[Marxism] Fighting "Talibanization" in Pakistan covers elite privilege and repression

["Fred Feldman" <ffeldman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/mar/11/pakistan-islam-za
rdari
An elite clings on to power
The idea that Pakistan is being 'Talibanised' helps stifle dissent and
protect privilege
Markus Daechsel guardian.co.uk, 
Thursday 12 March 2009  

The spectre of "Talibanisation" has taken possession of much recent
political commentary on Pakistan. The attacks on the Sri Lankan cricket team
in Lahore have become part of the same story as the imposition of "sharia
law" in Swat, the bombing of security forces in Peshawar and vigilante
action against video shops in Islamabad. This fabric of fear creates the
sense of a failing state on the eve of another Islamic revolution and
ignores that these are all different kinds of events happening in different
places and for different reasons.

Such a narrative is not only an exercise in over-simplification, it is also
an important political weapon in the hands of the powerful both inside and
outside Pakistan.

The threat of a violent religious takeover hides the highly questionable
sources of power on which the current and allegedly secular government of
President Asif Ali Zardari depends. The former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif,
is not entirely off the mark when he described the prevailing system as an
"elected dictatorship" - although it has to be said that his own terms in
office had been similarly marred by extrajudicial killings and the willful
dismissal of critical bureaucrats. Although Zardari himself has always been
trusted somewhat less than his late wife Benazir Bhutto, much of western
opinion continues to produce support for his Pakistan People's party at the
expense of their (allegedly) more religiously inclined rivals.

William Dalrymple recently claimed in this newspaper that Sindh - Zardari's
home province - was a model of peace and tranquility, and that Sufism - the
local brand of mystical Islam - should be recommended as an antidote to the
Wahhabi extremism of the frontier. What Dalrymple, and others of similar
opinion, do not say is that the tranquility in rural Sindh is achieved
through the near total power of feudal landowners who pose as secular
parliamentarians by day but punish local dissent with greatest brutality at
night. The veneration of saints (pirs) that is fundamental to Sufi Islam is
an essential component in this network of oppression as most of these saints
are closely linked to the landowners by financial and family ties. It was
actually the unwillingness of anybody else to represent the grievances of
local tenant populations against such landowners in the south of Punjab that
gave a first opening to Sunni sectarian groups widely associated with
today's "Talibanisation".

Much of what can be described as a "religious turn" in Pakistan today is
best explained with reference to increasing social mobility and political
mobilisation. The influx of remittances from the Gulf states and elsewhere,
a growing urbanisation of the population and the expansion of higher
education over the last decades have created both the opportunity and the
need for new forms of social identity to millions of Pakistanis. A more
visible espousal of Islamic dress, for instance, by first-generation female
students or working women represents an attempt to rework old ideas of
respectability into more mobile and self-aware forms.

The demand for sharia law similarly acquires a less sinister and reactionary
meaning when seen in the local context. Most cases in the official legal
system drag on for so long as to financially destroy the economically weaker
party regardless of the merit of their claims. The infamous Red Mosque
madrassa in Islamabad, which was before its bloody demolition by the
Musharraf government in 2007 seen as the very lynchpin of "Talibanisation",
did have a large and flourishing section for female students. When
interviewed on cable television during the siege, their worried parents
turned out to be less religious radical than mainstream conservatives of
aspiring working class background. In a country where almost all access to
power and economic resources depends on expensive private education, it is
unsurprising that they would choose a madrassa as the most affordable
option.

The years leading up to the downfall of the Musharraf government saw the
emergence of a new and broad coalition of Pakistanis campaigning for freedom
of speech, for a more democratic government and for a wider sharing of
economic resources. Key to its vibrancy and success was the unfettered
journalism of the new private television channels, which has since been
curtailed in the name of counterterrorism. This coalition was remarkable
because it bypassed much of the old elite and gave little importance to many
of the old identity divisions of secular and religious. It started with the
organisation of unofficial aid after the devastating earthquake of 2005 and
continued in the popular campaign to have the chief justice reinstated; it
brought together critical elements in the elite with newly aspiring sections
of the population.

The narrative of "Talibanisation" is designed to drive a wedge into this
coalition and to persuade the rich and the liberal that their ultimate
safety rests with the bastions of old privilege - the military and the 
feudal elite.
guardian.co.uk C Guardian News and Media Limited 2009



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