Re: [Marxism] Supply-line problems critical for imperialists inAfghanistan

["Lüko Willms" <lueko.willms@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Sun, 08 Feb 2009 19:46:39 -0500, Fred Feldman wrote:

  quoting Juan Cole: 

> While the attention of the US public and the news media here has been
> consumed (understandably enough) by the congressional debate over the
> economic stimulus plan, America's war in Afghanistan has nearly collapsed
> because of logistical problems.

   A recent article of the Stratfor (Strategic Forecast) geopolitician George 
Friedman may add some food for thought on this issue. Geopolitics, 
especially in the Stratfor version, thinks of the world as a collection of 
nations which try to dominate each other, but without any thought of the 
existence of several distinct and even opposed social classes whose struggle 
determines history. 

  According to what I know, the German occupation troops in Afghanistan 
move supplies also by rail via the Russian Federation, and there has been 
speculation that they would want to extend up to their Masar-i-Sharif camp 
the broad gauge rail line which crosses the border river Amu Darja at 
Heyratan
> 
<http://maps.google.de/maps?f=q&source=s_q&hl=de&geocode=&q=heyratan+
Friendship+bridge&sll=37.232515,67.40181&sspn=0.082278,0.164452&ie=UTF8
&ll=37.218847,67.404556&spn=0.082293,0.10746&t=h&z=13&lci=lmc:panorami
o>
which is said to extend 12 km into Afghanistan. The Russian Federation has 
also recently allowed the transport of military goods; in how far this is also 
done by Uzbekistan is unknown to me. 


published January 19, 2009:
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OBAMA ENTERS THE GREAT GAME

By George Friedman


U.S. President-elect Barack Obama will be sworn in on Tuesday as president 
of the United States. Candidate Obama said much about what he would do as 
president; now we will see what President Obama actually does. The most 
important issue Obama will face will be the economy, something he did not 
anticipate through most of his campaign. The first hundred days of his 
presidency thus will revolve around getting a stimulus package passed. But 
Obama also is now in the great game of global competition -- and in that 
game, presidents rarely get to set the agenda.

The major challenge he faces is not Gaza; the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is 
not one any U.S. president intervenes in unless he wants to experience pain. 
As we have explained, that is an intractable conflict to which there is no real 
solution. Certainly, Obama will fight being drawn into mediating the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict during his first hundred days in office. He 
undoubtedly will send the obligatory Middle East envoy, who will spend time 
with all the parties, make suitable speeches and extract meaningless 
concessions from all sides. This envoy will establish some sort of process to 
which everyone will cynically commit, knowing it will go nowhere. Such a 
mission is not involvement -- it is the alternative to involvement, and the 
reason presidents appoint Middle East envoys. Obama can avoid the Gaza 
crisis, and he will do so. 


Obama's Two Unavoidable Crises

The two crises that cannot be avoided are Afghanistan and Russia. First, the 
situation in Afghanistan is tenuous for a number of reasons, and it is not a 
crisis that Obama can avoid decisions on. Obama has said publicly that he 
will decrease his commitments in Iraq and increase them in Afghanistan. He 
thus will have more troops fighting in Afghanistan. The second crisis emerged 
from a decision by Russia to cut off natural gas to Ukraine, and the resulting 
decline in natural gas deliveries to Europe. This one obviously does not 
affect the United States directly, but even after flows are restored, it 
affects 
the Europeans greatly. Obama therefore comes into office with three 
interlocking issues: Afghanistan, Russia and Europe. In one sense, this is a 
single issue -- and it is not one that will wait. 

Obama clearly intends to follow Gen. David Petraeus' lead in Afghanistan. The 
intention is to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, thereby 
intensifying pressure on the Taliban and opening the door for negotiations 
with the militant group or one of its factions. Ultimately, this would see the 
inclusion of the Taliban or Taliban elements in a coalition government. 
Petraeus pursued this strategy in Iraq with Sunni insurgents, and it is the 
likely strategy in Afghanistan. 

But the situation in Afghanistan has been complicated by the situation in 
Pakistan. Roughly three-quarters of U.S. and NATO supplies bound for 
Afghanistan are delivered to the Pakistani port of Karachi and trucked over 
the border to Afghanistan. Most fuel used by Western forces in Afghanistan is 
refined in Pakistan and delivered via the same route. There are two crossing 
points, one near Afghanistan's Kandahar province at Chaman, Pakistan, and 
the other through the Khyber Pass. The Taliban have attacked Western 
supply depots and convoys, and Pakistan itself closed the routes for several 
days, citing government operations against radical Islamist forces. 

Meanwhile, the situation in Pakistan has been complicated by tensions with 
India. The Indians have said that the individuals who carried out the Nov. 26 
Mumbai attack were Pakistanis supported by elements in the Pakistani 
government. After Mumbai, India made demands of the Pakistanis. While the 
situation appears to have calmed, the future of Indo-Pakistani relations 
remains far from clear; anything from a change of policy in New Delhi to new 
terrorist attacks could see the situation escalate. The Pakistanis have made it 
clear that a heightened threat from India requires them to shift troops away 
from the Afghan border and toward the east; a small number of troops 
already has been shifted. 

