Re: [Marxism] The notion of absolute truth and marxisms - a question for the list

[Yavuz Tuyloglu <yavuztuyloglu@xxxxxxxxx>]

On the discussion of Marxism as a science. It may be of some help...
  =========
  From Frederic Jameson."Five Theses on Actually Existing Marxism" in Ellen 
Meiksins Wood and John B. Foster eds. In Defense of History: Marxism and the 
Postmodern Agenda. New York: MR Press, 1997. (Jameson presents the First Thesis 
with these opening remarks)

  "Marxism is the science of capitalism, or better still, in order to give 
depth at once to both terms, it is the science of the inherent contradictions 
of capitalism. This means on the one hand that it is incoherent the 'death of 
Marxism' in the same breath with which one announces the definitive triumph of 
capitalism and the market. The latter would rather seem to augur a secure 
future for the former, leaving aside the matter of how 'definitive' its triumph 
could possibly be. [1]

  [1] The 'critique of political economy' never wished to be a science in the 
sense in which 'political economy' was itself conceived, let alone academiz 
forms of 'economics' it isolates the basis of the error it identifies, 
rejecting a radical discontinuity between theory and pracice, facts and values.
  ============

  As Jameson puts it nicely in the footnote, power of Marxism as a 'science' 
(or a theory of social reality) comes from it's 'critical' stance. That, unlike 
'the sciences' -here I have in mind social sciences- as we get to learn within 
the confines of the modern nation-state, which are tailored towards certain 
purposes; Marxism strives to transform society in an 'emancipatory' direction. 
It does not, for example, abstracts economy into the 'dehumanised' mechanics of 
supply and demand, nor freezes history within the given boundaries of a 
nation-state. Marxism directly, with the power dialectic dynamism, challenges 
the 'pseudo-positivism' of burgeoisie sciences, which represent itself with the 
myth of 'explaining' what's out there; a deceptive shield that aims at 
preserving status quo. In this sense, Marxism is a proudly and critically 
'positivist'.

  As Robert Cox once put it: "A theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose." I guess it naturally follows that "Marxist theory is for Marxists and 
revolutionary purposes."

  Yavuz

  Note: I was planning to add a quote from Yevgeny Zamyatin, but I wasn't sure 
(which means I didn't undertand) about the rules on the extent of quoting 
material.

  Haines Brown <brownh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
  > I don't have any problem in accepting a definition of Marxism as a
> science, but don't think that anything is gained by using this
> language in the context of contemporary debates about Marxism,
> social movements, ideology critique, or the philosophy of
> science. The term science has been too thoroughly co-opted by
> positivism

Louis, this subject is inherently ambivalent, and so it probably comes
down mostly to a question of personal taste. I tend to associate
Marxism (and human studies generally) with the word "science" because
it implies a rigorous method, perhaps a need to take wholes into
account, for its inherent materialism, and, arguably, because science
is a universal language, less culture bound than other frameworks in
which dialog might take place. As for the baggage of positivism, that
seems to me less true of natural scientists than folks in humanistic
studies whose acquaintance with science is fairly limited or naive
(although I may be characterizing myself here ;-().

> -- hence the seemingly innocuous character of the language of
> 'hypotheses'. I don't see any hypotheses in Marx, though it is
> possible to derive some from his texts. One could further break down
> his texts into propositions, postulates, generalizations,
> predictions, and so on. Nothing is gained by doing that, in my
> view.

Perhaps so, but I wonder. Although positivism may be a bête noire, it
seems less so today than a kind of post-modern indifference to
truth. I appreciate the critique of Enlightenment presumptions, but I
don't believe that critique necessarily discredits science, and it can
bring with it a kind of destruction to the notion of the progress of
understanding that Marxism, I presume, embraces. Perhaps embedded at
the beginning of this thread was not just the issue of an "absolute"
truth, but whether our statements can have any real truth value
whatsoever. This seems to be to be a substantial issue today, more so
than the positivist methodology for justifying statements of truth.

To justify this remark, I refer to a very standard work dealing with
the issue, the neopositivist discussion in Imre Lakatos and Alan
Musgrave, eds., _Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge_. Here the old
positivist notions are jettisoned, and the authors (at one point)
arrive at an almost existential notion of truth. That makes me
nervous, but at least it shows how much natural scientists have
distanced themselves from positivist baggage.

> On the question of ideology critique, I think its possible to bring
> an outside view effectively to any number of situations. We do it
> all the time, in fact. E.g., we critique child rearing practices
> that strike us as cruel or authoritarian, thus bringing a modern or
> even modern-western view to the issue. But this is not what Marx
> does ...

"Ideological critique" helps specify a bit your previous remark about
which I begged for elaboration. Note that my comments at the time were
not meant to address ideology specifically - at least not in its
narrower senses.

