[Marxism] Times report suggests likelihood of arrangement between Fatah and Hamas

["Fred Feldman" <ffeldman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

The framework of this article is that Hamas has set out to create a separate
Palestinian state in Gaza, but will not be able to go all the way.  While I
think Hamas could do more to foster unity, the main pressure will be on
Fatah, because their strategy of giving Dahlan -- and Israel and the United
States -- a free hand against Hamas has blown up in their faces.

Aside from the any Palestinian deliberately seeking a "two-state solution"
among the Palestinians would be an idiot as well as a traitor, Gaza's
economic need for collaboration with the rest of the Palestinians is only
one part of the equation. The political factors favoring another
accommodation with Hamas are as strong, if not stronger.

And the current situation is a product of the Abbas-Dahlan offensive against
Hamas, which blew up in Abbas' face.  Now the Israelis and Washington are
probably pressing Abbas to "unleash" Dahlan for a similar operation against
Hamas on the West Bank. But, as Abbas et al probably knows, this has a very
strong chance of blowing up in their faces as well and leaving them greatly
weakened on the West Bank as well.

As a separate force, Fatah has never been in weaker bargaining position than
it is today, not only in relation to Israel and Washington but to Hamas and
the Palestinian people.  Abbas' credibility must be about as close to zero
as it is possible to go.  The civil war in Gaza was also a civil war within
Fatah, as the Guardian article I posted makes clear. The tensions within
Fatah on the West Bank are probably even sharper, because of the elements of
a real mass base that Fatah retains there.

It has the alternatives of complete capitulation to Israel and Washington,
or attempting to retain the capacity of calling on the Palestinian people to
resist if Israel and its imperialist bankrollers are too recalcitrant.  They
can expect hefty bribes for capitulating completely but no real concessions.
To be able to resist today, they need the masses who follow Hamas and the
Fatah dissidents.

The Palestinians, who are a people and have no intention of becoming two
peoples. If two governments were to emerge, which might transpire if the
Fatah offensive escalates on the West Bank, BOTH would undoubtedly claim to
be the sole government of occupied Palestine.  The Palestinian people thus
have a fairly strong chance of forcing another patchwork agreement on their
leaders, possibly at the expense of the now utterly discredited and defeated
Dahlan.

Fred Feldman



New York Times
June 17, 2007
Hamas May Find It Needs Its Enemy 
By CRAIG S. SMITH and GREG MYRE
ISLAMIST fighters of Hamas seized control of Gaza last week. For the first
time in the history of the Palestinians' fight for nationhood, there seemed
a real possibility that two Palestines rather than one might emerge - one in
Gaza, dominated by Hamas, the other in the West Bank, led by Fatah. 

But Palestinian society is not so simple. There are many historical,
economic and tribal loyalties that bind it together, and many of those
cross, rather than coincide with, the frontiers of the two territories.

In addition, there are compelling reasons why the two communities need
unity.

A look at the history of these territories, how they developed differently
over time, and what their populations still share, shows why they are at
odds now but also why it might be too early to write off the possibility
that this breach can be bridged.

They have always had distinct traits, culturally and geographically - the
West Bank supporting a landlocked urban and agricultural society, Gaza
facing the sea.

Those differences increased after the creation of Israel in 1948, when Gaza
fell under the administration of Egypt and the West Bank was annexed by
Jordan.

Egypt treated Gaza as a Palestinian enclave and encouraged a strong sense of
Palestinian identity. Many Gazans who studied in Egypt during those years
were influenced, in turn, by the Muslim Brotherhood, whose goal is to
establish Islamic theocracies across the Arab world.

Back in Gaza, some of those men founded Hamas in 1987.

Jordan, on the other hand, suppressed Palestinian nationalism in favor of
Jordanian identity and Palestinians in the West Bank were more influenced by
the secular societies of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, where many went to
study. Others traveled even further abroad, bringing back a liberal view of
the world.

By the time the two territories came under Israeli occupation together after
the 1967 war, they were very different places. Their separate legal and
educational systems weren't consolidated until after the Palestinian
Authority was established in the mid-1990s.

There were high hopes back then that the two territories could be tied
together into a Palestinian state. In signing the 1993 Oslo accords, Israel
pledged to treat the West Bank and Gaza as "a single territorial unit" and
guaranteed "safe passage" for Palestinians traveling between them.

A road specifically for Palestinians was established between the West Bank
and Gaza, a distance of about 40 miles. It functioned, but sporadically,
until the second Palestinian uprising began in September 2000.

