[Marxism] Hizballah: Hamas holding own and refusing role of Islamist Fatah

["Fred Feldman" <ffeldman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article10163.shtml
Will Hizballah intervene in the Gaza conflict? 
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, The Electronic Intifada, 11 January 2009 

  
A mock Katyusha rocket-launcher pointed towards Israel sits next to a main
highway in southern Lebanon. (Matthew Cassel)  

While Israel fervently attempts to terrorize the Palestinians into
submission in Gaza, many observers have started to wonder why Hizballah has
refrained from stepping in militarily to assist its brothers-in-arms, Hamas.
Such musings fail to take account of the constraints on Hizballah's room for
action, as well as the circumstances under which Hizballah would ignore such
constraints. The question that should be posed is not so much if Hizballah
will act, but when.

As things currently stand, Hizballah is not in a position to directly help
Hamas militarily by opening a new front with Israel. In the first place,
Hizballah and its supporters have only recently recovered from the
devastating impact of Israel's war against them in July 2006. A Hizballah
offensive against northern Israel would surely be met with
"disproportionate" force on Israel's part, which Israel has been threatening
as much for several months now. Mass destruction and devastation aside,
Hizballah would once again be faced with intense domestic pressures to
disarm, and possibly, more externally manufactured, locally-executed
conspiracies hatched against it that could drag it into the kind of civil
warfare that the movement found itself in during May 2008.

Armed action by Hizballah would not only hurt the movement but would also
harm Hamas whose status as a nationalist resistance movement, capable of
defending its own people, would be greatly undermined and its raison d'etre
called into question. Furthermore, since Hamas has thus far managed to
withstand the Israeli onslaught on its own without suffering any significant
damage to its organizational hierarchy or military infrastructure, Hizballah
does not regard an intervention on its part as an exigent need.


The preconditions for Hizballah's active engagement in the conflict are two.
First, if Hamas is left bleeding to death on the battlefield, either due to
the decapitation of its leadership ranks or if its military infrastructure
suffers a significant blow, drastically impairing its military performance
and leading to its eventual collapse, Hizballah would likely step in.
Second, if the organization is forced to accept a conditional ceasefire
along the lines of the current French-Egyptian proposal that meets all of
Israel's key demands while weakening Hamas militarily and politically,
Hizballah would feel compelled to come to its rescue.

For Hizballah, the need to act under such circumstances would override all
the attendant costs that come with such action -- a calculation which takes
as its basis Hizballah's moral responsibility towards the Palestinians and
the shared strategic fate between the two resistance movements. As expressed
by Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on 16 July 2008: "[the
resistance] is one project and the resistance movement is one movement and
has one course, one destiny, one goal, despite its different parties,
factions, beliefs, sects and intellectual and political trends ...
Resistance movements in this region, especially in Lebanon and Palestine,
complement one another and are contiguous groups ..."

Hizballah's view of the conflict in Gaza

This moral and strategic imperative to act is also based on Hizballah's
understanding of the current war as but one episode of an open-ended and
comprehensive war waged by the US-Israeli-"moderate" Arab axis against the
jabhit al-mumana'a (political and military resistance front) which includes
Iran, Syria, Hizballah and Hamas. According to this narrative, the events
unfolding are simply an extension of the July War of 2006, as evinced by
Israel's admission that one motive behind its current onslaught is to
restore the deterrence capability and image it lost in July 2006. Further
bolstering this view is the virtually identical stand moderate Arab regimes
have taken on Gaza as the one taken in July 2006. In fact, the perception of
the Arab role has shifted from one of "silence" and concealed
"collaboration" with Israel in the July War, to open "cooperation" and
"partnership" with the Zionist state in its war against Gaza. So blatant has
Arab, and especially Egyptian, government support for Israel's military
campaigns become, that even UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (known for his
sympathies to the US and Israel) chided Arab regimes on 29 December for "not
doing enough" to help the Palestinians in Gaza, while Israeli officials and
media continue to knowingly embarrass their moderate Arab allies by
flaunting their newly out-of-the closet relationship.

