[Marxism] A power move with far-reaching implications

[clintonf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Indonesia 1965: A power move with far-reaching implications
By Clinton Fernandes

On September 1, 1965, the US State Department prepared a Special National 
Intelligence
Estimate for Indonesia. Written by the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
intelligence
organisations of the Departments of State and Defence and the National Security 
Agency, it
assessed the prospects for, and strategic implications of, a communist takeover 
in
Indonesia.

It assessed that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was ?by far the best 
organised and
most dynamic entity in Indonesia?.1 Only a few months later, the PKI would 
cease to exist.
Its destruction, according to former US ambassador Marshall Green, ?was a 
momentous event in
world affairs, and I don?t think that the press and the public has ever seen it 
that way?.2 

This article will discuss aspects of that event.3 

Indonesia after independence
Indonesian independence was proclaimed on August 17, 1945. There followed a 
four-year
guerrilla war to defeat Dutch attempts to recolonise the territory. The Dutch 
conceded
defeat in 1949, and Indonesia?s political independence was assured. The newly 
independent
state assigned a high priority to the education of its population, establishing 
schools and
literacy programs at a rapid rate. It was quite successful in its efforts: in 
1950, basic
literacy was estimated at about 10 per cent of the population and only 230 
Indonesians had
received tertiary education. Ten years later, almost every village had a school 
and basic
literacy was nearly 80 per cent. Tertiary education had also shot up 
dramatically. 

Formal schooling was only one aspect of the new, post-independence culture. The 
public began
to participate in politics to a much greater extent. Centuries of colonisation 
had stifled
popular involvement in the social, political and cultural spheres. Such 
involvement had
grown fitfully in the final decades of the independence struggle, although 
colonial
repression remained a significant constraining factor. With political 
independence, however,
a more participatory culture took shape. The social and cultural spheres were 
occupied by
numerous organisations such as credit unions, chess clubs, prayer groups, 
housewives?
associations, cultural groups, worker and peasant unions, youth groups and 
student bodies.
These diverse organisations were associated with certain political parties. The 
combination
of political party and associated organisations came to be known as cultural 
streams or
?aliran?. The years after independence brought the growth of several such 
aliran, which were
an everyday affair ie more than simply a machine for generating votes in the 
lead-up to an
election campaign. Many Indonesian citizens saw these aliran as constituting 
their primary
identity. As a result, political life beame connected to the population?s 
social and
cultural life. 

Australian planners recognised that Indonesia had "a strong Communist Party with
considerable prospects of increasing its popular appeal".4 The Indonesian 
Communist
Party (PKI) defended the interests of the poor and was rapidly increasing its 
support among
landless peasants. The PKI was allied with the left wing of the Indonesian 
Nationalist Party
(PNI). Under this allied leadership, an organised movement of workers and 
peasants
campaigned for the redistribution of land in the countryside, the 
nationalisation of foreign
companies and greater economic equality. It opposed the US war in Vietnam and 
supported
national liberation movements around the world.

The PKI was no tool of China or the Soviet Union, however. According to a 
standard source on
the subject, the PKI "had won widespread support not as a revolutionary party 
but as an
organisation defending the interests of the poor within the existing system". 
As the
US?s Special National Intelligence Estimate put it, should the PKI come to 
power, its
"foreign policy decisions ? would stress Indonesian national interests above 
those of
Peking, Moscow, or international communism in general". It "would be 
sufficiently
nationalistic to refuse to grant air or naval bases or missile sites to either 
Moscow or
Peking".6

The Australian government viewed the PKI?s growing support with alarm. 
Australian strategic
planners shared this concern, warning that a communist victory "would be a 
considerable
blow to Western prestige in South East Asia and would assist in the growth of 
Communist and
neutralist sentiment throughout the area".7 Subsequent analysis by US 
intelligence
agreed, observing that in the longer term "Indonesia would provide a powerful 
example
for the underdeveloped world and hence a credit to communism and a setback for 
Western
prestige."8 

