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----- Original Message ----- From: Claus Germer <cmgermer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> To: <ope-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Sent: Monday, January 10, 2000 6:09 PM Subject: [OPE-L:2080] Re: Re: Re: Re: *What will happen in the 21st Century?* > In [OPE-L:2055] Duncan wrote: > > > I'm not sure I want to sign on to this concept, but I think it's worth > > discussing. I am puzzled as to how to imagine a society operating an > > advanced division of labor economy without recourse to the market, and I > > think we should be thinking about how to adapt Marxist thinking about > > socialism to Hayek's point that markets are more important as > informational > > than as allocational mechanisms. (Of course, they also redistribute...) > > > > Isn't it true that, theoretically, if socialism means the abolition of > private property of means of production, there can no longer be a market, > since this implies the sale and purchase of commodities, hence a commodity > producing society. Things that are sold are private property. > > The market is the capitalist mechanism for the distribution of use values, > but it is also the way through which social labor is distributed. Once > there is no longer a market, this means that the distribution of social > labor and of use values has to be made in another way, i.e., through > previous planning of production and distribution. If we admit that the > market should still have a role in the distribution of commodities, > shouldn't we also admit the same role for the distribution of the labor > force? This would imply wage labor .... Or not? I must say that I fully concur with Claus here. As soon as you allow for the existence of markets under a socialist economy except in the limited sense of the 'market like' distribution of consumer goods for labour tokens described by KM, you end up with the re-establishment of the circuit of capital. Any unit of production that purchases its inputs and requires to sell its outputs in order to reproduce itself is a capital, so that any economy is based on such units is a capitalist economy. I agree with Duncan that we have to take Hayek's criticisms seriously, but taking them seriously is not the same thing as giving his ideas credence. What one has to do is produce a critique of his ideas, bearing in mind that the sole purpose of his putting forward these ideas was to discredit socialism. I believe that Allin and I have at least started a critique of Hayeks work on the informational functions of the market in our paper "Information and Economics: a critique of Hayek" which appeared in Research In Political Economy, vol 16. There is a systematic failure in both Hayek and the Neoclassical literature on information and economics which stems from an misunderstanding of basic Shannon/Weaver information theory. Hayek himself, dispite having done some work in the '40s on neural nets and leaning, makes no references to information theory in his work as far as I am aware, so that his use of the term information remains at a pre-scientific ideological level. This is dispite the fact that the late '40s and '50s saw a flowering of work applying Shannon/Weaver information theory to diverse areas - computing, biology, psychology etc. The use of information theory by the Neoclassical is reviewed by Jordan in Information Incentives and Economic Mechanisms (University of Minisota Press 1987). What both Hayek and the neoclassical users of information theory share in common is their treatment the economy as being characterized by a set of agents each of whom may emit one or more messages. The receipt of these messages by other agents causes them to adjust their activity in such a way as to bring the system into equilibrium. The messages are assumed to be real valued variables, and taken in aggregate the set of possible messages sent by all of the agents forms a Euclidean vector space. The informational cost of the system is taken to be proportional to the dimension of the vectors. This definition is highly abstract, and one encounters problems if one tries to con-cretize it. First, from an information theoretic standpoint, to treat messages as real-valued variables is to accord them an infinite information content. If each message requires an infinite bit string, it then makes little sense to compare costs in terms of the number of such infinite strings required to achieve a task. This, however, is a relatively minor problem, since theoretical work of this sort can almost certainly be recast in terms of messages defined over a finite subset of the integers. A more serious problem relates to the choice of the dimension of the message vector as the metric for informational cost. In the work of Hurwicz, Mount, Reiter and Jordan (the formative contribution be-ing Hurwicz, 1960), each agent has a response function that takes as a parameter the message vector in the current time-step in order to calculate the appropriate action in the next timestep. In Hurwicz these messages m are defined as symbols drawn from some set M . It is not made clear whether this is a finite set but the argument is not altered if we make this assumption, which is necessary from an information theoretic viewpoint. The real problem is that the process by which the messages get from one agent to another is not considered. In effect it is assumed that the messages are broad-cast. This tacit assumption is highly questionable. The broadcasting of messages can only be done using a scarce resource such as a portion of the electro-magnetic spectrum. If a radio station were available to broadcast the messages, the channel would have to be time-multiplexed between the different economic agents: only one agent at a time could send a signal, and the time to perform one adjustment cycle would grow linearly with the number of agents involved. But as a practical matter the assumption that messages take the form of radio broad-casts is unreal, and if the messages must pass from each agent to all agents in each cycle they must be delivered by multiplying the messages-mail shots or something similar. In that case the total number of messages sent will be proportional to the square of the number of agents. In the simple case where the agents each emit a single integer scalar as their message, the number of messages sent will be proportional to the square of the dimension of the message vector. Thus, in using the dimension of the message vector, rather than its square, as a metric, the authors seriously underestimate the amount of information that would have to be transmitted in their model of a decentralized economy. Were this a realistic model, it would if anything demonstrate the impossibility of any large scale competitive economy because of the highly non-linear informational cost function associated with the number of agents. This applies most obviously to the total number of letters, telexes, or email messages that would have to be sent. In addition, it implies that agents must spend a number of person-hours proportional to the number of agents in the economy processing their incoming mail. The lack of realism in such models stems from two factors: the idea that information can somehow be broadcast to all participants in a single operation, and the idea that each agent must process messages from all others. This idea is probably a hangover from the Walrasian concept of an auctioneer who calls out prices. We have attempted to be both more realistic and more conservative in our estimates of the informational costs of the market economy, since we explicitly count all individual messages sent, and only compel a firm to accept information from its suppliers and customers. Given these assumptions, which are much more favorable to the market economy than those of Jordan, the number of messages we take into account is a lower bound on what must actually occur. In particular we explicitly omit all messages associated with the payment and clearing of checks between bank accounts. We are able to demonstrate that the information transmission overheads associated with the market are in fact higher than those which would be associated with a system of centralised planning. Our full form of the argument is available on: http://ricardo.ecn.wfu.edu/~cottrell/socialism_book/hayek_critique.pdf
- [OPE-L:2121] Re: Re: Why is Malthus correct on unproductive labor, according to Marx?, (continued)
- [OPE-L:2121] Re: Re: Why is Malthus correct on unproductive labor, according to Marx?, Jurriaan Bendien Wed 12 Jan 2000, 23:38 GMT
- [OPE-L:2135] Re: Why is Malthus correct on unproductive labor, according to Marx?, Gerald Levy Thu 13 Jan 2000, 12:13 GMT
- [OPE-L:2136] Re: Why is Malthus correct on unproductive labor, according to Marx?, Paul Zarembka Thu 13 Jan 2000, 16:22 GMT
- [OPE-L:2080] Re: Re: Re: Re: *What will happen in the 21st Century?*, Claus Germer Mon 10 Jan 2000, 18:10 GMT
- [OPE-L:2084] Re: *What will happen in the 21st Century?*, clyder Tue 11 Jan 2000, 13:49 GMT
- [OPE-L:2088] Re: Re: *What will happen in the 21st Century?*, Jurriaan Bendien Tue 11 Jan 2000, 17:34 GMT
- [OPE-L:2103] Re: Re: Re: *What will happen in the 21st Century?*, clyder Wed 12 Jan 2000, 09:47 GMT
- [OPE-L:2126] markets and reproduction, michael a. lebowitz Thu 13 Jan 2000, 07:54 GMT
- [OPE-L:2129] Re: markets and reproduction, clyder Thu 13 Jan 2000, 10:12 GMT