> Rather, it seems to me, his central concepts are those needed to
> understand the workings of capital. If those concepts ... did not
> exist, they would have to be invented.

I don't disagree with you, but I'm still fumbling with your
idea. Clearly, as your example above shows, what is involved is the
application of cultural norms to lend value to social practices. What
you may be getting at is that in Marx the source of our judgements is
not removed from our material existence (assuming, somewhat
inaccurately, that culture is autonomous from it), but our
understanding of the the material processes themselves in which we are
actors. If so, I'm in accord, although the distinction may not be
absolute if are to inquire as to the origins of our culture, which I
would argue are hardly independent of our material existence.

The more specific question is regarding ideology itself (another
ambivalent word). I regard ideology as a world view (body of thought)
that to a degree has a functional relation to our material existence,
and if we are speaking of class society, that functional character is
therefore "one-sided" (if you will allow the term). So, in a
contradictory society, there are contradictory ideologies. However,
ideology hardly exhausts the content of our world view (I suppose you
would agree), for it has expressions that are peculiar to particular
individuals or non-class social groups, or which (arguably, in natural
science to a significant extent) are independent of social
location. If you believe natural science cannot escape being
determined by our social location, then I would perhaps better
understand some of your objection to the word in connection with
Marxism.

> But his elaboration of those concepts (his mode of exposition, if
> you will) 150 years ago cannot stand as the final word. (That would
> make Marxism a religion.) They need constant elaboration in order to
> engage developments in political economy. I'm assuming we agree on
> this.

Yes, we do.

> One of the arguments against Marx's concept of ideology (mostly now
> from political science, though it originated from sociology in the
> 1940s) is that people no longer think ideologically, but instead
> pursue their interests reflexively and habitually on the basis of
> imperfect information.

I'm unclear about your point. For example, if ideology reflects our
material circumstances, is it not then "reflexive"? If we prefer to
think of ideology as the basis for a critique of existing
circumstances, that might seem to contradict the idea that it is only
reflexive (an old issue raised in objection to early Marxism, which
argued that the working class can't be revolutionary). However, I
don't think so. Thought _emerges_ from our experience, and so is only
probabilistically determined by it.

That is, circumstances constrain ideology, but do not determine it
unequivocally. For example, the experience of the capitalist
determines only that it most natural or easiest for him to think like
a member of the capitalist class, but with some effort he could think
otherwise (adopt a contrary ideology). The classic case is that of the
petite bourgeoisie which has (speaking in traditional terms) an
ambivalent class position and so naturally adopts either a
working-class or a capitalist ideology. More to the point, workers can
think like capitalists, and perhaps capitalists like workers. I'm here
skirting around your point in order to have you pin it down a bit more
concretely.

> And the concepts that Marx uses to examine the workings of capital
> turn out to be the very same concepts that people use to orient
> themselves to recursive situations, pervasive forces, social facts,
> opportunities, risks, etc., in the orbit of capitalist political
> economy.

Very interesting. Would you mind elaborating your point? For example,
what immediately comes to my mind about "recursive situations" is the
circulation of capital between the spheres of production and exchange,
but are you using the notion more broadly than this? Did you imply
something more general like dialectical processes here? Specifically,
what in the character of daily life is comparable to Marx's analysis
of the capitalist system?

> But if we (anybody) begin from an external position, i.e., if we
> speak as scientists rather than members of society (workers, if you
> will), or if we use concepts detached from experience for whatever
> reason, we talk only to ourselves.

I suspect you were describing the reduction of ideology to its parts
(cultural singularities) (correct me if I'm wrong) that have become
rather detached from their (material) context. If so, I'm with you.

I touched upon this above, but just to recall my point, I believe that
culture must be at once independent and yet determined, and the way to
reconcile this contradiction is to see it as probabilistically
determined. To suggest that culture is indeterminant on one hand or a
simply function of circumstance on the other seems to be unrealistic
when we actually take a look at specific cultural content, which seems
to range from one extreme to the other. When it comes to natural
science, it is clearly determined by material circumstance (nature),
but is also to some extent ideological (positivism, for
example). However, it is my sense that natural science has proven
itself able to get a pretty good handle on the nature of the cosmos
and break loose from much of this ideological content. That it is
nearly a universal language might be an indication of this.

So, contrary, I believe, to your suggestion, I assume that a
working-class scientist is perfectly able to enter into a constructive
dialog with a capitalist scientist (I hope you will agree that the
influence of the source of research funding and the relative
importance of research projects, while important considerations, are
marginal to the central issue of the truth at which they arrive). For
example, the method or findings of quantum mechanics or meteorology
seems as true for one class as it is for another.

[I won't be able to respond to your reactions to this for a couple
days because this weekend I'm being inducted into an honorary society
of 50-year submarine veterans.]

--

Haines Brown
KB1GRM
ET1(SS) U.S.S. Irex 482

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