[Marxism] A liberal proposal to contain the Bolivian revolution, the Morales goverment

["Fred Feldman" <ffeldman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

This item from the liberal COHA group should be read together with
Christian Parenti's article from the Nation, which I submitted earlier.
Together they present (though Parenti may not intend to be so limiting
to Bolivia, his presentation carries the clear implication that the
Bolivian process can go so far and no further, AND HAD BETTER NOT RISK
DOING MORE THAN IT HAS ALREADY DONE.

Building on that analysis -- which assumes that a few months after
Morales took office, the revolutionary process is already over to all
intents and purposes OR AT LEAST SHOULD BE. Both hope to cajole the Bush
administration into giving Morales a hand against forces allegedly to
his left. And both ignore or play down the modest land reform program
being undertaken in the explosive eastern region (and there's nothing
much more explosive you could try in that area than a modest land
reform) and the changes taking place in the lives and rights of Indian
communities (Parenti writes like the burning issue here is separation
and national independence for the Indian nations, but there is little
sign of this being central just now.) Of course, Morales's host of
sectarian-left critics will take these liberal assessments as the last
word on what is really happening in Venezuela, and denounce the new
president in the customary way.  Fortunately, the leftist,
anarchist-minded, anti-government-on-principle, council-communist, and
revolution-without-taking-power type critics have suffered some
important desertions lately, as a number of groups have begun to take
the Bolivian process rather more seriously.

Of course, if you had assumed that the Cuban revolution had reached its
end three months into 1959, it would have been easy to show that what
had been accomplished was really very modest.  But the future had many
things in store.

Basically, COHA'S proposal seems to be that rather than the highly risky
project of trying to crush the Bolivian revolution, Bush should try to
become its legal guardian.  
Fred Feldman


A Quantum Leap for U.S.-Bolivian Relations
Friday, 9 June 2006, 10:55 am
Opinion: Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Council On Hemispheric Affairs
MONITORING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC ISSUES AFFECTING THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Thursday, June 8, 2006
COHA Opinion:

A Quantum Leap for U.S.-Bolivian Relations

Direct Intervention: A Call for Bush and Bolivia?s Morales to Take a
Leap of Faith and Change Presidential Issues into Personal Ones

Last Tuesday, as reported by the Associated Press, Bolivian President
Evo Morales distributed a press release declaring that U.S. authorities
were actively working to assassinate him. As of Tuesday, the Bolivian
embassy in Washington was reporting that Morales had cancelled his
planned trip to the Inter-American Development Bank?s annual conference
in Washington next week, where he was scheduled to address the gathering
and possibly meet with President Bush. Were the two events connected?
Neither the embassy nor the State Department are ?speculating,? but one
thing is for certain: though barely six months old, Morales?
presidential term has brought unprecedented tension to relations between
Bolivia and the United States. Defusing this tension is proving
difficult for the U.S. president, who undoubtedly finds the Bolivian
leader?s commitment to socialism to be personally repugnant.
Nevertheless, one can only wonder why the Bush administration is
incapable of applying the same innovative thinking it has fitfully
utilized with regards to the Middle East, Iran, North Korea, Vietnam,
and Libya, to the situation in Bolivia. The Bush administration would be
wise not to pursue what seems like an inevitable path for its launching
of hostile and predictably punitive steps against Bolivia, which could
ultimately lead to a CIA role in that country. This would be done in
order to neutralize President Morales, a strategy that would also
logically have to be taken against South America?s premier populist
voice ? that of Venezuela?s Hugo Chávez.

It is no secret that the Bush administration?s feuding with Caracas ?
and now La Paz ? already has done grave and mounting damage to
Washington?s hemispheric image, as well as Bush?s personal standing. The
only hope for preventing the relationship between Bolivia and the United
States from further deteriorating (as it has with Venezuela) is for both
leaders to engage in one-on-one dialogue. This, sadly, seems highly
unlikely at this time, because of President Bush?s penchant for inviting
to the White House only Latin American leaders whose vision closely
mirrors his own. These kindred spirits have included Mexican President
Vicente Fox, former Chilean President Ricardo Lagos and now his
successor, Michelle Bachelet, outgoing Peruvian President Alejandro
Toledo, and, of course, Colombia?s hard-line leader Álvaro Uribe.
ADVERTISEMENT

Bush and Morales clearly possess contrasting visions of whether market
access or socialist development is the proper engine for hemispheric
growth. Crossing the ideological divide and taking the early steps
towards normalization of cordial relations is a process that must
involve personal discourse. Admittedly, such a rapprochement is unlikely
at the present time, although if ideological differences were reconciled
successfully, this could slowly usher in a more positive era for
U.S.-Latin American ties.

An Underestimated Alliance

The importance of such a potential modus vivendi between the United
States and Bolivia should not be underestimated. The Bolivian president
is emerging as a rising star of the hemisphere?s influential leftist
establishment. Morales has cannily positioned himself as a less blustery
alternative to Chávez as an area spokesman, and by doing so he has
become far more than just another irrelevant populist gasbag, like, for
example, Alan García who just beat out Ollanta Humala to be the new
president of Peru. His high-flying rhetoric has been backed by tactful
concrete action; he is a leader who covets results. In a series of
electrifying moves on May 1, he nationalized Bolivia?s gas reserves and
raised royalties on the country?s two biggest gas fields from 50% to
82%. In an auspicious coincidence, two weeks later, Chávez raised
royalties on Venezuela?s four largest foreign crude oil arrangements
from 16.6% to 33%.

