[Marxism] Ahmadinejad and the working class

[Louis Proyect <lnp3@xxxxxxxxx>]

http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/21792

How can we help Iranians?

June 26, 2009

By Mina Khanlarzadeh


The English-language media is full of articles that claim Iranian 
post-election demonstrations are either a class war or an uprising of 
rich Iranians against the authority. None of these articles support 
their offered claim with any strong arguments. The thought process 
usually involves either the cliche that peasants don't stand up to 
elites for sociopolitical justice --they don't know that they are being 
exploited-- or paint Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as a socialist South-American 
ally who is against the neo-liberal trend of the world and who has 
helped peasants and working class people in Iran. Consequently they 
question why working class people should protest against someone who 
helps them financially.

To test the accuracy of such ideas one can take a look at the record of 
Ahmadinejad and see how he has treated the working class during his 
presidency and whether he has done anything for the peasants of Iran 
beyond his demagogic economic slogans. Some weeks before the election, 
upon being asked by an Iranian interviewer of his opinion about labor 
syndicate, Ahmadinajed responded "what is labor syndicate?". Iranian 
workers who peacefully protested on May Day 2009, almost 42 days before 
the election, were beaten up by the police and some got arrested. 
Mansour Osanlo, who is a bus driver, was imprisoned for peacefully 
protesting for better wages for bus drivers. Teachers who protested 
peacefully in 2007 got arrested -- their income increased, however, two 
weeks before the election and many believe this to be manipulation on 
the part of Ahmadinejad. The oil income of the country during 
Ahmadinejad's presidency has been equal to the net oil incomes of 
Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammed Khatami's presidencies combined; 
nevertheless, inflation has increased. Food and housing prices are 
skyrocketing. The unemployment rate is at its highest. Ahmadinejad is in 
favor of privatization -- read, militarization--  of the economy. In the 
name of privatization, most of Iran's economy is in the hands of the 
Revolutionary Guard. Although some money and potatoes (literally!) have 
been distributed to people in marginalized areas of Iran, the benefits 
of these handouts pale in comparison to hardships -- such as high prices 
of housing and food -- resulting from economic sanctions and 
Ahmadinejad's administration's mismanagement. If members of the working 
class have a harder time feeding themselves and keeping roofs above 
their heads, and if the sociopolitical atmosphere has deteriorated under 
Ahmadinejad's presidency, why would poor people support Ahmadinejad? Not 
all poor people are Ahmadinejad's supporters. While the housing prices 
and food costs skyrocket (living expenses have doubled or tripled in the 
past four years), Ahmadinejad's slogans sound meaningless to many 
low-income people. These people live the mismanagement of the 
government; for them, it is not just numbers and graphs, it is their 
power to buy milk and bread.

There is no unified political view shared among the poor in Iran. 
Political attitudes can be influenced by several different factors, 
viz., the level of education, income, locale (rural or urban), 
religiosity, age and to some extent ethnicity. Those Iranians (young or 
old) who do not support Ahmadinejad often desire a better job, 
affordable living and housing, more sociopolitical freedom, a 
transparent, accountable administration, and a calm leader who does not 
give excuses to warmongers. Yet Ahmadinejad has supporters among people 
(not necessarily poor or from rural areas) who still believe in his 
economic justice slogans, humble way of living, modesty, nationalistic 
anti-imperialist stance and denouncements of the selective 
discriminatory behavior of world powers. Among Ahmadinejad's supporters, 
you typically see members of ideological militaries (i.e., Basij and the 
Revolutionary Guard), those who admire his modest way of living and 
economic justice slogans, and those who endorse his utopian 
anti-imperialist stance and nationalistic attitudes toward nuclear 
facilities.

