[Marxism] Selling Iran

[Louis Proyect <lnp3@xxxxxxxxx>]

http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/06/selling-iran-ahmadinejad-privatization-and-a-bus-diver-who-said-no/
Selling Iran: Ahmadinejad, Privatization and a Bus Driver Who Said No
by Billy Wharton / June 28th, 2009

A creeping assumption lies just beneath the surface of arguments 
concerning the disputed election in Iran. Incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
is cast as an anti-US populist crusader resisting the materialistic 
advances of the West. His opponent, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, as his foil — a 
Western-backed liberal intent on implementing free-market policies. 
Violent street battles have been presented as a re-enforcement of the 
Western disposition to see the two idealized positions as the limit of 
what is politically imaginable. Such arguments conveniently avoid a 
third force — the people of Iran, whose street politics threaten to move 
well beyond the confines of the electoral campaigns. Questions remain. 
Is Ahmadinejad really a populist — the only force preventing a wave of 
pro-market policies in Iran? Does Mousavi’s campaign mark the limits of 
the reform movement?

Since his election in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, under the guidance of 
the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, has overseen a regime 
dedicated to the privatization of state-controlled industries. The 
intention of the regime, as stated by the newly appointed Governor of 
the Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Seyyed Shams Al-din Hosseini, 
is to privatize 80% of state-owned industries by 2010. This mandate was 
made real just prior to the disputed elections as a state-owned bank, 
Saderat, announced it would offer 6% of its shares to private investors 
(Press TV, 6/8/09). Other significant privatizations during 
Ahmadinejad’s reign include the postal service, two other state-run 
banks, Tejerat and Mellat, and, in February 2008, a 5% bloc of shares in 
the publicly owned steel maker, Foulad-e Mobarakeh, was sold out in 
eight minutes (Iran Daily, 2/14/08). In total, since 2005, 247 
enterprises have been processed by the Iran Privatization Organization, 
the state-ministry specifically charged with overseeing privatizations 
(Iranian Privatization Organization website).

Khamenei has propelled the process forward. While Ahmadinejad crafted 
just enough populist rhetoric to provide headlines, the Supreme Leader 
issued a letter in 2006 ordering the sell-off of banking, mining, 
industrial, and transport companies — 80% across the board. 
Ahmadinejad’s ministers have aggressively followed suit. In September 
2008, Labor Minister Mohammad Jahromi described the fact that so many of 
the country’s resources are located in the public sector as an 
“obstacle” to growth (Iran Daily, 9/29/08). Heidari Kord-Zangeneh, 
Ahmadinejad’s deputy finance minister and head of the Iran Privatization 
Organization, drew pro-market policies together with the myth of 
anti-imperialism. “We are going to activate our private sector and our 
private banks,” he exclaimed, “in order to fight against these [US] 
sanctions.” He punctuated this with a pre-election promise, “I promise 
that if I am here for the next two years, between 80 and 90 percent of 
the government will be sold” (Iran Daily, 2/12/08).

Ahmadinejad’s supposed anti-Western approach stops short when it comes 
to allowing foreign investors to penetrate Iran’s economy. His Minister 
of Economic Affairs and Finance Davoud Danesh-Jafari boasted at a 2008 
meeting of the Islamic Development Bank that foreign direct investment 
in Iran had increased by 138% since 2007. (Iran Daily, 2/17/08) Some 80 
projects had been initiated during that period. Key to this capital 
penetration was the 2004 acceptance of the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF) Article VIII Obligations (IMF Press Release, 9/14/04). Under this 
provision, Iran agreed to refrain from imposing restrictions on currency 
transactions and other elements essential to capital flow.

While Ahmadinejad has been the implementer of privatization policies, 
the reform camp was its architects. Central to this process was the 
creative violation of Article 44 of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. This article mandates that key sectors of the economy 
remain in public hands. It represented the radical-populist edge of the 
1979 Islamic Revolution. Parliamentary legislation in 2004, near the end 
of the regime of reformer Mohammad Khatami, created the first breech in 
Article 44. The legislation called for a “change in the role of 
government from direct ownership and management of enterprises to 
policymaking, guidance and overseeing” (Iranian Privatization 
Organization website). The one consistent voice pushing this process 
forward is Khamenei, whose tenure as Supreme Leader encompasses both 
reformer and populist presidential regimes.

