Re: [Marxism] The notion of absolute truth and marxisms - a question for the list

[brownh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Haines Brown)]

> Dear Comrades,
>
> There is a concept of absolute truth within Marxism. Marxism is
> essentialy a dialectical logic and from the dialectical logic
> dogmatism and relativism are one-sided reflection of
> reality. Marxism doesn't reject the concept of universal and in that
> sense the concept of absolute is essential in Marxism. If Marx in
> Capital was analysing the different moments and stages of Cpitalist
> socio-economic formation,so how can he reject the very concept of
> capital which is absolute and universal within all the moments of
> his work.He began his project from A Commodity, but his very
> beginning was seen through the very end and that was Capital. Let me
> conclude, according to Marxism relative is the moment of the
> absolute and the absolute truth is the reflection of the process of
> all the stages of the truth.
>
>      Asim Akhund

I'm sorry to pick up on Asim's contribution to this thread at a very
late date, but I believe he brings up an important point, particularly
because it might appear to lend some credence to the OP's reference to
someone who posited the existence of absolute truth in Marxism. To
make sure I understand him correctly, I'll try to parse his
comment. However, before that I can't avoid addressing what "truth"
means.

Objectivism

My sense is that Marxism is an example of "objectivism", which is to
say it assumes the existence of a reality that is independent of the
mind, of our knowing of it. This objective reality does not have the
quality of truth or falsity, which can only refer to our statements
about some it. It is also my sense that Marxism would be classified as
an example of "realism" in that its statements about a reality do
correspond to reality in some way (have some truth value), as opposed
to instrumentalism, which feels our statements are true if they lend
themselves to reliable results of action.

The difference may not be obvious, but I believe it to be profound. In
particular, there are situations for which we cannot have knowledge of
the outcome of a present unique process. In such cases, an
instrumentalist view collapses, for there is no known outcome that can
be instrumental. The advantage of the realist position is that an
outcome is presumed to exist even if we don't know it and that the is
outcome is in some way determined by the initial state of the process
that we do know. If we understand these determinations, we gain a
sense of the likely outcome, even if it is not known.

We can study the present and determine the probability of its various
possible outcomes. We don't know the future with any certainty, but
knowing the probability distribution of possible futures tells us much
about the present. In fact, our actions are frequently informed by
this knowledge. If I speed as I drive, I am more likely to have a
serious accident. It not only represents a truth about my present
behavior, but causes me to alter that behavior by slowing down. While
the instrumentalist can learn from a series of accidents that driving
too fast is unwise, an objectivist does not require knowledge of these
other examples to come to that conclusion. The logic of the situation
implies that speeding means a reduced reaction time and therefore a
greater chance of an accident. In practice, of course, our experience
of accidents makes us very sensitive to the dangers of speeding, and
we know that to go over the speed limit is statistically associated
with accidents, but we could also be aware that speeding will
contribute to our chance of a serious accident without that
experience.

Indeed, we often face unique situations in life for which we have no
exemplars to turn. The logic of such situations that implies their
probable outcomes represents a valuable truth about any emergent
process, the outcomes of which are unknown. I discussed elsewhere in
this thread a variety of sciences, called "evolutionary", which are
concerned with processes having unique outcomes.

It is also possible for the initial state of a process to be unknown,
while the outcome is certainly known. This happens when we study the
history of an emergent process taking place in the past. The initial
state is unknown in the sense that it represents a sufficient
complexity (unless it takes place in our laboratory) that we cannot
ascertain just which were the determinant factors. What we have to do
is to consider as many of these initial factors as we can and estimate
the probability distribution of their possible outcomes. The known
outcome tells us which of these factors were probably operative in
causing the outcome. If offers a way to test the truth value of the
various hypotheses that might explain the outcome.

The implication is that there is no one "scientific method", for there
are other methods to discover the truth of things. The alternative
described above is called "retroductive" or "abductive" inference in
scientific circles, while historians are inclined to call it
"retrodictive explanation". For fuller discussion, see
dharma-haven.org/science/myth-of-scientific-method.htm#Method .

Understanding the probability distribution of the possible outcomes of
an emergent system under study defines its real potentials and
limitations, and this I believe is essential to the Marxist
revolutionary agenda. Launching a revolution to overthrow capitalism
cannot rely on other examples, even if it is not the first such
effort, for every situation is to some extent unique, and these other
examples therefore might not fit the situation.

Truth

Turning now to the problem of truth, philosophers today tend to handle
the issue of truth in terms of formal semantics - in terms of the
meaningfulness of statements. A distinction can be made here between
analytical philosophers who focus on the logic of our statements and
scientists who start out with what they hold to be "signs" or
"representations" of reality and try to ascertain their relative truth
value.