Many people, rural or urban, are disillusioned with Ahmadinejad's 
promises of economic justice as a direct result of their experiences 
during these four years of his presidency. The three weeks before the 
presidential election the other three candidates made loud accusations 
about the mismanagement committed by Ahmadinejad's administration. The 
presidential debates were important, particularly Ahmadinejad's 
misleading graphs during his debate with Karoubi, which he used to 
proclaim his economic achievements. These graphs were mostly comparisons 
between the economic conditions of his and previous presidencies (i.e., 
those of Khatami and Hashemi).  A day after the Ahmadinejad-Karoubi 
debate, Mousavi showed the true graphs during his debate with Karoubi 
and compared them with Ahmaidnejad's version. Mousavi explained that all 
his data was taken from Central Bank of Iran. Mousavi's explanation and 
numbers accorded with people's financial hardships and frustrations and 
countered Ahmadinejad's hollow claims. The other important debate, and 
the hardest one for Ahmadinejad, was with Rezaie. Ahmadinajed claimed 
that unemployment rates had decreased during his presidency. Rezaie 
pointed out that, during Ahmadinejad's presidency, the definition of 
unemployment has changed (from two days of work per week to two hours of 
work per week) and therefore Ahmadinejad's claims are a manipulation at 
best. Since Ahmadinejad and Rezaei are both principalists (Osoulger), 
Rezaei's criticism of Ahmadinejad's foreign policy and economic 
mismanagement are particularly powerful. This caused people to take 
Mousavi's words more seriously; it is not simply a fight between a 
reformist and a principalist.

A friend of mine --who believes the biggest problem in Iran is the 
disparity between rich and poor, and Ahmadinejad is the one who can 
decrease or resolve this problem-- called me from Nahavand after the 
presidential debates. She was disillusioned with the demagogic slogans 
of Ahmadinejad and told me she is not going to vote for him. During 
these debates, many people, who trusted that Ahmadinejad really cared 
about low-income and repressed (Mostazafin) Iranians, learned directly 
from other presidential candidates about his manipulation of numbers and 
mismanagement of the budget, unemployment rate, inflation, etc. (There 
was a poll taken three weeks before the election by the Center of Public 
Opinion that showed significant support for Ahmadinejad, but it was not 
accurate: the debates decreased Ahmadinejad's popularity, and the 
respondents were a relatively small proportion of those who were contacted.)

The Euro-American media has reported that the Iranian president does not 
have much authority in Iran's political system and therefore it is not 
important who will become the president. This idea was promulgated by 
anti-war activists who feared a war with Iran, which would be justified 
by demonizing Ahmadinejad -- calling him an anti-semite and a threat to 
Israel's existence. While it is correct that the Iranian president can 
not order war or an invasion of another country, he _can_ affect 
sociopolitical freedoms such as limiting cinema, book, and media access. 
  The president's economic policies can also have a direct effect on 
people's lives.

A month before the election I was discussing the different candidates' 
plans with Iranians onfriendfeed.com . We considered many different 
aspects of each candidate. Mousavi had the support of Khatami; the 
alliance between Khatami and Mousavi gave the idea that under Mousavi's 
presidency there would be increased sociopolitical freedom. Mousavi also 
had the support of his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, a famous revolutionary 
feminist who campaigned with him, giving speeches. Zahra Rahnavard gave 
the idea that women's rights activists' demands are more likely to be 
met if Mousavi becomes president. During his service as the prime 
minister, Mousavi showed himself to be a socialist in economic policy. 
His belief in social welfare and social justice caused people to think 
that he still cares about what most other reformists have abandoned from 
their political agendas. Unlike Mousavi, however, the other reformists 
are only focused on sociopolitical freedom. They are pro capitalism and 
privatization and do not have slogans like Ahmadinejad about poor or 
repressed (mostazafin) people, albeit Ahmadinejad's slogans are empty 
and he is the most pro-privatization president after the revolution. 
Mousavi appealed to those who seek sociopolitical freedom and to those 
who care about state welfare. He was a close associate of Khomeini and 
was once famously told by Khomeini that those who accuse you of not 
being able to manage the country are themselves not capable of managing 
a bakery. For many, Khomeini's support gives Mousavi popularity. Keep in 
mind that many reformists achieve their legitimacy by mentioning 
Khomeini's name in their speeches in order to show commitment to the 
revolution and its values.

