[Marxism] Re: Australian troops back in East Timor

[clintonf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

This is probably the point at which it will be asserted (without evidence) that 
Indonesia
was going to withdraw anyway and that the Howard government simply deployed 
troops 
to fill the vacuum. Hence, an excerpt from Reluctant Saviour:

<http://www.scribepub.com.au/Catalogue/Titles%202004/Reluctant%20Saviour.html>

Indonesia announced that East Timor would be placed
under martial law from midnight on 6 September. While this
was going on, assassination squads were secretly deployed to
hunt down and kill the leadership of the independence
movement. ? these squads were given cover names like
KIPER-9. The original KIPER was a group of Indonesian citizens
who wanted to ensure a free and fair ballot, and who had
therefore decided to monitor it themselves. Known as Komite
Independen Pemantau Pemungutan Suara, or Independent
Committee for Direct Ballot Monitoring, KIPER was one of
many citizens? groups that monitored the ballot. By giving its
assassination squads names like KIPER-9, the Indonesian
military was continuing its strategy of plausible denial.

Under the terms of martial law, all power belonging to the
civil administration passed to the military. This was a mere
formality, of course; the military had always been the real
authority in East Timor. However, the formality provided the
pretext for creating new facts on the ground following an all-out
assault on FALINTIL. Martial law meant that soldiers could
openly ?stop anyone and search them for weapons, arrest anyone
suspected of creating disturbances for 20 days without a
warrant, and shoot on sight anyone who breaks the curfew?.
The effect of this was to turn East Timor into a free-fire zone,
meaning that TNI could attack and destroy FALINTIL in
conventional warfare. The imposition of martial law was
accompanied by familiar allegations that the ballot had been
rigged. Indonesia?s permanent representative to the UN
reiterated this allegation when he claimed that the violence had
been triggered by:

the deep disappointment of pro-autonomy factions over the
referendum?s outcome, coupled with unamet?s failure to
respond satisfactorily to reports of irregularities before and
during the vote.

Indonesia continued to insist that international intervention
was unacceptable. In addition to statements to that effect, there
were two ways in which it underlined this insistence. The first
was to talk up the violence and the dangers, knowing that
Western governments were reluctant to accept casualties. Ali
Alatas, warning that a foreign peacekeeping mission would
sustain casualties, spoke of the ?failure of this kind of mission
when there is no peace yet to be kept?. 

The second was the announcement that additional troops 
were being deployed into East Timor.
Ostensibly to ?maintain law and order?, their significance was
clear, and recognised as such by military planners overseas?
foreign governments like Australia saw clearly that a unilateral
intervention would meet armed opposition. On occasion, the
threat was overt: Indonesia?s Air Force chief warned that his
forces were ?ready to face any intruders from Australia?. Clear
and unambiguous warnings were issued, in case the message
had not registered: ?Any nations willing to send peacekeepers to
the province would have to shoot their way in?. This warning,
issued by foreign minister (and Officer of the Order of
Australia) Ali Alatas, matched the Howard government?s own
talk of casualties and peacekeepers losing their lives.
The TNI leadership realised that president Habibie was
vulnerable to external pressure, which was building. With his
reputation for impulsive behaviour, there was a chance he might
make an announcement without their approval, just as he had
done on other occasions. It was therefore important to stiffen
his resolve?and to make it clear who was in charge. After a
meeting of the senior military leadership, Wiranto visited
Habibie to warn him against giving in to foreign demands. This
?unmistakable flexing of military muscles? was a stark reminder
of the TNI?s power.
The assessment of the TNI leadership appeared to be that it
could stave off international pressure long enough to create new
facts on the ground. This assessment was based on a rational
understanding of the nature of power: as long as the UN, not the
US, was most insistent, the TNI could act with a degree of
freedom.

The Australian government continued to make public
statements that took the pressure off Indonesia. On the day after
the ballot result was announced, when most unamet regional
offices were under attack or shut down, Downer had said:
?I get the impression that President Habibie, Mr Alatas, General
Wiranto are all trying to do the right thing. And some of the
commanders, clearly, are trying to do the right thing. But there
have been and there still are some fairly wild elements within the
Indonesian military?.
There was no significant departure from this position as the
violence escalated. Calls for troops to be sent in were deflected
by a standard response: Australia can?t invade Indonesia. As
Australia?s defence minister put it,?we?re not going to go in there
and invade Indonesia. That would be, you know, tantamount to
creating a very substantial war, and that would I think result in
a lot of unnecessary loss of life for both nations?. Downer would
also warn that invading ?the world?s fourth most populous
country is probably not a very brilliant idea?.

See the book itself for footnotes.

CF
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