The reference to "neutralist sentiment" is instructive. As a leading
anti-colonialist advocate and founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
Indonesia wielded
great influence in the Third World. Australian planners feared that other 
countries would
join it in pursuing similar goals and choose their own path of economic and 
social
development. By the mid-1950s, Indonesia?s non-alignment, coupled with the 
growing
popularity of the PKI, was a matter of serious concern to Western policymakers. 
US President
Eisenhower wondered out loud, ?Why the hell did we ever urge the Dutch to get 
out of
Indonesia??9 The US, with Australian participation, tried to break up Indonesia 
by
encouraging an outer islands rebellion on Sumatra and Sulawesi. The Indonesian 
military
demonstrated its strength by crushing this rebellion. The US therefore realised 
the
importance of cultivating the military, and began providing it with limited 
military aid in
order to sustain anti-communist elements in the officer corps. 

Until 1957 the PKI had been excluded from government, but it benefited from the 
system of
so-called Guided Democracy. This system was proposed by President Sukarno, who 
argued that
the indigenous Indonesian way of deciding important questions was to have 
extensive
deliberation (musyawarah) designed to achieve a consensus (mufakat). Since this
"democracy with guidance" operated at the village level, he argued that it 
should
be the model for the nation. Guided Democracy would consist of a government 
based on the
four main political parties plus a national council representing the parties and
"functional groups" ? workers, peasants, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, religious
bodies, youth groups, women?s groups, and so on. Under presidential guidance, a 
national
consensus could be formulated. 

From 1957 onwards, Dutch-owned assets in Indonesia were occupied in a series of 
direct
actions, and then nationalised as part of a campaign for the recovery of West 
Irian. The
army took over the management of these plantations, mines and other estates. 
Military
entrepreneurs began to play a strong role in the domestic economy. (In later 
years, it
became customary to attribute the decline in the productivity of these assets 
to the
influence of the PKI. In fact, however, they declined under military 
management.) The
influence of the PKI continued to increase. Its members began to hold a range of
bureaucratic and political posts. From 1957, several cities on Java had 
communist mayors and
several provincial governors were close to the party. However, the PKI and the 
left wing of
the PNI did not occupy any but the most symbolic positions in Cabinet. Control 
over the
productive capacity of the economy rested in the hands of senior bureaucrats 
and military
officers, who did not support Sukarno?s economic program. It was they ? not 
Sukarno or the
PKI ? who implemented strategic economic decisions. As for Cabinet, it too 
disagreed with
Sukarno in the economic sphere. 

When John F. Kennedy became president of the United States, there was a 
tactical shift in US
policy towards Indonesia. Kennedy and several of his key officials on the 
National Security
Council believed that Eisenhower?s approach had been counter-productive, 
driving Indonesia
even further away from US influence. They therefore used a more tolerant 
rhetoric toward the
Non-Aligned Movement, and received Sukarno amiably in Washington in April 1961. 
The Dutch
were persuaded to leave West Irian soon after. 

Growth of the Indonesian Communist Party 

Between 1960 and 1965, the PKI and its allied peasant organisations began to 
carry out a
program of land seizures in order to make landlords comply with existing laws. 
These actions
resulted in violent responses by landlords, and fights between security forces 
and peasants.
Mass mobilisations began to increase very rapidly, with large protests in the 
main cities
and a growing number of smaller protests in other towns and villages. The party 
also took up
the cause of plantation and industrial workers in North Sumatra, and of 
Javanese migrants in
North and South Sumatra. It supported Hindus against East Javanese orthodox 
Muslims who were
members of the local elite, as well as opponents of Hindu priestly authority in 
Bali. All
this grassroots activity contributed to a major increase in the membership of 
the PKI and
the left wing of the PNI. By 1965, the PKI had three million members and was 
said to be the
largest communist party in the world outside the Soviet Union and China. In 
addition to its
vast membership, more than 15 million people had indirect connections to it 
through their
membership of the peasant associations, labour unions and other affiliates. 