Apart from the direct impact this kind of Pakistani troop withdrawal would 
have on cross-border operations by the Taliban, such a move also would 
dramatically increase the vulnerability of NATO supply lines through Pakistan. 
Some supplies could be shipped in by aircraft, but the vast bulk of supplies 
-- petroleum, ammunition, etc. -- must come in via surface transit, either by 
truck, rail or ship. Western operations in Afghanistan simply cannot be 
supplied from the air alone. A cutoff of the supply lines across Pakistan 
would thus leave U.S. troops in Afghanistan in crisis. Because Washington 
can't predict or control the future actions of Pakistan, of India or of 
terrorists, 
the United States must find an alternative to the routes through Pakistan.

When we look at a map, the two routes through Pakistan from Karachi are 
clearly the most logical to use. If those were closed -- or even meaningfully 
degraded -- the only other viable routes would be through the former Soviet 
Union.

One route, along which a light load of fuel is currently transported, crosses 
the Caspian Sea. Fuel refined in Armenia is ferried across the Caspian to 
Turkmenistan (where a small amount of fuel is also refined), then shipped 
across Turkmenistan directly to Afghanistan and through a small spit of land 
in Uzbekistan. This route could be expanded to reach either the Black Sea 
through Georgia or the Mediterranean through Georgia and Turkey (though the 
additional use of Turkey would require a rail gauge switch). It is also not 
clear that transports native to the Caspian have sufficient capacity for this.

Another route sidesteps the issues of both transport across the Caspian and 
the sensitivity of Georgia by crossing Russian territory above the Caspian. 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan (and likely at least a small corner of Turkmenistan) 
would connect the route to Afghanistan. There are options of connecting to 
the Black Sea or transiting to Europe through either Ukraine or Belarus.

Iran could provide a potential alternative, but relations between Tehran and 
Washington would have to improve dramatically before such discussions 
could even begin -- and time is short.

Many of the details still need to be worked out. But they are largely 
variations on the two main themes of either crossing the Caspian or transiting 
Russian territory above it. 

Though the first route is already partially established for fuel, it is not 
clear 
how much additional capacity exists. To complicate matters further, Turkmen 
acquiescence is unlikely without Russian authorization, and Armenia remains 
strongly loyal to Moscow as well. While the current Georgian government 
might leap at the chance, the issue is obviously an extremely sensitive one 
for Moscow. (And with Russian forces positioned in Azerbaijan and the 
Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow has 
troops looming over both sides of the vulnerable route across Georgia.) The 
second option would require crossing Russian territory itself, with a number of 
options -- from connecting to the Black Sea to transiting either Ukraine or 
Belarus to Europe, or connecting to the Baltic states.

(click image to enlarge)

Both routes involve countries of importance to Russia where Moscow has 
influence, regardless of whether those countries are friendly to it. This would 
give Russia ample opportunity to scuttle any such supply line at multiple 
points for reasons wholly unrelated to Afghanistan.

If the West were to opt for the first route, the Russians almost certainly 
would pressure Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan not to cooperate, and Turkey 
would find itself in a position it doesn't want to be in -- namely, caught 
between the United States and Russia. The diplomatic complexities of 
developing these routes not only involve the individual countries included, 
they also inevitably lead to the question of U.S.-Russian relations. 

Even without crossing Russia, both of these two main options require Russian 
cooperation. The United States must develop the option of an alternative 
supply route to Pakistan, and in doing so, it must define its relationship with 
Russia. Seeking to work without Russian approval of a route crossing its 
"near abroad" will represent a challenge to Russia. But getting Russian 
approval will require a U.S. accommodation with the country.


The Russian Natural Gas Connection 

One of Obama's core arguments against the Bush administration was that it 
acted unilaterally rather than with allies. Specifically, Obama meant that the 
Bush administration alienated the Europeans, therefore failing to build a 
sustainable coalition for the war. By this logic, it follows that one of 
Obama's 
first steps should be to reach out to Europe to help influence or pressure the 
Russians, given that NATO has troops in Afghanistan and Obama has said he 
intends to ask the Europeans for more help there. 

The problem with this is that the Europeans are passing through a serious 
crisis with Russia, and that Germany in particular is involved in trying to 
manage that crisis. This problem relates to natural gas. Ukraine is dependent 
on Russia for about two-thirds of the natural gas it uses. The Russians 
traditionally have provided natural gas at a deep discount to former Soviet 
republics, primarily those countries Russia sees as allies, such as Belarus or 
Armenia. Ukraine had received discounted natural gas, too, until the 2004 
Orange Revolution, when a pro-Western government came to power in Kiev. 
At that point, the Russians began demanding full payment. Given the 
subsequent rises in global energy prices, that left Ukraine in a terrible 
situation -- which of course is exactly where Moscow wanted it.