Bush would be wise to view any discussions with the Bolivian president
through the lens of pragmatism rather then self-satisfying Babbittry,
since Morales has already displayed a keen sensitivity to attempts by
outside forces ? especially those operating from Washington ? to
manipulate his government?s domestic strategy. This holds true
especially with respect to such core issues as gas nationalization and
coca eradication.

Gas Nationalization Must Stay

Morales? nationalization of Bolivia?s extraordinarily valuable natural
gas resources at least temporarily has thrust the Washington-backed
neoliberal economic model to the sidelines. But, it would be a mistake
for Bush to consider aggressively strong-arming Morales in an attempt to
revise his stand on either that issue or the Bolivian?s increasingly
warm ties with fellow free trade dissenters, Hugo Chávez and Fidel
Castro. Chávez, both in recent months and for the foreseeable future,
will be able to do far more for Bolivia with his abundance of
petro-dollars than has been the case with the White House. Washington?s
decision to stress trade far more than aid, while also failing to cut
short the long bureaucratic process by which its funds are traditionally
allocated to poverty-stricken Bolivians, has done little to create a
positive relationship. Moreover, a single-minded war on drugs has proven
highly destructive to ties between Bolivians and the United States.

Control over his country?s natural resources was the banner commitment
that vaulted Morales to the presidency. To the Bolivian indigenous
community, he successfully contrasted his crusading image with that of
the ?plundering? foreign gas companies, vowing to strive for a Bolivia
for Bolivians, one in which his countrymen would be the lead actors
rather than the chorus. Morales is all too aware that backing down on
his campaign pledge to nationalize hydrocarbons would have cost him the
overwhelming popular backing he needs to carry through on far-reaching
radical reforms, such as redistributing millions of hectares of
state-owned property to the country?s historically oppressed Quechua and
Aymara-speaking minorities. If Bush persists with attempts to impose a
Washington Consensus-like formula on Morales, he will not only fail, but
he will also alienate a leader who could have helped the White House
orchestrate a more moderate and responsive policy regarding U.S. basic
interests in Bolivia and elsewhere in the Americas. By accepting
Morales? bona fides, and the depth of his shared vision with Castro and
Chávez, the White House would reflect its comprehension of the
widespread consensus throughout the region that there is no going back
for some of the region?s new leadership.

Cooperating in the Coca Leaf Eradication Effort

Bush and Morales must also achieve a happy middle-course in their
efforts to stem coca leaf cultivation. The plant is a key raw ingredient
in U.S.-bound cocaine, but it is also Bolivia?s quasi-sacred traditional
crop. Although at this point, coca leaf-eradication programs throughout
the country have been largely restored to pre-Morales levels, many are
now ?voluntary,? as per Morales? instructions. While U.S.
representatives have pressed their desire to accelerate forcible
eradication programs, as of yet they have tolerated Morales?
controversial campaign for legalization of the coca leaf at the United
Nations. Bush would be wise to study Morales? compromise position of a
slower, voluntary pace of eradication. This approach has its roots deep
within the national psyche. Bolivians are fiercely nationalistic, and if
the populace perceives that the coca leaf is being denied them by the
actions of foreigners, joint anti-drug efforts will inevitably fall prey
to nationalist sentiment. Harmonious collaboration must be the
distinguishing characteristic of any successful eradication efforts; in
Bolivia, the war on drugs will only go as far as Morales? voluntary
acquiescence can take it.

So when is the State Visit?

It will be easy for President Bush to dismiss Morales? latest
accusations as further proof that he is nothing more than a paranoid
extremist in need of tutoring from Washington, but in doing so he would
be dismissing a man who is emerging as a very important factor in South
America?s new left-leaning world, one which is convinced that the West?s
development model has not worked for the bulk of its citizens. On the
other hand, it would be expected, and all too easy, for Morales to tune
out the economic and anti-narcotic concerns of the United States and
play only to his Bolivian constituents. But by doing so, he would be
ignoring the one country whose support could be perhaps negotiated to
help secure his country?s stable future. Still, Bolivia will not mutely
follow nor dumbly submit, and the socialist-minded Morales is not likely
to switch to requiring forcible coca eradication any time soon. Nor will
he reverse course on the issue of private domination of energy
resources. In order to contain an increasingly hostile relationship
between Bolivia and the United States, Bush and Morales must personally
intervene and be prepared to make real concessions to each other?s
fundamental national interests. This process would have to include a
mixed economy featuring some degree of state control of national
resources, as well as basic guarantees for private companies operating
in Bolivia. For the U.S., this would mean far more modest concessions
than it appears to be ready to make in dealing with North Korea, Iran,
Libya, and Vietnam. And, after all, Bolivia is situated in Washington?s
vaunted ?back yard.?

*************

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Fellow Anita Joseph
June 8, 2006


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