So a scientific notion of truth depends on an objectivist assumption
that scientific statements have a determinant relation with a reality
that necessarily is only partially known, which makes all statements
of truth necessarily partial. What is known constrains the probability
distribution of our possible interpretations. This can refer to
situations about which we are partially ignorant, about processes of
which the outcome is not known, or situations of sufficient complexity
that it supports multiple hypotheses to explain a known outcome.

However, the universal source of this partial ignorance is that all
things exist in relation to their environment, which in turn stands in
relation to a wider environment. A laboratory experiment artificially
isolates the experiment from outside perturbations and in so doing is
able to arrive at reproducible results. That is, general laws in
science are an artifact of laboratory isolation. This is not to say
the laws are not real, but that they describe only one dimension of
what actually takes place in the real world.

The result is that all things are processes. For example, the Second
Law of Thermodynamics states that all things, everything else being
the same, will experience increasing entropy. Engels referred to this
by saying that all things are "in motion". He was roundly criticized
for mindlessly embracing "vitalism", but we now know he was right.

The more we take into account the environment of a process, the better
we will understand it. If you were to grow a crystal of copper
sulphate, this "negentropic" process would appear to violate the
Second Law until you took into account its environment (the increasing
entropy of the super-saturated solution in which the crystal grows).

It seems to follow that the truth value of our statements about a
reality are in part a function of the extent to which we take its
environment into account, and the environment's environment, etc. That
is, the more universal we make the object of our study, the greater
capacity is has for truth value. I don't see that Marxism has any
problem with the notion of universal, although because it is
materialistic, the universal refers to all that exists - ultimately
all that exists in the cosmos. We can never comprehend it all in
thought because we are a part of the whole, and this whole has no
truth in itself, but to the extent our statements are universal, to
that extent they can be said to be "absolute" in that we have in
theory encompassed all that accounts for outcomes, and there is
nothing beyond it that might alter those outcomes. Since relative
absoluteness makes no sense, and since the part (us) can never embrace
the whole, I'd not be inclined to use the term absolute.


Asim's contribution

> Marxism is essentialy a dialectical logic and from the dialectical
> logic dogmatism and relativism are one-sided reflection of reality.

If I give this a sympathetic reading, I infer that in Marxism there is
a dialectical relation of our understanding and the world being
understood. As we better understand the world, our ability to
understand it improves (for reasons sketched above), and thus the
truth value of our statements about it increases. The truth value
becomes embedded in our conventional knowledge of the world that is
socially transmitted (and so becomes, literally, "dogma"), and yet
that truth is always partial because we don't comprehend the entire
cosmos, and in particular, our experience of reality is a function of
our social location, specifically, social class.

> Marxism doesn't reject the concept of universal and in that sense
> the concept of absolute is essential in Marxism.

This I don't understand. If we were able to comprehend the universal,
our knowledge would (arguably) become absolute, but that is an
impossibility (we are not identical to the cosmos). On the other hand,
the truth value of what we know is absolute in the sense that it is
(in principle) unquestionably true and so an absolutely true partial
truth. However, even if this were granted (which I'm not inclined to
do), I see no good reason to represent what truths we do have as
absolute. It seems unscientific to do so. Also, the realities
addressed by Marxism are in continual evolution, which means we need
to struggle to learn ever more. One can never have complete knowledge
of a process that is not over.

> If Marx in Capital was analysing the different moments and stages of
> Cpitalist socio-economic formation, so how can he reject the very
> concept of capital which is absolute and universal within all the
> moments of his work. He began his project from A Commodity, but his
> very beginning was seen through the very end and that was Capital.

A more conventional way of putting this is that for Marx, the
existence of capital was axiomatic. But, after all, it was his
mental construct, a mental representation of a reality. Being an
axiom, it was treated as a given, as being unproblematic, and in this
sense absolute. However, I fear Asim may be implying someother other
than this.

> Let me conclude, according to Marxism relative is the moment of the
> absolute and the absolute truth is the reflection of the process of
> all the stages of the truth.

Yes, I suppose so. In any complex process, there are continuities that
transcend any phase changes and or evolution within a given
phase/stage, and there are differences. In our understanding of a
particular system, these constants are axiomatic perhaps. It seems to
me that a system such as capitalism, and perhaps even capital itself,
is defined as a causal structure. Empirical change will take place
within and as a result of this causal structure. The causal structure
gives rise to empirical evolution, but a point is reached
(necessarily, given the Second Law of Thermodynamics) that this
evolution must cease because of the contradictory relation of emergent
properties and the dissipation of the environment upon which it
depends. At this point, some systems (such as human history, but not
the copper sulphate crystal mentioned above), evolution (quantitative
change) can result in revolution (structural change, qualitative
change). Quantity becomes quality, etc.

So, the axiomatic constructs we employ to undertand a system are
unchanging and in this sense absolute, it seems to me the word
"absolute" can only cloud the issue because of its metaphysical or
religious associations.

--

       Haines Brown
         KB1GRM
         ET1(SS) U.S.S. Irex 482

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