[Marxism] Results of royal hubris

["Nasir Khan" <nasir.khan@xxxxxxx>]

Republished: http://nasir-khan.blogspot.com and  http://sudhan.wordpress.com

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Results of royal hubris

Fritz Stern
Posted online: Saturday , January 12, 2008 at 2214 hrs IST

The United States, with its claims of exceptionalism, is usually thought of as 
free of historical analogies. But comparisons with the fate of earlier empires 
are becoming more common. I have recently been struck by an analogy from German 
history: the disaster of German leadership during World War I, epitomised by 
Kaiser Wilhelm II. Wilhelm assumed the throne in 1888 at age 29, his liberal 
father having reigned for 88 days before succumbing to throat cancer. His 
grandfather, Wilhelm I, had presided over Prussia's military victories, which 
enabled Bismarck to create the unified Reich in 1871. Within two years, Wilhelm 
II dismissed Bismarck. Wilhelm II became the leader of a country on the cusp of 
European mastery. By the 1890s, Germany was the strongest power on the 
continent. But power generates opposition, and Germany's alarmed neighbours 
began to form defensive alliances. 

Wilhelm flaunted his absolute power, believing it to be divinely ordained. He 
was contemptuous of parliament, whose circumscribed powers were set forth in a 
constitution that he boasted of never having read. He was intelligent, 
impressed by technological progress, but untutored and impulsive; he reveled in 
the trappings of power and delighted in uniforms. His ostentation and 
extravagance were deeply un-Prussian. 

He was given to bombastic speeches, once warning newly sworn-in recruits that, 
if he so ordered, they would have to shoot their parents. He gave astounding 
orders to soldiers departing to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in China: they 
should awaken fear as had the Huns of yore. He detested liberal critics. And he 
spoke disparagingly of foreign nations, especially Great Britain. Some of this 
had to do with his ambivalent anglophobia and his distrust of his mother, Queen 
Victoria's daughter. 

Worse, he supported those groups that sought to increase German military power, 
including the creation of a high-sea fleet that could challenge the British 
navy. He shunned the details of government, for they interfered with his 
diversions. From the beginning, members of his entourage worried about his 
volatility and mental balance. 

German foreign policy from 1890 to 1914, for which the Kaiser bore formal and 
intermittently actual responsibility, comprised a series of failures and 
setbacks. But Wilhelm did not in fact rule, as Germany's conduct during WWI 
made clear. In early July 1914, after the murder of Austrian Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, Wilhelm egged on the Austrians, but by the end of the month he 
couldn't restrain his own subordinates from starting a war, following the 
dictates of military strategy - the famed Schlieffen Plan. 

Once war started, Wilhelm became Supreme War Lord, and his chief function would 
have been to adjudicate among rival elements within his government. At the 
centre, a civilian-military conflict emerged, the German army having always had 
a state-within-a-state mentality and status. Moreover, military and civilian 
leaders were divided among themselves. 

After the battle of the Marne (September 1914) and the failure of the 
Schlieffen Plan, some of Wilhelm's advisers realised that the chances for a 
military victory were slim, hence the need for a negotiated peace. But by that 
time, even the civilian chancellor had resolved on extravagant war aims that 
made hopes for a negotiated peace illusory. 

>From then on, the Kaiser's mental state became a dominant issue in the war's 
>conduct. Yet the most portentous decisions had to be taken: changes in the 
>military and civilian leadership, and, in 1917, whether to declare 
>unrestricted submarine warfare and thus insure the United States' entry into 
>the war. 

The fate of his country (and of Europe) depended on how Wilhelm decided. But, 
after three years of unimaginable carnage, the Kaiser had been reduced to an 
instrument of a military dictatorship run by Paul von Hindenburg and his chief 
of staff, Erich Ludendorff. They enjoyed the confidence of Germany's ruling 
classes, were determined to reject all compromise, and believed that "one more 
push" would deliver "total victory." Meanwhile, the Kaiser was systematically 
shielded from the truth and became estranged from reality. 

For a moment in the spring of 1918 - after the Bolsheviks signed a 
German-dictated Carthaginian peace - a German victory seemed possible. But by 
August, Allied forces broke through German lines, and a stunned Ludendorff, 
fearing a sudden collapse of his army, demanded that the newly constituted 
civilian government send an immediate request for an armistice. But the Allies 
wouldn't negotiate with the Kaiser. War-weary Germans began to demand the 
Kaiser's abdication. The army forced Wilhelm into exile in the Netherlands, 
where, until his death in 1941, he spread venomous poison where he could: the 
Jews and socialists were to blame; he alone was right. Once more reflecting and 
encouraging a large segment of what had been his people, he saw in Hitler the 
new man chosen by providence, the saviour of a Germany defeated by treachery. 
Wilhelm had terrifying flaws and operated at the head of a deeply flawed 
political system. But, ultimately, his chief failure had been to hand power to 
military and civilian hawks - wrongly called conservatives, for their vision 
was a radical reordering of Europe. Of course, America is not Imperial Germany. 
But there may be a lesson from a country whose wartime rulers, quarrelling 
among themselves, inflicted unimaginable harm on their people and to the world 
with their mendacious, secretive, and paranoid style. The consequences of their 
leadership became manifest only later, as an aggrieved nation's people turned 
against each other in their deep political and moral divisions and hatreds. 

It took a worse catastrophe, a world-historical scourge, to teach these people 
a lesson. Let us hope that Americans learn their lesson about the dangers and 
follies of imperial hubris sooner. 

Fritz Stern, emeritus professor of history at Columbia University, is the 
author of Five Germanys I Have Known 
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