The Russians cut off natural gas to Ukraine for a short period in January 
2006, and for three weeks in 2009. Apart from leaving Ukraine desperate, the 
cutoff immediately affected the rest of Europe, because the natural gas that 
goes to Europe flows through Ukraine. This put the rest of Europe in a 
dangerous position, particularly in the face of bitterly cold weather in 
2008-2009.

The Russians achieved several goals with this. First, they pressured Ukraine 
directly. Second, they forced many European states to deal with Moscow 
directly rather than through the European Union. Third, they created a 
situation in which European countries had to choose between supporting 
Ukraine and heating their own homes. And last, they drew Berlin in particular 
-- since Germany is the most dependent of the major European states on 
Russian natural gas -- into the position of working with the Russians to get 
Ukraine to agree to their terms. (Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited 
Germany last week to discuss this directly with German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel.) 

The Germans already have made clear their opposition to expanding NATO to 
Ukraine and Georgia. Given their dependency on the Russians, the Germans 
are not going to be supporting the United States if Washington decides to 
challenge Russia over the supply route issue. In fact, the Germans -- and 
many of the Europeans -- are in no position to challenge Russia on 
anything, least of all on Afghanistan. Overall, the Europeans see themselves 
as having limited interests in the Afghan war, and many already are planning 
to reduce or withdraw troops for budgetary reasons. 

It is therefore very difficult to see Obama recruiting the Europeans in any 
useful manner for a confrontation with Russia over access for American 
supplies to Afghanistan. Yet this is an issue he will have to address 
immediately. 


The Price of Russian Cooperation

The Russians are prepared to help the Americans, however -- and it is clear 
what they will want in return. 

At minimum, Moscow will want a declaration that Washington will not press 
for the expansion of NATO to Georgia or Ukraine, or for the deployment of 
military forces in non-NATO states on the Russian periphery -- specifically, 
Ukraine and Georgia. At this point, such a declaration would be symbolic, 
since Germany and other European countries would block expansion anyway. 

The Russians might also demand some sort of guarantee that NATO and the 
United States not place any large military formations or build any major 
military facilities in the former Soviet republics (now NATO member states) of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. (A small rotating squadron of NATO fighters 
already patrols the skies over the Baltic states.) Given that there were 
intense anti-government riots in Latvia and Lithuania last week, the stability 
of these countries is in question. The Russians would certainly want to topple 
the pro-Western Baltic governments. And anything approaching a formal 
agreement between Russia and the United States on the matter could quickly 
destabilize the Baltics, in addition to very much weakening the NATO alliance.
 
Another demand the Russians probably will make -- because they have in 
the past -- is that the United States guarantee eventual withdrawal from any 
bases in Central Asia in return for Russian support for using those bases for 
the current Afghan campaign. (At present, the United States runs air logistics 
operations out of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan.) The Russians do not want to 
see Central Asia become a U.S. sphere of influence as the result of an 
American military presence.
 
Other demands might relate to the proposed U.S. ballistic missile defense 
installations in the Czech Republic and Poland.

We expect the Russians to make variations on all these demands in 
exchange for cooperation in creating a supply line to Afghanistan. Simply 
put, the Russians will demand that the United States acknowledge a Russian 
sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. The Americans will not want 
to concede this -- or at least will want to make it implicit rather than 
explicit. 
But the Russians will want this explicit, because an explicit guarantee will 
create a crisis of confidence over U.S. guarantees in the countries that 
emerged from the Soviet Union, serving as a lever to draw these countries 
into the Russian orbit. U.S. acquiescence on the point potentially would have 
ripple effects in the rest of Europe, too.

Therefore, regardless of the global financial crisis, Obama has an immediate 
problem on his hands in Afghanistan. He has troops fighting there, and they 
must be supplied. The Pakistani supply line is no longer a sure thing. The 
only other options either directly challenge Russia (and ineffectively at that) 
or require Russian help. Russia's price will be high, particularly because 
Washington's European allies will not back a challenge to Russia in Georgia, 
and all options require Russian cooperation anyway. Obama's plan to recruit 
the Europeans on behalf of American initiatives won't work in this case. 
Obama does not want to start his administration with making a massive 
concession to Russia, but he cannot afford to leave U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan without supplies. He can hope that nothing happens in Pakistan, 
but that is up to the Taliban and other Islamist groups more than anyone else 
-- and betting on their goodwill is not a good idea. 

Whatever Obama is planning to do, he will have to deal with this problem 
fast, before Afghanistan becomes a crisis. And there are no good solutions. 
But unlike with the Israelis and Palestinians, Obama can't solve this by 
sending a special envoy who appears to be doing something. He will have to 
make a very tough decision. Between the economy and this crisis, we will find 
out what kind of president Obama is.

And we will find out very soon.


This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution 
to www.stratfor.com.

Copyright 2009 Stratfor.

----------------- off -----------------


Comradely yours,   
Lüko Willms
Frankfurt, Germany
--------------------------------
visit http://www.mlwerke.de Marx, Engels, Luxemburg, Lenin, Trotzki in Ge
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