[Marxism] Twenty Theses on Sinn Fein's Strategy

[Domhnall Ó Cobhthaigh <donaloc@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Phil has written a number of articles in which he attempts to portray Sinn 
Fein and the Republican movement as having 'sold out' and myself as covering 
for them.

Before jumping to conclusions people should understand the situation in 
Ireland sufficiently. The only person emailing facts was attacked for the 
source of their facts - Phil would rather use epithets to conduct a 
'marxist' analysis.

I don't have a huge amount of time to explain my take on things (insofar as 
I can express it openly) but here goes...

1. Sinn Fein are as committed to achieving its ultimate objective of a 
Thirty-two County Democratic Socialist Republic as it has ever been.

2. That narrow programme would probably garner no more than about 10% of the 
total vote in a popular election either side of the border - socialism 
itself right now is not a huge selling point in an Ireland which has just 
experienced considerable growth as a result of an FDI-led growth spurt. 
National feeling in the Free State is largely limited by an acknowledgement 
of the need for the consent of a majority in the north for reunification. 
Parties which stand on a strong socialist platform like the SWP get paltry 
levels of support.

3. So logically, Sinn Fein must promote that agenda by the most effective 
means possible: politics. In the context of the current 'agreement', Sinn 
Fein believe that its political goals can be achieved through political (and 
democratic) means. This is not a result of Sinn Fein lowering its standard 
from revolutionary to reformist but as a direct result of the success of the 
IRA's military campaign against the British. In a sense, the state is no 
longer unassailable from within as it has been forced to accord equal 
legitimacy to Sinn Fein's demands to those of bourgeois parties.

4. From this perspective, the northern state itself is a battle-ground. Sinn 
Fein's entry into PSNI structures is a case-in-point where the party is 
waging a determined struggle on a range of issues from the routine arming of 
the PSNI to community-empowerment policing structures (CRJ). Elements within 
the PSNI are struggling very hard to prevent that agenda. British MI5 as a 
result of the negotiations has committed themselves to playing an external 
role in that struggle.

5. All negotiations are a concretisation of struggle, they reflect the 
relative balance of forces at the time of the negotiations themselves. That 
is one reason why the process of Irish integration has grown rather than 
shrunk over time - it reflects the growth of popular support for Sinn Fein 
in electoral and political terms across the north and border counties.

6. Sinn Fein attract around 25-30% of the vote in the north currently. 
Despite historically low levels of mass mobilisation or political engagement 
across Irish society, Sinn Fein does still command a substantial mass level 
of adherence. This is primarily because the party does not campaign directly 
on its ultimate objective but on its immediate policy platform which is more 
limited and focussed around Irish reunification. While the party has a 
substantial vote, in reality, it ends up that the other parties who 
constitute around 70% of electoral representation tend to side with those 
elements within the state which wish to hold back radical change.

7. Despite the fact that other political parties represent little by way of 
substance and SF as a representative political party 'punching above its 
weight' - the party is badly outgunned across most sites of struggle because 
other parties tend to end up effectively acting as conduits for the status 
quo civil service agenda. The end result is that change has been less than 
might be hoped for but a constant demand for change across all aspects of 
local and regional government. However, the party is achieving greater 
successes by linking outwards with civil society and popular opinion as its 
agenda is largely 'populist' and as such the civil service agenda can be 
confronted effectively where issues are opened out to the people.

8. Key to this is the trend within the party which emphasizes a strategic 
commitment to participatory democracy and participatory forms of governance.

9. As with anything the development of the party in this direction is 
combined and uneven.

10. The DUP which is currently acting as the bulwark of unionism is under 
serious pressure from its grassroots from engaging with Republicans in a 
power sharing administration and in all-Ireland institutions. This may or 
may not have impacts on the viability of unionism in the medium-term.

11. SF has not accepted consent. However, the party has taken the step of 
working within a system where consent is enshrined. This was the most 
substantial compromise made by the party and some found it difficult to 
accede to working in such a framework saying that this amounted to an 
ideological commitment to consent. At the same time, the current 
arrangements reflect the opinion of the bulk of Irish people and the 
position of every single other party of substance in the island. No change 
is possible without proceeding from the standpoint of the bulk of Irish 
people - as such, the party has been forced to negotiate and act within a 
framework outside itself. This is a substantial problem that radical critics 
of Sinn Fein are in denial about - the people themselves do not view the 
continued existence of the North as a British colony as illegal. As a 
consequence military options do not have sufficient levels of support to be 
sustainable. Indeed, it is likely that political options of rejecting the 
Peace process will leave their adherents sidelined in political terms from 
the action. The situation post-1998 is qualitatively different than previous 
to it given the overwhelming support of the Irish people for the new 
arrangements.

12. Economics lies largely in favour of Irish reunification. In terms of 
Agriculture, Environment, the Economy and Energy the argument for 
all-Ireland approaches is unassailable. Even hardened pro-British parties 
like the DUP are now calling for the adoption of integration across these 
sectors. Any such changes to the base will have tremendous impact on the 
political super-structure over time. As Engels said, "According to the 
materialistic conception of history, the production and reproduction of real 
life constitutes in the last instance the determining factor of history."