The PKI was opposed by sections of the commercial and land-owning 
establishment, senior
figures in the bureaucratic apparatus, and a number of right-wing intellectuals 
and
students. This conservative alliance also had the support of a large number of 
smaller
Islamic parties. Crucially, it was backed by the powerful ? and increasingly 
apprehensive ?
Indonesian military. While there were important left-wing and populist forces 
within the
army itself, the right wing was always stronger. Indeed the army had 
demonstrated its power
and right-wing credentials in 1948 when it put down an uprising supported by 
the PKI in the
Madiun region of Central Java. The divisions in Indonesian society were 
reflected in an
increasingly tense situation inside the army as well. In subsequent years, 
particularly from
1962-65, there were sharp internal struggles between left-wing populists and 
right-wing
forces within the army. 

In late 1963, US policy became more aggressive. Lyndon Johnson had succeeded 
Kennedy as
president, and his "personal antipathy toward Sukarno, along with several 
important
bureaucratic changes ? combined to introduce a far less forgiving stance toward 
Indonesian
actions in the Far East Bureau of the State Department and on McGeorge Bundy's 
National
Security Council (NSC) staff?".10 This policy shift coincided with regional 
friction as
Indonesia challenged Britain's role in the creation of Malaysia. In March next 
year,
after an American magazine called for the US to end all aid unless Indonesian 
attacks on
Malaysia were halted, Sukarno said in a speech in Jakarta that he would tell 
any country
that tried to attach strings to its foreign assistance, "You can go to hell 
with your
aid." This remark (made in English) was widely reported in the US. All US aid 
came to
an end, except for "military assistance" intended for the Indonesian army. 

Western intelligence analysts turned their attention to Sukarno, describing him 
as an
"intuitive politician" and a "mass leader of extraordinary skill". State
Department analysts believed that Sukarno operated according to "opportunistic,
play-it-by-ear policies rather than by a long-range fixed plan". The CIA 
concluded that
his "Marxist inclination"? were "largely emotionally based". It
characterised his relationship with the Communists as one of "mutual
exploitation". Sukarno needed the PKI because he lacked a mass political 
organisation
of his own; the PKI needed Sukarno for protection against the army. As for the 
army, Sukarno
used it to counterbalance the PKI, and the army saw Sukarno as the best person 
to hold the
far-flung and diverse parts of Indonesia together.11 

Strengthening the Indonesian military

It became clear to US policymakers that the Indonesian army?s hand would have 
to be
strengthened. US ambassador to Malaysia James Bell, who had had considerable 
previous
Indonesian experience, suggested reassuring the army that the West would not 
interfere if it
moved against the PKI: "If we can give them this kind of shot in the arm they 
might
have more inclination to act."12 McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to 
President
Johnson, sent Bell?s memo to Chester Cooper, his senior assistant on the Far 
East. He wrote,
"Cooper: It makes sense to me. Can we do it? MG.B." US ambassador to Indonesia
Howard Jones argued against Bell, warning that such an approach "would rebound 
as [an]
unwarranted attempt [to] interfere internally". Cooper therefore wrote back to 
Bundy,
attaching his note to the cables from Bell and Jones: "Mac ? You asked my views 
on the
coming from Malaya (attached). I have brooded and have checked around and agree 
with Jones.
Chet."13 

Ambassador Jones approached a friendly Indonesian diplomat, asking what would 
happen if
Sukarno were "suddenly removed from the scene". The diplomat predicted a
polarisation of the country around Defence Minister Nasution and D.N. Aidit, 
the head of the
PKI. He said that General Nasution was "the strongest man in the country" who 
had
the loyalty of the officer corps. Jones visited Nasution three days later, 
asking him
"whether some military leaders welcomed the disintegration of the economy on 
the theory
that the PKI would make a bid for power and the military could then crack down 
on the
PKI". Nasution "avoided like the plague any discussion of a possible military
takeover, even though this hovered in the air throughout the talk, and at no 
time did he
pick up obvious hints of US support in time of crisis". But Nasution had 
obviously
talked it over with his fellow generals, for they met two weeks later. This 
time Nasution
assured the ambassador that the military was "strongly pro-US and anti-PKI". He
said the PKI was probably unprepared to make a bid for power, but if it did, 
"Madiun
would be mild compared with an army crackdown today."14. The US kept 
encouraging the
Indonesian military to increase the pressure on Sukarno. The 303 Committee of 
the National
Security Council approved a CIA-State Department political action program aimed 
at
portraying the PKI "as an increasingly ambitious, dangerous opponent of Sukarno 
and
legitimate nationalism and instrument of Chinese neo-imperialism".15 Western
policymakers knew that it would be folly to take on Sukarno directly because of 
his
tremendous popularity. 