The reforms that many people in Iran seek are unachievable by either 
reformists or principalists. Khatami, a former reformist president from 
1997 to 2005, was limited by the governmental structure and was a 
disappointment to many Iranians. Under the pressure of the current 
government, however, it is hard to organize an independent political 
movement that reflects the sociopolitical aspects of what many Iranians 
seek to achieve. Many political activists, such as socialists, were 
imprisoned or killed after the revolution. Given the current 
circumstances, the best chance for reform is within the system itself, 
through legal avenues such as elections (consider, e.g., the reform 
movement and the green movement). As the post-election protests showed 
us, even a movement within the establishment can cost physical 
punishment, imprisonment, and even human life. To many Iranian people, 
reformists like Mousavi who are part of the system and care about 
socioeconomic justice are the path to real change.

The Euro-American media has been fascinated by Iran's election. They 
have been captivated about the domestic shortcomings of the Ahmadinejad 
administration from the perspective of the Iranian people. The 
post-election protest itself is an affair that the Euro-American media 
would not expect from Iranian society -- from the same people who have 
been demonized over the past four years, through their president. People 
of Iran have always been the passive victims of an "all options on the 
table, including military" policy. The media is shocked to see the very 
same Iranian people in the streets, lambasting their president over 
domestic issues. Now the question the Euro-American media genuinely asks 
is "how we can help Iranian people". To answer this question, one should 
examine closely the effect of the US rhetoric on domestic issues of Iran 
during the last four years.

Audiences in Europe and the US came to realize that Iranian people have 
real issues with the domestic issues that have intensified during 
Ahmadinejad's presidency, including a growing disparity between the poor 
and the rich, pro-privatization agenda (despite Ahmedinejad's 
socioeconomic justice slogans), deteriorating sociopolitical freedom, 
unsatisfactory response to women's rights movement, high housing prices 
and the failure of economic justice (promised in Ahmedinejad's 2005 
campaign). Ahmadinejad's administration correctly blames economic 
sanctions imposed on Iran by the US for some of the economic failures. 
There has also been a cacophony of war threats against Iran. These war 
threats have been the most important national crisis for all Iranians. 
People throughout the political spectrum fell silent about domestic 
issues in order to unify against a possible war. The threat of war, 
combined with Ahmadinejad's bombastic nationalistic rhetoric, 
overshadowed his failed domestic policies for some Iranians. In fact, 
some people throughout the Middle East who are tired of threats and 
humiliation consider Ahmadinejad to be a hero. Although Ahmadinejad 
deserved to be criticized for domestic policy, these shortcomings have 
been overshadowed by Ahmadinejad's strong stance in defense of Iran's 
right to have nuclear facilities, national dignity, and sovereignty.

So how can Americans help the people of Iran? In order to help Iranians, 
the obstacles to better life conditions should be recognized. The war 
threats and economic sanctions hurt Iranians both directly (through 
economic hardship) and indirectly (by empowering the Iranian government 
and overshadowing their mismanagements). Furthermore, the economy of 
Iran is largely based on oil and the government is the distributor of 
the oil wealth; it can give financial help to those who are faithful to 
them. This increases the notion of "khodi va gheire khodi" (us vs. 
them). Iranians bear the cost of the war threats and foreign 
interventions. They are forced into silence about domestic issues in 
order to unify against the "enemies," not giving them any excuses. 
Observe that even the green movement, indigenous to Iran, is accused by 
the Iranian government of being tainted by a fabricated association with 
Western enemies. (It should also be mentioned that, in parallel, some 
English language media offensively label the green movement the "Gucci 
glasses" movement.) In conclusion, to truly help Iranians, the economic 
sanctions and all war threats should be removed and in solidarity with 
demonstrators and people of Iran, their voice should be amplified by the 
their brothers and sisters all over the globe.



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