[Marxism] Reluctant Saviour: A review of the review

[clintonf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Racy, heavily simplified, breathless, conspiratorial, righteous, urgently 
written, lurid... 
Professor Elson could well be describing the latest pronouncement from 
Indonesia?s military headquarters. Instead, he?s referring to Reluctant 
Saviour, 
my 2004 book on the events that led to the liberation of East Timor. 
Putting the aesthetic issue to one side for now, Elson makes a few points 
that are worth addressing for pedagogical reasons.

First, I argue that in 1974-75 policymakers believed that an independent East 
Timor 
might have resulted in a viable democratic alternative in the middle 
of the Indonesian archipelago. This was intolerable, because it would allow the 
Indonesian 
public to see, in their geographic midst, an alternative to the New Order. 
Elson objects to this, 
asserting that there are ?numerous possible alternative scenarios and 
explanations?. 
He provides no example, so his assertion cannot be evaluated. 
But I cited on page 14 a document written by Michael Curtin, 
who states: ?If an independent and politically radicalised East Timor were to 
make a go of it, 
with political and economic help not to Indonesia?s liking, 
it would certainly become something for discontented Indonesians to look to?. 
Curtin was Head of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs? Indonesia 
Section from 1975-1976. 
As a senior Australian policymaker, Curtin?s then-classified analysis carries 
some weight. 
If indeed there are ?numerous possible alternative scenarios and explanations?, 
I look forward to Elson providing (say) six examples, with supporting evidence.

Second, Elson refers to ?the unlikelihood that the Indonesians would accede 
to so major an intrusion on their sovereignty?. The fact is that in September 
1999 it took just four days 
of pressure for Indonesia to capitulate. Its capitulation came only two days 
before the second deadline 
imposed by US legislation that would have banned US support for economic 
assistance 
to Indonesia. This ban would have required the US to vote against the economic 
rescue-package 
needed by Indonesia. Indonesia agreed to do precisely that which Elson 
dismisses as unlikely. 

Third, Elson asserts that ?the scale and ferocity of the post-referendum mayhem 
was unexpected by the Australians?. Such a claim, once again, requires the 
evidentiary support 
of intelligence documents and other primary materials. Elson provides none, so 
his claim cannot be evaluated. But I provide several examples of leaked 
documents 
and other primary materials to support my claim. 

Fourth, Elson says that my ?conspiratorial tone credits Australia with greater 
knowledge,
command and certainty over the emerging pattern of events than can possibly 
have been the case?. 
In fact, I make the opposite claim, with evidence. Readers may want to check 
pages 105-111 for more details, but I?ll provide a few examples below to 
show how Australia had very little command over the emerging pattern of events:

1. On 7 September 1999, an East Timor policy unit was established within 
Australian Defence Headquarters. The speed with which it was set up is best 
illustrated 
by the fact that it did not even have a room of its own to meet in; 
it was set up in a temporary conference room, and required external 
infrastructure to function.

2. The Australian Defence Force, not expecting to have to arrange for a 
peacekeeping force, 
had to borrow 4000 flak jackets from the United States.
 
3. The Post Operations Report concluded that, for some of the major units, 
no language training packages ?were made available through the 
system for possible operations in East Timor at any stage during 1999?. To the 
contrary
??there was an active policy of suppressing access to information ? This policy 
militated 
against having colloquial linguists and a culturally aware [unit] for 
deployment as part of Interfet?.

Finally, the aesthetic issue: the book was indeed written for a wide audience. 
Happily, it has found it, and all royalties are going to 
http://www.timorwomen.org 
which supports women?s economic development in East Timor.

CF


Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 52, Number 1, 2006, pp. 
156-157.
Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the Independence of East Timor. 
By Clinton Fernandes (Melbourne: Scribe Publication, 2004). Pp. 138, index. 
$22.00 pb.

The products of the genre of diplomatic history can often be complex, measured,
complicated and dry. If you like your discussions of the ideology and practice 
of
foreign policy to be racy, heavily simplified, breathless and, best of all, 
sustained by an
impeccable and uncompromising moral uprightness, purpose and clarity, as well 
as a
sure command of the truth, then this is the book for you.
Clinton Fernandes?s little book is one of a number of such books published 
recently
by Scribe which seek to provide sharp, concise and rapidly-produced analysis of
matters of (near) contemporary concern in Australia. Truth, one my of my old 
teachers
was fond of saying, is in the nuances. There is, unfortunately, little room for 
nuance in
the format employed here. Reluctant Saviour is an urgently written account of 
the
Australian Government?s malfeasance in the matter of the eventual attainment of 
East
Timorese independence. The picture presented is that of an Australian 
Government or,
better a state apparatus, whose sense of the national interest is no more and 
no less than
the promotion of the broader interests of Australian capital. Cheered on and 
prodded by
a highly influential ?Jakarta Lobby? in Canberra, the Australian Government long
maintained good relations with and support for the evil regime of Suharto?s New 
Order
and especially with the Indonesian military upon whose power the regime rested 
and
who could guarantee the right climate for profitable investment (p. 24). That 
support
required the systematic denial of East Timorese claims to independence and, 
Fernandes
argues, a refusal to intervene directly in East Timor?s post-referendum 
violence of
August 1999 until forced to do so, reluctantly, by the urgings of an 
increasingly
agitated and alarmed Australian domestic electorate.
Such an analysis has a certain force and persuasiveness to it, provided one 
adopts
the underlying assumptions and does not filter out the grossnesses of 
generalisation
that sustain the argument. In this kind of work, one makes an undocumented and
unargued assertion which carries just a hint of truth, and uses it as a 
foundation stone
for the argument that follows. Thus, the major reason for Australian failure to 
support
East Timorese independence in 1974-75 was that ?it might have resulted in a 
viable
democratic alternative in the middle of the Indonesian archipelago [which was]
intolerable because it would allow the Indonesian public to see, in their 
geographical
midst, an alternative to the New Order? (p. 14). Well, maybe. There are, of 
course,
numerous possible alternative scenarios and explanations, based upon other 
kinds of
assumptions. But they remain uncanvassed, because to do so might cloud and
problematise the purity of the argument, and detract from its force.
Such a style of analysis makes a page-turning novel, but does not make for
enhanced understanding of what was, especially in 1999, a most complex and 
rapidly
changing situation. Fernandes?s view that the Australian Government deliberately
rejected the notion of a peacekeeping force so as not to upset the Indonesians 
(and
especially the Indonesian military) is another case in point. It carries an 
intimation of
truth (Australian concern with Indonesian sensitivity), but seems completely to 
miss
other key aspects of the drama (for example, the unlikelihood that the 
Indonesians
would accede to so major an intrusion on their sovereignty, and that the scale 
and
ferocity of the post-referendum mayhem was unexpected by the Australians).
Fernandes?s conspiratorial tone credits Australia with greater knowledge, 
command
and certainty over the emerging pattern of events than can possibly have been 
the case,
and in doing so paints its alleged guilt in even more lurid colours.
An analysis such as this might give its author a sense of righteous 
satisfaction, but
does little to increase our nuanced, detailed appreciation of this key 
transition in the
modern history of Australia, Indonesian and East Timor itself, and the lessons 
which
might flow from it. 
R.E. ELSON, History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics, University of Queensland

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