In April 1965, President Johnson dispatched his special envoy Ellsworth Bunker 
to Indonesia.
Bunker reported back that relations with Indonesia were unlikely to improve. He 
confirmed
that Sukarno "is still the symbol for Indonesian unity and independence, 
believes in
himself and his destiny, and is able and shrewd. There is little question of 
his continued
hold on the loyalty of the Indonesian people, who in large measure look to him 
for
leadership, trust his leadership, and are willing to follow him. No force in 
this country
can attack him nor is there evidence that any significant group would want to 
do so."16
As for the PKI, Bunker argued that its strengths were "powerful organisation",
"brilliant manipulation of other political forces", "dominance in the labour
field", and "virtual control of the national press and radio". Its weaknesses
were that: "The bulk of its strength is in Java, a handicap in a country where
animosity against Javanese is strong in the outer islands; it has no 
paramilitary arm to
challenge the army, although it is now making strong efforts to build one; and 
its freedom
of action remains limited by the need to continue a subservient posture toward
Sukarno."17 

Indonesia?s poor economic performance under military management was compounded 
by the fact
that sales of rubber, its major export earner, were shrinking as a result of 
competition
from synthetic alternatives. Indonesia was therefore deprived of an important 
source of
foreign currency. Despite the economic problems, Bunker noted the country?s 
"resilience
to economic adversity" because "over half the population live outside the
monetised sector of the economy as self-sufficient farmers".18 As for the 
Indonesian
government, it "occupies a dominant position in basic industry, public 
utilities,
internal transportation and communication". Bunker warned that should the drift 
towards
PKI dominance continue: "It is probable that private ownership will disappear 
and may
be succeeded by some form of production-profit-sharing contract arrangements to 
be applied
to all foreign investment." In Bunker?s assessment: "The avowed Indonesian
objective is 'to stand on their own feet' in developing their economy, free from
foreign, especially Western, influence."19 

Bunker advised that the US should reduce its visibility "so that those opposed 
to the
communists and extremists may be free to handle a confrontation, which they 
believe will
come, without the incubus of being attacked as defenders of the 
neo-colonialists and
imperialists".20 He warned against any attempt to foment military rebellion 
along the
lines of 1958 because "the ideal of national unity is an overriding obsession 
with
practically all Indonesians, stronger by far than any real divisive regional
feeling".21 

Accordingly, the US adopted a "low silhouette" policy; its official presence
"shrank from over 400 in April to only 35 in August. But the CIA station 
maintained its
staff of 12, including its full complement of eight clandestine operatives 
responsible for
intelligence collection and, on occasion, covert action. Similarly, the top 
personnel in the
Embassy?s political section and the military attaches remained."22 Soon after, 
Marshall
Green replaced Howard Jones as the new ambassador to Indonesia. He arrived in 
Jakarta on
July 23, 1965.23 Green "had the complete trust of the State Department", which
"never moved a muscle without his advice".24 

The mutiny
Tensions within a now thoroughly polarised Indonesian society continued to 
build, until they
exploded into open conflict on the evening of September 30, 1965, when a small 
number of
middle-ranking, left-wing army officers staged a mutiny. The mutineers killed 
six generals
(Yani, Suprapto, Parman, Sutojo, Harjono and Panjaitan) and a lieutenant 
(Tendean). The
circumstances of this mutiny have never been fully explained, but there are 
good reasons to
believe that it was designed to prevent a coup by a right-wing Council of 
Generals. However,
the mutineers ? led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, a left-wing commander in the 
Presidential
Guard ? failed to arrest key generals, including Major General Suharto. Strong 
evidence
suggests that Suharto had been tipped off beforehand about the mutiny. 