13. Sinn Fein is not the only party to recognise this. The largest party of 
the Free State (Fianna Fail) has indicated it will now actively pursue an 
all-Ireland structure. Fianna Fail is the definitive party of the Irish big 
bourgeoisie (mixing both comprador and national bourgeoisie elements). This 
is reflective of the fact that the Free State [Dublin] Bourgeoisie recognise 
that they have a natural interest in exploiting opportunities on an 
all-Ireland scale. The rate of investment from Dublin to Belfast is 
substantial and is supported by the Dublin Government pumping £600m into 
infrastructure for the north. This money is not for nothing. Dublin is 
preparing the ground for reunification on the back of economic integration.

14. This move north is on the back of Fianna Fail's success in hammering 
Sinn Fein in the recent Free State elections. Fianna Fail decimated the left 
in those elections - the SPI (CWI) which had a TD and was hoping for a 
second lost their only seat. Sinn Fein went down from 5 TDs to 4 but this 
reflected a failure to achieve grandiose targets of up to 15 seats. In 
essence, this reflected the working class hopefully voting en-masse for the 
party of the big bourgeoisie to retain 'the good times'. As such, it is a 
transcient victory and Fianna Fail recognise that with its substantial 
northern electoral base, Sinn Fein remain a serious threat to Fianna Fail - 
largely because of that party's core support deriving from the working class 
and the potential to lose a fraction of the (powerful) national bourgeoisie 
to Sinn Fein - as has happened in the north.

15. Fianna Fail are also interested in the money. Sinn Fein despite its 
limited achievements has remained as a bulwark against corruption and has 
been very active driving an equality agenda. This does not suit big business 
interests and Fianna Fail believe that Sinn Fein need to be and can be 
attacked on their home ground.

16. While this represents a serious threat to Sinn Fein given the disparity 
between the level of support for Sinn Fein's ultimate objectives of a 
Socialist Republic and its current levels of political support, there are a 
range of opportunities associated with Fianna Fail coming north. Not least 
is that Fianna Fail will hasten Irish unity as they will be able to speak 
more effectively to sections of unionism which see their loyalty as stemming 
from material advantage. In the future, this economic-based loyalty to 
Britain will be replaced by a more pragmatic attitude based on 
profit-making. Given the all-Ireland economic dynamic this is a very 
persuasive factor.

17. Sinn Fein contesting elections against Fianna Fail in the north will 
also sharpen the party's own focus on what it stands for. Key to this is a 
commitment to Equality and Participation. Equally, the struggle to 
effectively democratise the Police through the accountability mechanisms 
negotiated will assume greater importance in awakening wider consciousness 
around the need for radical outcomes. Sinn Fein's work within institutions 
and use of political power will inevitably and eventually contribute to a 
radicalisation of Irish society, north and south, as cross-border 
institutions bed down.

18. At the same time, power-sharing in the north has opened the door to Sinn 
Fein engaging with unionism at grassroots levels and will accelerate the 
process whereby working class unionists begin to challenge their political 
affiliations to conservative parties. This process, however, is much more 
involved than might be otherwise assumed. It reflects the strength of the 
ideology of loyalism and sectarianism. In a sense, it is akin to countering 
attitudes of racism in the US south.

19. The contours of the struggle are therefore complicated. It is guaranteed 
that anyone without a comprehensive understanding of localised politics 
based on practice will come unstuck if they attempt to apply simplistic 
models to strategy. Ireland is divided artificially but this division is 
reflected in  popular consciousness. Ireland is at once a neo-colony and a 
colony. Large sections of its indigenous working class are materially 
privileged and have a material interest in maintaining this relative 
privilege. That situation is doubly complicated in the north. I seriously 
doubt whether Sinn Fein will be taking any advice from groups or individuals 
who have been signally ineffective in advancing their struggle in their own 
countries.

20. Sinn Fein's entry into institutions cannot be disservered from the 
success of the IRA's military campaign. This campaign has opened the state 
up for struggle. Effectively, SF are engaged in a war of position with 
elements from within the state itself and other political trends. The 
British Government, itself composed of various trends, retains a material 
interest in Ireland as expressed variously by the Northern Ireland Office, 
British MI5, etc. The direct interest of the British Government, in 
particular its Treasury, in curtailing moves towards further devolution or 
independence is related to its struggle to contain Scottish demands for 
Independence. None of these factors are simply coterminous and they can be 
contradictory. All of which makes for a variety of viewpoints.

Nothing is guaranteed for Sinn Fein and the Republican movement. The state 
itself may be able to withstand Republicans and tie down their struggle for 
years. However, I doubt this given the economic and political trends we see 
manifesting themselves today. Similarly, Sinn Fein remains focussed on its 
goals so let us hope they are successful. If not, Eirigi is performing a 
useful task in collecting all those individuals who find that they cannot 
believe in the current strategy so I wish them well too. If Sinn Fein is to 
succeed, it will need all the allies it can get in prosecuting the struggle.

I hope that this explains things a little more than Phil's simplistic 
rantings about Sinn Fein's engagement in a capitalist state and just giving 
up on the freedom struggle.

Le meas,
DoC 


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