Considering the extent of Arab cooperation with Israel in its latest
military (mis)adventure and in view of the ferocity of the latter, the
current Gaza episode is deemed a particularly dangerous moment in the
regional conflict insofar as it represents not merely a war against Hamas,
but against the Palestinian cause, or as Nasrallah described it on 29
December, "the fate of Palestine." Given that the Palestinian cause is
embodied by Hamas and defines the political identity of its regional allies,
this conflict is one in which the ideological and strategic stakes for all
members of the resistance front are extremely high. Nasrallah admitted as
much in his 28 December speech: "what is happening in Gaza will have
repercussions not only for Gaza alone or Palestine, but for the entire umma
[a term used to refer to the Arab nation in a secular nationalist context
and for the world community of Muslims]. We must continue work and not be
satisfied with an activity here, a demonstration there ... we must exert
every effort to defend our people."

Hizballah's regional strategy in the Gaza conflict

For Hizballah, the Israeli offensive against Gaza must have been foreseeable
given Israel's repeated violations of its ceasefire agreement with Hamas
over the past several months and the latter's refusal to renew it at least a
month before it expired. It is more than likely that Hizballah has been
preparing for this eventuality alongside Hamas for some time now. In a sign
of such coordination, on 15 December Nasrallah used a televised speech to
mobilize popular support for an "open ended" campaign to lift the siege on
Gaza that was to be launched on 19 December, several days before the Israeli
assault began. It is no coincidence that the Hizballah leader chose to make
this announcement one day after Hamas' political head, Khaled Meshal,
formally declared the movement's ceasefire with Israel over on 14 December.

Over and above this political coordination, Hizballah must have helped Hamas
ready itself for such an Israeli operation by providing weapons and
training, as well as through joint military planning. Hizballah officials'
strong confidence in Hamas' military performance appears to stem from an
intimate knowledge of the organization's capabilities. This conclusion
reveals itself in the assertion made by the head of Hizballah's
parliamentary bloc, Mohammad Raad, who claimed on 2 January that "the enemy
will be surprised by the range of rockets found in the resistance's arsenal
in Gaza." This argument is further bolstered by Nasrallah's admission in
March 2002 that the three Hizballah officials whom Jordan had captured as
they were trying to smuggle weapons into the West Bank, did in fact belong
to the movement, as well as his declaration at the time that "to supply arms
to the Palestinians is a duty ... it is shameful to consider such an act as
a crime."

Hamas' fighting style also seems to bear the hallmarks of the military
tactics Hizballah used during the July War such as its use of underground
bunkers and tunnel networks, as well as adopting similar rocket tactics, all
of which suggest Hizballah's extensive training of Hamas' military forces.
Nasrallah came close to admitting as much when he claimed on 31 December
that "the resistance in Gaza benefitted more from these lessons [from the
July War] than the Israelis." More than simply receiving military training,
Hamas's military strategy appears to conform to the "new school of fighting"
founded by Hizballah's assassinated military leader, Imad Mughniyeh (himself
rumored to have personally trained and equipped several Palestinian groups
over the years), which combines conventional and non-conventional, guerilla
warfare that functions not only to liberate occupied territory, but to
defend it from aggression.

Hizballah's strategy vis-a-vis Egypt

Not only did Hizballah coordinate its activity on the Gaza crisis with
Hamas, but also with Iran. One such indication of this coordination was the
fact that the Iranian campaign against Egypt's closure of the Rafah crossing
was launched several days in advance of the one kicked off by Nasrallah,
prompting Cairo to recall its diplomatic envoy from Tehran. On 12 December,
Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, a member of the Assembly of Experts with strong
ties to Iran's Supreme Leader, Imam Khamenei, disparaged Arab regimes in
language reminiscent of Khomeini's revolutionary discourse of the 1980s:
"Forget about silence. They are cooperating with Israel." Referring to Egypt
by name, in light of its cooperation with Israel on the Gaza siege, Khatami
asked: "where has your Islam gone, where has your humanity gone?" In a
similar vein, in his 28 December speech Nasrallah denied the existence of an
Arab "silence," insisting that it was an Arab "partnership" with Israel.
Like Khatami, Nasrallah also singled out Egypt by name, warning it that if
did not open the crossing then it too would be "partners to the crime,
partners to the murders and partners to the Palestinian tragedy." To that
end, the Hizballah leader called on "millions" of Egyptians to brave
government repression and take to the streets to express their outrage,
similarly urging the Egyptian armed forces to apply pressure on the regime
to open the crossing.

