iran 
under "Operation Staunch."
> Those efforts were largely successful, 
despite the glaring anomaly of
> the 1986 Iran-contra scandal when the 
White House publicly admitted
> trading arms for hostages, in violation of 
the policy that the United
> States was trying to impose on the rest of 
the world. 
> 
> Although U.S. arms manufacturers were not 
as deeply involved as
> German or British companies in selling weaponry to 
Iraq, the Reagan
> administration effectively turned a blind eye to the 
export of "dual
> use" items such as chemical precursors and steel tubes 
that can have
> military and civilian applications. According to 
several former
> officials, the State and Commerce departments promoted 
trade in such
> items as a way to boost U.S. exports and acquire political 
leverage
> over Hussein. 
> 
> When United Nations weapons 
inspectors were allowed into Iraq after
> the 1991 Gulf War, they compiled 
long lists of chemicals, missile
> components, and computers from American 
suppliers, including such
> household names as Union Carbide and 
Honeywell, which were being used
> for military purposes. 
> 
> A 1994 investigation by the Senate Banking Committee turned up 
dozens
> of biological agents shipped to Iraq during the mid-'80s 
under
> license from the Commerce Department, including various strains 
of
> anthrax, subsequently identified by the Pentagon as a key 
component
> of the Iraqi biological warfare program. The Commerce 
Department also
> approved the export of insecticides to Iraq, despite 
widespread
> suspicions that they were being used for chemical warfare. 
> 
> The fact that Iraq was using chemical weapons was 
hardly a secret. In
> February 1984, an Iraqi military spokesman 
effectively acknowledged
> their use by issuing a chilling warning to 
Iran. "The invaders should
> know that for every harmful insect, there is 
an insecticide capable
> of annihilating it . . . and Iraq possesses this 
annihilation
> insecticide." 
> 
> Chemicals Kill Kurds 
> 
> In late 1987, the Iraqi air force began using chemical agents 
against
> Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq that had formed a 
loose
> alliance with Iran, according to State Department reports. 
The
> attacks, which were part of a "scorched earth" strategy to 
eliminate
> rebel-controlled villages, provoked outrage on Capitol Hill 
and
> renewed demands for sanctions against Iraq. The State Department 
and
> White House were also outraged -- but not to the point of 
doing
> anything that might seriously damage relations with Baghdad. 
> 
> "The U.S.-Iraqi relationship is . . . important to our 
long-term
> political and economic objectives," Assistant Secretary of 
State
> Richard W. Murphy wrote in a September 1988 memorandum that 
addressed
> the chemical weapons question. "We believe that economic 
sanctions
> will be useless or counterproductive to influence the Iraqis." 
> 
> Bush administration spokesmen have cited Hussein's use of 
chemical
> weapons "against his own people" -- and particularly the March 
1988
> attack on the Kurdish village of Halabjah -- to bolster 
their
> argument that his regime presents a "grave and gathering danger" 
to
> the United States. 
> 
> The Iraqis continued to 
use chemical weapons against the Iranians
> until the end of the Iran-Iraq 
war. A U.S. air force intelligence
> officer, Rick Francona, reported 
finding widespread use of Iraqi
> nerve gas when he toured the Al Faw 
peninsula in southern Iraq in the
> summer of 1988, after its recapture by 
the Iraqi army. The
> battlefield was littered with atropine injectors 
used by panicky
> Iranian troops as an antidote against Iraqi nerve gas 
attacks. 
> 
> Far from declining, the supply of U.S. 
military intelligence to Iraq
> actually expanded in 1988, according to a 
1999 book by Francona,
> "Ally to Adversary: an Eyewitness Account of 
Iraq's Fall from Grace."
> Informed sources said much of the battlefield 
intelligence was
> channeled to the Iraqis by the CIA office in Baghdad. 
> 
> Although U.S. export controls to Iraq were tightened up in the 
late
> 1980s, there were still many loopholes. In December 1988, 
Dow
> Chemical sold $1.5 million of pesticides to Iraq, despite 
U.S.
> government concerns that they could be used as chemical 
warfare
> agents. An Export-Import Bank official reported in a memorandum 
that
> he could find "no reason" to stop the sale, despite evidence that 
the
> pesticides were "highly toxic" to humans and would cause death 
"from
> asphyxiation." 
> 
> The U.S. policy of cultivating 
Hussein as a moderate and reasonable
> Arab leader continued right up 
until he invaded Kuwait in August
> 1990, documents show. When the 
then-U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, April
> Glaspie, met with Hussein on July 
25, 1990, a week before the Iraqi
> attack on Kuwait, she assured him that 
Bush "wanted better and deeper
> relations," according to an Iraqi 
transcript of the conversation.
> "President Bush is an intelligent man," 
the ambassador told Hussein,
> referring to the father of the current 
president. "He is not going to
> declare an economic war against Iraq." 
> 
> "Everybody was wrong in their assessment of Saddam," said Joe 
Wilson,
> Glaspie's former deputy at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, and the 
last
> U.S. official to meet with Hussein. "Everybody in the Arab world 
told
> us that the best way to deal with Saddam was to develop a set 
of
> economic and commercial relationships that would have the effect 
of
> moderating his behavior. History will demonstrate that this was 
a
> miscalculation." 
>