The mutiny did not appear to have planned in much detail ? no serious measures 
were taken to
seize choke points in the capital. The worker and peasant movements had been 
given no
forewarning, and most of them were caught unawares. The PKI did not try to 
mobilise its
massive party membership. According to a US clandestine source, the PKI central 
committee
reacted only after hearing the mutineers? radio broadcast. Sir Andrew 
Gilchrist, the British
ambassador, also suspected that the PKI had not been kept in the loop, joining 
in only
"because they feared that if the army crushed Untung it would crush them as
well".25 The Australian Joint Intelligence Committee noted that while individual
communist groups clearly participated in the mutiny, "evidence of actual PKI
involvement ? that is, of prior planning by the Central Committee ? is largely
circumstantial".26
 
The US appears to have been caught by surprise.27 One of its diplomats saw 
roadblocks and
unusual military activity as he went to work on the morning of October 1, 1965. 
At first he
assumed that Sukarno had died or become incapacitated. So did other US 
diplomats, who did
not know much about Major-General Suharto. There was more than one Suharto in 
the senior
ranks of the army, and at first they misidentified him. Similarly, the CIA?s 
research bureau
knew little of Suharto or his politics; all it could say of him in the initial 
period was
that he was "considered to be an anti-Communist"28 ? not very illuminating,
considering his profession and rank. US analysts later realised that five of 
the six
generals killed had been trained in the US. Suharto himself had not trained in 
the US but
thirteen of his top aides had.29 
The crackdown

The Indonesian military moved swiftly and decisively. It arrested PKI members 
and took
control of the media, using Radio Indonesia and the Antara news agency to 
encourage anti-PKI
action. A major theme in its propaganda campaign was the murder of the six 
Indonesian
generals. The military claimed that the generals were tortured and their 
genitals cut off by
members of the PKI-affiliated women?s organisation Gerwani. Major-General 
Suharto said that
"it was obvious for those of us who saw [the bodies] with our own eyes what 
savage
tortures had been inflicted by the barbarous adventurers calling themselves 'The
September 30th Movement'".30 Autopsies ? ordered personally by Major-General
Suharto ? revealed that these stories were false, but the propaganda continued. 
(According
to the autopsies, none of the victims? eyes had been gouged out, and all their 
penises were
intact.31) Sukarno and his foreign minister Subandrio tried to inform the 
public that the
post mortem certificates had not mentioned any abnormalities, but the army was 
firmly in
command of the media and these messages did not get through32. 

Through the Antara news agency, the Indonesian military claimed that the PKI 
had drawn up
lists of hundreds of government officials marked for execution if the mutineers 
had
succeeded.33 Other stories claimed that members of PKI youth organisation 
Pemuda Rakyat had
kidnapped two youths in Sumatra and tortured them for five days, removing eyes 
and cutting
off hands and testicles, before killing them. It was also claimed that other 
Pemuda Rakyat
members had tortured and murdered Muslims praying on the bank of a river.34 
Other, extremely
successful, propaganda stories alleged that PKI leader Aidit had encouraged 
Gerwani and
Pemuda Rakyat members to take part in "delirious sexual orgies" for six months
before the mutiny.35

Full-scale massacres of PKI members across the Indonesian archipelago occurred 
when special
forces or parachute troops went into the regions. These soldiers participated 
in the
killings, but more frequently used local militias to liquidate suspected PKI 
sympathisers.
Local military units made it clear that they wanted to annihilate the PKI. They 
provided
weapons, equipment, training and encouragement to youth organisations, eg the 
Muslim Ansor
in Central and East Java. These groups usually went from village to village, 
grabbing PKI
members and taking them away to be murdered. In some cases, entire villages were
obliterated, but more typically the killers used hit lists and local informants 
to identify
their victims. Particular attention was given to teachers and other village 
intellectuals.
According to declassified British reports, many of the victims were the "merest 
rank
and file" of the PKI, who were "often no more than bewildered peasants who give
the wrong answer on a dark night to bloodthirsty hooligans bent on violence".36
According to British historian Mark Curtis, an Australian diplomat learnt that:
"Torture was the customary prelude to death and was in fact carried out in the 
army
establishment next door to his own home. The nightly executions, carried out 
just outside
Kupang, were open to the public provided those who attended took part in the 
executions. The
Army was in complete control of these operations."37

