[Marxism] Preliminary comments on the 5th September 2006 ICG Report on Papua

[clintonf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Preliminary comments on the 5th September 2006 ICG Report on Papua

 

The ICG Report on Papua dated 5th September 2006 provides a valuable insight 
into how the status quo will be defended in the months ahead. It begins by 
stating, ?No part of Indonesia generates as much distorted reporting as Papua, 
the western half of New Guinea that has been home to an independence movement 
since the 1960s? (page 1). It?s worth examining the ICG?s own report for 
examples of such distorted reporting. 

 

ICG Report: The Report dismisses ?the idea that non-Papuan Indonesians are in 
control?, asserting that it ?is simply not true. The directly elected governors 
of Papua and West Irian Jaya, the two provinces within the broader territory of 
Papua, are indigenous Papuans, as are the heads of all 29 districts.?(page 1). 

 

Comment: A similar argument was made during the Indonesian occupation of East 
Timor, whose governors were inevitably of East Timorese descent. Furthermore, 
the vote in East Timor for the ruling party Golkar had always been higher than 
the national average in previous elections. Nearly 80% of East Timorese voted 
for independence from Indonesia about two months after 80% of them participated 
in the post-Suharto elections of June 1999. Indonesian military heavyweight 
Feisal Tanjung would later claim that the high voter turnout was ?a strong 
indication that the majority of the East Timorese were siding with Indonesia?. 
He was mistaken. The ICG Report should similarly be treated with skepticism.

 

ICG Report: The ICG Report asserts that these Papuan leaders are not puppets of 
Jakarta (page 1). 

 

Comment: The governor of West Irian Jaya is Abraham (?Bram?) Atururi, a retired 
Marine Brigadier General. Atururi was a member of the National Intelligence 
Agency and he retains close connections to Indonesia?s security apparatus. 
Doubtless, the central government hopes that he will increase the 
Indonesianisation of West Irian Jaya province. 

 

ICG Report: The ICG Report claims that the Indonesian military ?has over 12,000 
troops in Papua, and there are between 2,000 and 2,500 police?(page 2). 

Comment: The ICG has inserted the word ?paramilitary? before ?police? on 7th 
September. Note that the ICG has to establish its case; other people don't have 
to provide a rebuttal until the ICG shows how it came to its conclusion. The 
source of the ICG?s claim (footnote 6, later amended to footnote 7) is listed 
as "Crisis Group interview, diplomatic source, June 2006". The ICG need not 
name its source, but should at a minimum shed light on the following:

1. Did the source provide evidence? 
2. What was the nature of the evidence? Personnel records of TNI/other security 
personnel? Pay records? Something else? 
3. Why did the source speak to the ICG? 
4. Without wanting to expose the source: 
a. what nationality was the source? 
b. what is the general level of access that the source has? 
c. did the source commit a security breach to reveal the material to the ICG?  
d. if not, who cleared the source to brief the ICG? 

Until such matters are addressed, it?s hard to take the ICG?s figures 
seriously. They seek to base a crucial claim (that Papua is not highly 
militarised) on an unverifiable assertion by an anonymous source. 

 

ICG Report: The ICG Report claims that, although the province of West Irian 
Jaya was created illegally, ?the Ministry of Home Affairs authorised elections 
for governor there, and a 70 per cent turnout last March gave legitimacy to a 
political fait accompli? (page 2).

 

Comment: As discussed above, nearly 80% of East Timorese voted for independence 
from Indonesia about two months after 80% of them participated in the 
post-Suharto elections of June 1999. Despite the ICG Report?s assertion, no 
legitimacy should be assumed in Papua.

 

Furthermore, when the partition of Papua was announced, it met with strong 
opposition. A Special Autonomy Defence Team was established to challenge the 
partition in the Constitutional Court. The Team argued that both the Indonesian 
military and the National Intelligence Board (Badan Intelijen Negara, or BIN) 
had economic interests in maintaining a large military presence in the region. 
They pointed out that the establishment of the new province would benefit key 
figures in Megawati?s political party, who had economic interests in the 
Bintuni Bay area where British Petroleum and Pertamina (Indonesia?s state-owned 
oil corporation) are establishing the Tangguh liquefied natural gas plant.

 

The Special Autonomy Defence Team knew, for instance, that in March 2002 
Papua?s military commander, Major-General Mahidin Simbolon, had paid a visit to 
the Tangguh project together with other members of the security forces and 
their wives and girlfriends. According to witnesses, they had strolled around 
the project site brandishing automatic weapons. British Petroleum officials had 
hoped to ensure the project?s security without involving the Indonesian 
military, but were soon disabused of that notion by Simbolon, who made clear 
that any deviation from the usual security role of the military for a project 
of national significance would need to be approved by Indonesian president 
Megawati.

 

The Special Autonomy Defence Team was supported by the then governor of Papua 
Dr Jaap Solossa and elements of the Papuan elite in Jayapura. Dr Solossa was an 
expert on the subject, having earned a masters degree in development economics 
from Gajah Mada University, and a doctorate with research on Special Autonomy 
from Padjadjaran University. He would later die under mysterious circumstances 
? a development that did not go unnoticed by Papuan critics of partition.

