[Marxism] Bias aside, Le Monde Diplomatique report links crises in Sudan, Chad

["Fred Feldman" <ffeldman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Despite the anti-Sudan, NGO bias of this article, I find it very useful
additional background to the recent attempted rebel takeover in Chad. I just
want to note the concluding paragraph which sees the cause of the regional
crisis as human rights violations by the Sudanese government.

This is the kind of explanation routinely used to prepare humanitarian and
liberal minds for brutal wars against oppressed nations (Iraq, Yugoslavia,
Panama, Iran, and so on). 

I would like to know what government in this region is respecting human
rights today. Certainly not the current rulers of Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Somalia, and (as the author admits) the pro-Darfur-rebel government of Chad.
And certainly not, as far as I can see, the various blocs of antigovernment
rebels in Sudan itself. Libya's people seem to have a somewhat better
economic situation, but from the standpoint of democratic freedoms they are
nowhere.

The nearest thing to an exception I see is Eritrea, and this is a very
partial exception indeed, where the government of a hard-pressed and
impoverished country has put a priority on education and medical care and
defends national sovereignty in what seems to be a fairly principled manner.
Of course, this government is a product of a national-revolutionary process,
whatever its limits.

Thus singling out Sudan in this situation seems less like a search for a
solution to a social and political and international crisis, but more like a
search for a scapegoat who can be demonized in international
liberal-democratic opinion in the imperialist countries in particular.
`
Anyway, very interesting reportage on the completely intertwined crises in
Sudan and Chad.
Fred Feldman

http://mondediplo.com/2008/03/05chad

Deepening the climate of mistrust
Chad: caught in the Darfur crossfire 
Chad ranks near the bottom of almost every world league table, poor, corrupt
and lawless ? and now under direct attack by rebels operating out of a base
in Darfur in an invasion co-ordinated by Sudan
By Gérard Prunier 

The sudden offensive by Chadian rebels on 31 January came as no surprise to
observers of the region. For well over a year Chad?s president, Idriss Deby,
has been involved in a proxy war conducted by guerrillas with Sudan?s
president, Omar al-Bashir. But with January?s rebel attacks, the war came
into the open.

On Monday 28 January a column of 250 pick-ups carrying 2,000 fighters set
off from their base in Hajil in western Darfur (Sudan). According to
witnesses, the invasion was directly coordinated by the Sudanese defence
minister, General Abd-er-Rahim Mohamed Hussein (1). On 1 February at the
battle of al-Massaqit, 80km northeast of Chad?s capital, N?Djamena, they
fought off a counter-offensive from the Chadian National Army (ANT). The
next morning the rebels reached the capital and besieged the main public
buildings, including the presidential palace, where Deby was trapped. On
February 3 the ANT regained control of the city after two days of fighting.


The reasons for the rebel failure were military: they were over-confident
that Deby?s regime was crumbling and launched their attack with inadequate
forces (too few men, no artillery, few anti-tank weapons and no
surface-to-air missiles), so the ANT was able to take full advantage of its
modest military superiority. They had three Mil Mi-24 helicopters piloted by
Ukrainian mercenaries and around 20 old Russian T-55 tanks. The rebels, who
lost two-thirds of their vehicles and between 200 and 300 men, withdrew from
the capital and regrouped 80km away to wait for reinforcements and fresh
supplies of fuel and ammunition. A further force of around 2,500 men set off
from Sudan. To stop them, Deby made an appeal to the Sudanese rebel force,
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (2). A large JEM force crossed the
border into Chad to try to prevent rebel reinforcements reaching N?Djamena.
In the battle near Adré on 4 February the Sudanese air force entered Chad?s
airspace to attack the JEM forces. Despite this, Deby?s supporters managed
to secure a narrow victory.

This second rebel failure sparked violent reprisals from Khartoum against
the JEM based on its territory. The Sudanese army and its Janjaweed (3)
militia massacred more than 200 civilians suspected of being JEM supporters
in the villages of Abou Surouj, Salia and Sirba near the Chadian border on 8
February. By mid-February the two rebel contingents that had tried to
overthrow Deby had joined forces 300km east of the capital. Nonetheless,
President Deby and his JEM supporters still retain strategic superiority.