Robert Cribb, a leading scholar on these events, writes that the killings were 
"largely
done with knives or swords, but some victims were beaten to death and some were 
shot. In
some cases the victims were forced to dig their own shallow, mass graves in 
secluded places,
or the bodies were dumped in rivers, or concealed in caves ? The regions most 
seriously
affected were Central and East Java, Bali and North Sumatra, where the [PKI] 
had been most
active, but there were massacres in every part of the archipelago where 
communists could be
found. A scholarly consensus has settled on a figure of 400,000-500,000 
deaths."38 
Western support

Western policymakers and diplomats were keen to support the army, but there was 
a problem:
Sukarno?s previous anti-imperialist rhetoric had resonated strongly with the 
Indonesian
public. Any overt support would therefore serve only to expose the army as a 
tool of the
West. Sukarno?s towering reputation presented a significant obstacle. A deft 
touch was
required. 

US ambassador Marshall Green understood that economic aid should not be offered 
because
economic difficulties hurt the reputation of the civilian administration, not 
the army. His
military contacts told him that there was an urgent need for food and clothing 
in Indonesia
but it was more important to let Sukarno and Subandrio "stew in their own
juice".39
 
The information campaign in support of the killings was informed by similar 
principles. The
Indonesian army secretly urged that foreign broadcasts not give the army "too 
much
credit" or criticise Sukarno; rather, they should emphasise PKI atrocities and 
the
party?s role in the mutiny.40 While Sukarno could not be directly attacked, an 
Indonesian
general offered to send background information on foreign minister Subandrio, 
who was
regarded as more vulnerable. Australian ambassador Keith Shann was told that 
Radio Australia
should never suggest that the army was pro-Western or right-wing. Instead, 
credit should be
given to other organisations, such as Muslim and youth groups.41
 
Radio Australia had an important role to play because of its overwhelming 
popularity with
Indonesian listeners. It was said to be more popular than Radio Indonesia 
because its
listeners included both the elite and students, who liked it because it played 
rock music,
which had been officially banned.42 Australia?s Department of External Affairs 
(as it was
then known) was aware that its high signal strength and massive listening 
audience meant
that its Indonesian broadcasts were "a particularly important instrumentality 
in the
present situation". It was therefore told to "be on guard against giving
information to the Indonesian people that would be withheld by the 
Army-controlled internal
media". The Australian ambassador worked to ensure that it gave "prominent
coverage" to "reports of PKI involvement and Communist Chinese complicity"
while playing down or not broadcasting "reports of divisions within the army
specifically and armed services more generally". Another senior official 
recommended
that Radio Australia "not do anything which would be helpful to the PKI"; rather
it "should highlight reports tending to discredit the PKI and show its 
involvement in
the losing cause".43

The US, Britain and Australia co-operated closely in the propaganda effort. 
Marshall Green
urged Washington to "Spread the story of PKI?s guilt, treachery and brutality",
adding that this was "perhaps the most needed immediate assistance we can give 
army if
we can find [a] way to do it without identifying it as [a] sole or largely US
effort".44 The British Foreign Office hoped to "encourage anti-Communist
Indonesians to more vigorous action in the hope of crushing Communism in 
Indonesia
altogether". Britain would emphasise "PKI brutality in murdering Generals and
families, Chinese interference, particularly arms shipments, PKI subverting 
Indonesia as the
agents of foreign Communists".45 British ambassador Sir Andrew Gilchrist wrote: 
"I
have never concealed ? my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be 
an essential
preliminary to effective change."46 Throughout this period, Western radio 
stations
continued to recycle stories from Radio Jakarta or the army newspapers and 
broadcast them
back to Indonesia. US Embassy officials established a back-channel link through 
the US army
attache in Jakarta, who regularly met with an aide to General Nasution. 