The IMF has hailed this process describing Iran in a 2007 position paper 
as, “Managing the Transition to a Market Economy.” The Fund has had a 
constant presence in the country since 1945, surviving even the 
turbulent 1979 Islamic Revolution. IMF officials have employed the usual 
equation of debt and technical assistance to enforce their pro-market 
agenda. The next phase, according to IMF planners, of market transition 
is to “curb the growth of internal demand” through the reduction of 
state subsidies. Ahmadinejad’s Central Bank appointee, Al-din Hosseini, 
indicated a shared sentiment, “The government plans to implement a 
strategy that involves significant reforms, the most important of which 
is the reform aimed at better subsidy system” (IMF Meeting, 10/13/08).

Pro-market privatizations have been combined with harsh restrictions on 
worker’s ability to organize in order to advance Ahmadinejad’s 
neo-liberal restructuring of Iran. Although Iran is technically a member 
of the International Labor Organization, and thereby mandated to allow 
free trade unions, workers are restricted from forming independent 
unions. Under the constitution, they are only allowed to join 
ideologically-centered Islamic Worker’s Councils, which hold no right to 
deal with worksite issues or collectively bargain. Despite these legal 
restrictions, privatization and soaring inflation have resulted in a 
series of escalating confrontations between workers and security forces.

In March 2007, thousands of schoolteachers spilled out into the streets 
in front of Parliament demanding that their collective grievances be 
heard and their salaries increased. They were attacked by security 
forces and their leaders received prison sentences of up to five years. 
Such repression did not deter Mahmoud Salehi, a baker, from making his 
annual demand to celebrate May Day. Salehi was found guilty of “acting 
against national security” and imprisoned. This year, in a small preview 
of the post-election street protests, Ahmadinejad’s security apparatus 
was used to repress 2,000 workers who attempted to organize a May Day 
celebration.

But the real foil to Ahmadinejad’s pro-market policies is a middle-aged 
bus driver from Tehran. Mansour Osanloo, acting as the president of the 
17,000 worker-strong Syndicate of Workers of Tehran and Suburbs Bus 
Company, led a 2005 strike in which drivers refused to accept fares in 
protest of working conditions and rising fares. The strike was 
immediately criminalized with Osanloo and fellow leaders placed under 
arrest. Undeterred, Osanloo led another strike attempt in 2006. He was 
again arrested and today sits in a cell in Iran’s notorious Evin prison 
— a living testament to both the courage of Iranian workers and the 
repressive nature of the regime.

Soon to be joining Osanloo in Evin are thousands of protesters who have 
also been criminalized by Ahmadinejad and Khamenei’s regime because of 
their protests over the stolen election. While it is difficult to 
describe a candidate with as many establishment credentials as Mousavi 
as a reformer, it is easy to see how the demonstrations on the street 
have rapidly progressed beyond his campaign. Slogans have moved from 
“Mousavi get our votes back” to “Death to the Dictator.” With this shift 
come possibilities for more radical measures. Automotive workers at 
Khodro Automobile Company have pledged resistance, university students 
are conducting sit-ins, and the Bus Drivers Union has issued a call for 
international solidarity.

Meanwhile, somewhere deep inside Evin prison, clandestine communications 
may be being initiated between a jailed bus driver and a newly minted 
student radical or an ailing baker and young rock-throwing worker. These 
actors need little help in understanding that Ahmadinejad’s regime, 
despite all his populist rhetoric, has worked hand-in-hand with IMF 
privatizers. After failing to deliver on his populist rhetoric, 
Ahmadinejad has stolen the election. Now, his only recourse is state 
repression. On the streets, something far more brilliant is underway — 
an open-ended emancipation project demanding nothing less than political 
freedom.

Billy Wharton can be reached at: wawharton@xxxxxxxxxx Read other 
articles by Billy, or visit Billy's website.


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