[OPE-L:3499] Aristotle

[bhandari@xxxxxxxxxxxxx (Rakesh Bhandari)]

if something has certain attributes only in virtue of its form, then isn't
form both explanatory principle/factor and causal force?  It seems to me
that if the conception of causality is reduced on both semantic and
ontological grounds to event generatation by energy transfer from one
entity to another (Bunge), then we can't by definition think of form as a
cause in either a semantic or ontological sense.  But do we get into too
much metaphysical trouble if we open up the conception of causality in
either a semantic or ontological sense (the Darwinian Ernst Mayr seems not
to thinks so); moreover, does Marx need formal causality to have both
senses? If we can't even have either, then I think Marx's theory is in big
trouble.
Yours, Rakesh