[Marxism] Marcuse vs Popper: pre-game warm-up [3]

[Ralph Dumain <rdumain@xxxxxxx>]

I may have a final round of proofing to do, but here is Bender's essay in full:

Frederic L. Bender, "Marxism, Liberalism, and the Foundations of Scientific
Method," pp. 1-53.
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/marcuse-popper-1.html

This is the same Bender who wrote THE BETRAYAL OF MARX, one of the major
texts of the sloppy interpretive scholarship of the Engels-Betrayed-Marx
school.  It is true, though, that what came down to subsequent generations,
including Bender's, under the rubric of "Marxism" or "Marxism-Leninism" was
a monstrous distortion of the foundations of Marx's own views.  It was
necessary to separate Marx from Marxism in order to recover Marx in full.

I hope this is not the same Bender who more recently wrote a book in
advocacy of deep ecology.  If it is, the decline into intellectual senility
could have one or both of two plausible causes: (1) it is one logical
outcome of latent romantic tendencies inherited from certain critical
theorists; (2) as the fortunes of the New Left and the new social movements
declined, and times changed, the Spotted Owl Club emerged as a congenial
center of ideological loyalty.

More seriously, Bender does a largely creditable job of summarizing basic
concepts of Marx's Marxism and its implicit ontological
fundaments.  However, as I argued in my previous post, Bender's argument is
seriously weakened by his grounding in Lukacs and the Frankfurt
School.  This shows up conspicuously in his treatment of the natural
sciences, which seems to partake of the worst notions of the tradition from
early Lukacs to Habermas (including by implication if not explicitly, the
notion of instrumental reason).  I get the sense that Bender has got Popper
wrong on a number of points, but even more fundamentally, Bender's notion
of science undercuts his analysis of Popper's philosophy of science.  This
is unfortunate, as Bender otherwise successfully skewers Popper's shameful
ignorance in the history of ideas, his inept views of holism, historicism,
and Marxism.

The full essay may begin to address some of the questions surrounding this
approach to social theory, but it is just as likely it's not going to
register with people unfamiliar with this type of material.  If and when
time permits, I will comment more fully on the essay to point out the
salient features that would clarify its approach for novices.

For now, I'll make only one or two points.  Bender published this essay in
the wake of the heated social movements of the late '60s and early '70s,
and with the waning of the New Left's momentum in the '70s.  The text,
however, is abstract and thus not specific to any particular moment or
strategic situation.  The question is, then, how one would relate what
Bender calls an "anthropological-axiological" argument, i.e. one that lacks
empirical specificity, to a specific site of political intervention.  The
issue is no stranger to the tradition of anti-Stalinist Marxism.  The
political situations of the mid-70s and now are very different, hence, a
characterization of how these ideas apply in reference to what is going on
politically then and now would have to be different.  Bender (circa 1976)
argues that the radical movements of the '60s and '70s would have to be
generalized into a working class movement in order to effect a fundamental
power shift.  Not terribly different from what others have had to say on
this score.  The only difference is that the meta-perspective, the notion
of what the movement would aim toward and how it conceives of itself is
predicated on a social ontology different from both the specific social
movements (Blacks, women, etc.) and Stalinist, Maoist, or Trotskyist
positions.  What practical difference does this make?  This is a question
for political strategy itself, not a philosophy or metascientific
perspective, which is to help explain the meaning of what is going on in
society as a whole.  Strategically and tactically, one can only do what one
can based on the possibilities of the moment, though hopefully oriented by
the big picture.  Contrary to Popper's ignorant ravings, the majority of
radicals in modern times have done just this, aside from currents of
romantic revolutionaries who think they can subjectively impose their will
on the world.  Even the phenomenon of ideological rigidification has its
counterpart of critical self-evaluation.  One of the purposes of theory is
not only to criticize the existing social order and its operant political
ideologies, but the very movement one is a part of.  Without fundamental
theoretical critique, how can one penetrate to the core of the meaning of
one's historical moment?  This is a key reason why fundamental social
theory, and not merely pragmatic wonkitude, is requisite.  What a shame
folks inside the Beltway will remain clueless to their dying day.


____________________
"Nowadays, anyone who wishes to combat lies and ignorance and to write the
truth must overcome at least five difficulties. He must have the courage to
write the truth when truth is everywhere opposed; the keenness to recognize
it, although it is everywhere concealed; the skill to manipulate it as a
weapon; the judgment to select those in whose hands it will be effective;
and the cunning to spread the truth among such persons. These are
formidable problems for writers living under Fascism, but they exist also
for those writers who have fled or been exiled; they exist even for writers
working in countries where civil liberty prevails."  -- Bertolt Brecht



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