[Marxism] Little Blue Pills Among the Ways CIA Wins Friends in Afghanistan

[Greg McDonald <sabocat59@xxxxxxx>]

Little Blue Pills Among the Ways CIA Wins Friends in Afghanistan

By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, December 26, 2008; Page A01

The Afghan chieftain looked older than his 60-odd years, and his  
bearded face bore the creases of a man burdened with duties as tribal  
patriarch and husband to four younger women. His visitor, a CIA  
officer, saw an opportunity, and reached into his bag for a small gift.

Four blue pills. Viagra.

"Take one of these. You'll love it," the officer said. Compliments of  
Uncle Sam.

The enticement worked. The officer, who described the encounter,  
returned four days later to an enthusiastic reception. The grinning  
chief offered up a bonanza of information about Taliban movements and  
supply routes -- followed by a request for more pills.

For U.S. intelligence officials, this is how some crucial battles in  
Afghanistan are fought and won. While the CIA has a long history of  
buying information with cash, the growing Taliban insurgency has  
prompted the use of novel incentives and creative bargaining to gain  
support in some of the country's roughest neighborhoods, according to  
officials directly involved in such operations.

In their efforts to win over notoriously fickle warlords and  
chieftains, the officials say, the agency's operatives have used a  
variety of personal services. These include pocketknives and tools,  
medicine or surgeries for ailing family members, toys and school  
equipment, tooth extractions, travel visas, and, occasionally,  
pharmaceutical enhancements for aging patriarchs with slumping  
libidos, the officials said.
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"Whatever it takes to make friends and influence people -- whether  
it's building a school or handing out Viagra," said one longtime  
agency operative and veteran of several Afghanistan tours. Like other  
field officers interviewed for this article, he spoke on the  
condition of anonymity when describing tactics and operations that  
are largely classified.

Officials say these inducements are necessary in Afghanistan, a  
country where warlords and tribal leaders expect to be paid for their  
cooperation, and where, for some, switching sides can be as easy as  
changing tunics. If the Americans don't offer incentives, there are  
others who will, including Taliban commanders, drug dealers and even  
Iranian agents in the region.

The usual bribes of choice -- cash and weapons -- aren't always the  
best options, Afghanistan veterans say. Guns too often fall into the  
wrong hands, they say, and showy gifts such as money, jewelry and  
cars tend to draw unwanted attention.

"If you give an asset $1,000, he'll go out and buy the shiniest junk  
he can find, and it will be apparent that he has suddenly come into a  
lot of money from someone," said Jamie Smith, a veteran of CIA covert  
operations in Afghanistan and now chief executive of SCG  
International, a private security and intelligence company. "Even if  
he doesn't get killed, he becomes ineffective as an informant because  
everyone knows where he got it."

The key, Smith said, is to find a way to meet the informant's  
personal needs in a way that keeps him firmly on your side but leaves  
little or no visible trace.

"You're trying to bridge a gap between people living in the 18th  
century and people coming in from the 21st century," Smith said, "so  
you look for those common things in the form of material aid that  
motivate people everywhere."


Full:<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/25/ 
AR2008122500931.html?hpid=topnews>


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