The war in Darfur
The key to understanding this conflict is in the war in Darfur. When it
broke out in February 2003, the leader of the rebellion in Sudan was a
Chadian by the name of Abbaka who was killed in 2004. He was from the
Zaghawa, a semi-nomadic people who live on the border between the two
countries (4), and sympathetic to his oppressed fellow Zaghawa in Sudan.
Deby was aware that the conflict in Darfur had the potential to destabilise
his country. The rebellion he led in 1989 against Chad?s president, Hissène
Habré, had been launched from Darfur, so in 2003 he was quick to back
Khartoum in putting down the uprising. But this meant fighting his own
ethnic group. In May 2005 the Zaghawa contingent in the Chadian National
Army revolted and insisted that Deby replace the chief of staff and the head
of the security force with Zaghawas sympathetic to the rebellion in Darfur.

These changes led to Chad switching allegiance and supporting the rebels in
Darfur, which provoked a reaction from Khartoum in late 2005. Deby?s regime
looked increasingly unstable: it was highly dependent on the Zaghawa (2% of
the population), who were themselves split over their support for the Darfur
rebels. There was a complete absence of democracy in the country: elections
were rigged, freedom of speech was suppressed and corruption rife. In 2006
Chad unilaterally reneged on an agreement with the World Bank, which obliged
it to reserve some of its petroleum revenues for long-term projects.
Instead, Deby used the money to buy arms.

By late 2005 the rebels found willing supporters among some of Chad?s
population. Even if they do seize power, there is little hope their regime
will be much of an improvement on Deby?s: the rebels often have former links
to the current regime, and have shown proof of corruption and brutality
besides ties with Sudan.

The unarmed civil opposition in Chad is in danger. Deby, fearful that the
rebels might make use of it to lend their cause moral authority, rounded up
its leaders on 3 February. Their fate remains unknown, and the government
continues to deny the evidence that it is detaining them. Since the rebels
were driven from the capital on 6 February, rumours of disappearances and
summary executions have begun circulating.

Chad?s crisis is being played out in a tense international climate. When the
rebels launched their attack from Sudan, two international peacekeeping
forces, Eufor-Chad and Unamid (United Nations-African Union Mission in
Darfur), were about to be deployed. Eufor, a French-dominated 3,700-strong
force, was establishing itself in N?Djamena, whereas the UN force, which has
suffered from the double handicap of weak international support and constant
sabotage by the Sudanese, was still being set up (5). The date of the rebel
offensive was unlikely to have been chosen at random: the rebels and their
Sudanese backers feared that Eufor, whose official mission is to protect
refugees and displaced people in eastern Chad, would prop up Deby?s regime.
As soon as Eufor-Chad was established and the border secured, it would be
easier for Unamid to become operational.

Sarkozy?s moves
Faced with this difficult diplomatic and military situation, President
Nicolas Sarkozy at first hesitated. Keen to avoid France being isolated for
its unilateral support of Chad?s dubious regime, he initially provided only
minimal support, information and logistics, to the Chadian army.

Then, seeing that the African Union (6) and the United Nations (7)
indirectly backed his strategy, he went further. French defence minister
Hervé Morin said that France would do what was necessary in the event of a
renewed attack. The rebels denounced French military aid and called on the
former colonial power to remain neutral in the conflict. The latitude which
international organisations have allowed France is in part a response to the
suddenness and brutality of the rebel attack, which at one point seemed
likely to succeed. The prospect of seeing a notionally legitimate regime
(however dubious in reality) forcibly replaced by an equally dubious regime
was seen as a threat to the stability of the whole region.

The United States has been absent, preoccupied with the conflict in Kenya
and happy to leave the French to sort out the situation in Chad. This
attitude reflects the contradictions in US policy on Sudan: the State
Department remains suspicious of the regime in Khartoum, believing it a
threat (8), while the Pentagon views the Sudanese leaders as reformed
terrorists, worthy of trust and capable of being useful in the war on
terror. Whether or not Paris goes further in its support of President Deby,
the problem is unlikely to change: Chad?s government is a phantom regime;
the situation in Darfur is a catastrophe (200,000 dead and 2,000,000
displaced); and the peace-keeping forces, if they are deployed, will find
there is little peace to keep.

The attitude of the Chadian and Sudanese governments, ?who accuse each other
of supporting rebels across their border, is deepening the climate of
mistrust,? according to Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the UN Under Secretary General
for peacekeeping operations. ?It?s feeding tensions between the two
countries and demonstrates that the potential exists for an international
conflict? (9). The Chadian-Sudanese border was a disaster area even when
Darfur was just a launch pad for regime change in N?Djamena. It has now
become a major flash point. And this is likely to persist as long as
Khartoum continues to show contempt for human rights in the region.


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