 

 

ICG Report: The ICG Report accuses ?Solidarity groups? who ?periodically raise 
the spectre of hard-line Muslim militias working with the army in Papua, which 
is predominantly Christian?. It dismisses these groups, saying that ?Little 
hard evidence exists. The salafi militia Laskar Jihad had a few hundred men in 
Sorong, in what is now West Irian Jaya, in 2001, but the organisation disbanded 
in October 2002, and there is little reason to believe it survived in Papua 
when it collapsed everywhere else. 

 

Comment: Once  again, the ICG Report omits the context. Something happened on 
12 October 2002. It was known as the Bali Bombing, in which 202 people were 
killed and a further 209 people were injured. Little wonder, then, that Laskar 
Jihad?s formal disbandment was announced the very next day. The Indonesian 
military was worried about the fallout from their support for this jihadst 
group.

 

Laskar Jihad began to enter Papua as part of an Indonesian military operation 
to terrorise Papuans. The group?s Afghanistan-trained commander Jafar Umar 
Thalib established branch offices in several Papuan towns through the Sunni 
Communication Forum (Forum Kommunikasi Ahlus Sunna Wal Jamaah, or FKAWJ), which 
had been formed in 1998. From the very beginning, there were strong indications 
that Laskar Jihad had the backing of military and political hardliners in 
Jakarta. Unlike other violent Islamic groups, which operated in a clandestine 
manner, Laskar Jihad revelled in shows of strength, such as rallies, 
demonstrations, parades, and processions. Its members also received military 
training near Bogor (West Java) and Yogyakarta from sympathetic members of the 
Indonesian military. Officer cadets, members of Kopassus, and martial-arts 
trainers were specifically involved in training camps near Bogor in April 
2000.Members of Kopassus enjoyed the support of officers in the Indonesian 
military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) who were opposed to the reformist 
presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. 

 

Laskar Jihad displayed the extravagant rhetoric, quasimilitary forms, and 
Javanese-inspired symbolism usually adopted by the Indonesian military when it 
orchestrates a proxy war. They claimed religious sanction for their activities, 
and Maluku-based Christians, for example, were described as kafir harbi 
(?belligerent infidels?)?the most dangerous category of non-Muslims. Four 
battalions were formed, each named after one of the Prophet Muhammad?s first 
four successors: Batalyon Abu Bakr, Batalyon Umar bin Khattab, Batalyon Usman 
bin Afan, and Batalyon Ali bin Abu. Each battalion had four companies, each 
company had four platoons, and each platoon had three squads. In keeping with 
its quasi-military form, Laskar Jihad also had special forces, intelligence, 
and logistics units. 

 

The group?s explicitly nationalist agenda also conformed to the Indonesian 
military?s strategy. Indeed, Jafar Umar Thalib went out of his way to emphasise 
his anti-separatist credentials, stating that the problem in Maluku was not 
caused by religion but by separatism. Thalib was arrested in Ambon on 4 May 
2002 on charges of inciting violence. However, it is indicative of the high 
level of official acceptance accorded to Laskar Jihad at this time that he was 
visited in prison by then vice-president Hamzah Haz.

 

After Laskar Jihad was disbanded, the Indonesian military sent Eurico Guterres, 
the notorious militia figurehead from East Timor, to Timika in 2003 to 
establish the Front Pembela Merah Putih, or Red and White Defenders? Front (red 
and white are the colours of the Indonesian flag). Their presence increased the 
levels of tension among the locals.

 

Racism and silence 

 

Missing from the ICG?s Report is the issue of racism towards Papuans. If a  
European power were to act in Papua as the Indonesian military does, it would 
be called racist ? and rightly so.

 

There are practically no Papuans visible on local television, which is awash 
with advertisements for skin whitening products such as Pond?s White Beauty, 
L?Oréal White Magic, Bioré Body Whitening Scrub, Citra Skin Whitener, and so 
on. There have been attempts by some Papuan beauty salons to give a more 
indigenous feel to their operations, by emphasising ?black beauty?, for 
instance. They have received intimidatory visits from local thugs as a 
consequence. 

 

Reliable reports indicate that racial antagonism plays a role in the Indonesian 
military?s presence in Papua. The most severe beatings in custody tend to be 
administered to Papuans who are darker than usual, or have a more prominent 
head, or are more muscular. On 14 July 2005, for example, soldiers reportedly 
tortured a Papuan by slashing his face and body with a knife and razor and then 
setting his hair alight after dousing it with petrol. A week later, 14 soldiers 
reportedly punched, kicked, and bit two Papuans, then placed a bundle of dried 
weeds on the back of one of them and set it alight.

 

Even sport is an indicator of separation between the Papuans and the other 
Indonesians. For example, although soccer is a popular sport in Indonesia, in 
Papua all the players are of Papuan descent, as are almost all the spectators; 
migrants to Papua show little interest in integrating with the locals. Nor is 
there a shortage of soccer balls: in many Papuan villages, a communal ball 
hangs in the net for people to use and replace afterwards.

 

For more details about Papua and related matters, see Reluctant Indonesians: 
Australia, Indonesia and the future of West Papua (Scribe, 2004):

 

http://www.scribepublications.com.au/book/reluctantindonesians

 

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