When it was open, the traffic was largely one way, carrying unemployed
Gazans to the West Bank in search of work in the better economy there.

But since Israel withdrew from Gaza in September 2005, effectively severing
the remaining links between the two territories, the West Bank and Gaza have
grown even further apart.

Gaza, which has suffered the most economically in the past few years, has
become increasingly conservative and increasingly religious, largely due to
the growing influence of Hamas.

Women in Gaza are more likely to be wear full Islamic dress and much less
likely to work outside the home than their counterparts in the West Bank.
Even in Gaza's large garment factories, the vast majority of the workers
sitting behind the sewing machines are men.

Gaza's cultural life tends to center on the local mosque, and its small
anemic economy consists almost entirely of small-scale businesses and jobs
provided by the Palestinian Authority.

The West Bank, meanwhile, has a far richer economic life that includes
industry, farming and a service sector. Its cities even have a few cinemas,
art exhibitions, decent restaurants and a few night clubs. 

In some ways, the current conflict is a local dispute specific to Gaza.

When Yasir Arafat returned from exile and established the Palestinian
Authority in 1994, he divided his time between the West Bank and Gaza in an
attempt to develop unity between the two territories.

But within two years, his security forces in Gaza, led by Muhammad Dahlan,
were cracking down on Hamas leaders. Many Hamas leaders were jailed and
their beards shaved to humiliate them. Some claim they were tortured.

Hamas has never forgiven Mr. Dahlan and other Fatah leaders for the harsh
treatment, and those resentments have fueled tension in Gaza ever since.

When Hamas won national elections last year and formed a government, no one
expected Mr. Dahlan's security forces to submit to Hamas control. To counter
Mr. Dahlan's power, Hamas organized a security force of its own under the
Ministry of the Interior.

It seemed only a matter of time before the two forces would clash in Gaza's
narrow confines. The current crisis began when the Palestinian Authority
president and Fatah leader, Mahmoud Abbas, appointed Mr. Dahlan as his
national security adviser to oversee all security forces in the Palestinian
territories.

While Hamas is now in control of Gaza and Fatah of the West Bank, neither
has achieved total political support in either place, and each organization
needs a political presence in both places to remain viable in the long term.

For now, Hamas appears to be winning, but its latest gains are primarily
military, not political. While the movement is popular politically among the
urban poor and the young in both the West Bank and Gaza, Fatah remains the
stronger movement in the West Bank - where people are relatively better off
and where it has built an extensive system of patronage. It still has
support among many moderate Gazans, too.

Hamas's military victory last week obscures the fact that Fatah has been
gaining political support in Gaza over the past year, according to Mouin
Rabbani, an analyst at the International Crisis Group in Jordan. He says
this may be because a larger percentage of Gazans depend on Fatah finances
to make a living. Hamas, meanwhile, has been gaining support in the West
Bank because Palestinians there are discouraged by Fatah's corruption and
policy failures, Mr. Rabbani says.

Hamas could face a backlash if Palestinians generally blame it for
undermining unity. It could also be blamed for giving Israel, the United
States and others further reason to isolate Hamas and work with Fatah in the
West Bank at the expense of Hamas in Gaza.

The Hamas-Fatah divide also cuts across clan lines at a time when clan
loyalty has been growing stronger, in Gaza in particular. If political
factions only bring more chaos and insecurity, clan loyalties could take
over.

Many ordinary Palestinians are upset with both factions for allowing the
feud to spiral out of control and for their inability to work toward the
larger goal of Palestinian statehood and the prospects of a secure economic
future.

Unity would be an advantage economically on the most basic levels: Gaza
could be an outlet to the world for West Bank products; the West Bank could
expand the prospects for jobs and living space for poverty-stricken,
overcrowded Gazans.

After the fighting last week, some people feared that Hamas might try to
repeat in the West Bank the military victory that it won over Fatah in Gaza.
But it is unlikely that that would sit well with the moderate Arab states
that have backed Hamas and recently worked so hard to forge the unity
government with Fatah that has now collapsed.

Hamas could even find itself shut off from Egypt, which is wary of
encouraging a movement on its border that is inspired by the Muslim
Brotherhood, which Egypt fights at home.

Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza, meanwhile, recognize that Fatah
alone holds the lifeline of Western financial support.

So if military dominance gives Hamas bargaining power, the economic
imperative of a unified Palestinian body politic argues, in the end, for
some accommodation with Fatah.





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