While many have dismissed Nasrallah's verbal barrage on the Mubarak regime
as little more than a diversionary or compensatory tactic designed to divert
attention from or compensate for Hizballah's inaction, such a view fails to
appreciate the unprecedented nature of this attack, as well as the wider
strategy underpinning it. Not since the 1980s has Hizballah adopted such an
inflammatory discourse against an Arab regime, or even singled out any one
for attack. Not even during the July War, when Arab complicity with Israel
was at its peak, did Nasrallah call on the Arab masses to exert pressure on
their governments, nor did Hizballah's relations with those regimes take a
turn for the worse thereafter. At the time, Hizballah clearly did not want
to burn its bridges with Arab regimes or provide them with ammunition to
invoke the Shiite scarecrow and stoke Sunni-Shiite tensions. In Gaza though,
Hizballah has not found any such room for diplomacy and self-restraint. In
his 7 January speech, Nasrallah warned that although Hizballah did not make
enemies of those who had betrayed it during the July War, "we will make
those who collaborate against Gaza and its people our enemies."

Hizballah's policy shift and its coordination with Iran on this matter
signal a joint Iranian-Hizballah strategy of exposing the Mubarak regime's
collusion with Israel and pressuring it to lift its siege of Gaza. These
goals also fulfill the grander objective of shaking the foundations of the
Egyptian-Israeli alliance which, in turn, would serve to weaken Israel's
regional position. A strategy of this kind is deemed necessary given Egypt's
"public embrace" of Israel, as one Israeli journalist put it (Haaretz, 9
January). In contrast to the July War when Egypt and other moderate regimes
confined their collaborative role to blaming Hizballah for Israel's
aggression, this time round Egypt has not even bothered to feign neutrality
while secretly trying to benefit from Israel's campaign against Hamas. In
this war, Egypt cannot even play the role of conspiring mediator because it
is in fact, a party to the conflict. Egypt's foreknowledge of Israel's
operation -- some would even argue, its demand that Israel launch such an
operation -- is now common knowledge, as is the false sense of security it
lulled Hamas into prior to the Israeli assault.

But the most palpable indication of Egypt's shared war aims with Israel is
in its siege of Gaza and its ardent refusal to lift it. Hizballah and its
allies view the opening of the Rafah crossing as being key to the outcome of
the conflict. As Nasrallah explained on 28 December: "today the Egyptian
stand is the cornerstone of what is going on in Gaza. If the crossing is
opened, and water, food, medicine, and money, and even arms reach our people
in Gaza, the epic victory in Lebanon will be repeated." Hizballah's wartime
experiences demonstrate this fact only too well. Syria's opening of its
border crossing with Lebanon, permitting the movement of weapons, goods and
refugees, was pivotal to Hizballah's military success in 2006. In the case
of Rafah, the opening of the border crossing is deemed even more
indispensable for the Palestinians considering that it is not merely a
supply line for Hamas, but a lifeline for Gaza's population who are besieged
from all sides.

While Nasrallah's strategy has failed to persuade Mubarak to open the
crossing, it did serve to greatly embarrass his domestic and regional
standing and reduce his regime's role to a purely defensive one, preoccupied
with formulating lamentable counter-arguments to the Hizballah chief's
accusations, and rallying its moderate allies to its defense. Furthermore,
to cover up for its moral bankruptcy the Egyptian regime has now formulated
a ceasefire initiative in the vain hope that it can somehow restore its lost
regional role. For the Palestinians though (not to mention the vast majority
of Egyptians and Arabs), no action on Egypt's part can compensate for the
opening of the Rafah border crossing. Moreover, the initiative itself serves
Israel's interests and military objectives, as well as as those of Mahmoud
Abbas, in so far as it merely seeks to reinstate the Fatah-Israel agreement
of 2005 which called for the supervision of the border by Fatah security men
and European monitors. Although Hizballah has yet to comment on the
initiative, Hamas has expressed "major reservations" about it, while Iran
has rejected it outright. It can be therefore surmised that Hizballah's and
Iran's forthcoming strategy will be to ensure that Hamas is not pressured to
accept the Egyptian proposal, which would weaken it politically and
militarily. Hizballah and its allies will strongly back Hamas' refusal to
become the Islamist equivalent of Fatah.


________________________________________________
YOU MUST clip all extraneous text when replying to a message.
Send list submissions to: Marxism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Set your options at: 
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/options/marxism/archive%40archives.econ.utah.edu