The US Embassy also compiled lists of PKI leaders and thousands of senior 
members and handed
them over to the Indonesian military.47 While these kinds of lists were based 
entirely on
previous reporting by the communist press, they proved invaluable to the 
military which
seemed "to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership at the
time".48 
General Sukendro secretly approached the US Embassy, asking for assistance in 
the army?s
operations against the PKI. Marshall Green advised the State Department that 
"we should
do what we can as soon as we can, to meet request for medical supplies. Cost is 
not
prohibitive and quantity is such that both finance and shipping could probably 
be handled
covertly."49 As for the army?s requests for small arms, Green said that he 
"would
be leery about telling army we are in position to provide same, although we 
should act, not
close our minds to this possibility. There is a chance that situation in 
central Java might
take such a turn for the worse that we would wish to move quickly with packages 
of certain
types of arms. Meanwhile, we could explore availability of small arms stocks, 
preferable of
non-US origin, which could, if necessary, provide covert assistance to army for 
purchase of
weapons."50 Green also authorised the provision of 50 million rupiahs to the
Kap-Gestapu movement, which was leading the crackdown. He advised the State 
Department that
there was "no doubt whatsoever that Kap-Gestapu?s activity is fully consonant 
with and
co-ordinated by the army. We have had substantial intelligence reporting to 
support
this."51 Overall, the US provided the Indonesian army with money, medicines,
communications equipment, weapons and intelligence. It was satisfied with the 
return it
received on this investment. As Marshall Green put it, the Embassy and the US 
government are
"generally sympathetic with and admiring of what army [is] doing".52 It would be
necessary "to lay [the] foundation of understanding between us" in order to
"make it easier for us to act effectively if at some future date army should 
want help
from US". There were potential problems that needed sorting out. "One such 
problem
was [the] position [of] American oil companies."53 

On February 21, 1966, Sukarno tried to reshuffle his cabinet and sack General 
Nasution as
Defence Minister. But with the public cowed in fear of the killings, his 
attempt to assert
his authority failed. There were large demonstrations backed by the army, and 
on March 11,
1966, armed troops mounted a show of force outside the presidential palace. 
Sukarno
capitulated and signed a letter of authority handing over executive power to 
General
Suharto. 
The aftermath

In the wake of the massacres, Indonesia?s pre-eminent cultural and intellectual
organisations ? the Peoples? Cultural Institute, the National Cultural 
Institute, and the
Indonesian Scholars? Association ? were shut down, and many of their members 
were arrested
or imprisoned. More than one and a half million Indonesians passed through a 
system of
prisons and prison camps. The PKI was physically annihilated, and popular 
organisations
associated with it were suppressed. The whole of Indonesian society was forcibly
depoliticised. In village after village, local bureaucrats backed by the army 
imposed a
control matrix of permits, rules and regulations. Citizens were required to 
obtain a
"letter of clean circumstances" certifying that they and their extended families
had not been associated with the left before 1965. Indonesian society became 
devoted to the
prevention of any challenge to elite interests. 

Control of the universities, newspapers, and cultural institutions was handed to
conservative writers and intellectuals, who collaborated with the New Order?s 
program and
did not oppose the jailing of their left-wing cultural rivals. Along with the 
violence,
certain cultural values were strongly promoted ? discussion of personal, 
religious and
consumerist issues was encouraged, while discussion of politics was considered 
to be in bad
taste. The conservative establishment also monopolised Indonesia?s external 
cultural
relations. 

Suharto would rule for more than 30 years until a popular uprising and a 
crisis-ridden
economy forced his resignation on May 21, 1998. 
Dr Clinton Fernandes is a historian and author of Reluctant Saviour: Australia, 
Indonesia
and the independence of East Timor (Scribe, 2004). He is currently a Visiting 
Fellow at the
Australian National University. These are his views. 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notes
1 Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXVI (FRUS), 
pp289-292. 
2 National Security Archive 15 January 1997, Interview with Marshall Green, 
Episode 15. 
3 I have borrowed in part from Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the 
Independence
of East Timor (Scribe, 2004). 
4 Department of Defence 1958, Importance of Indonesia to Australia and Regional 
Defence. 
5 H. Crouch 1978, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, p
351. 
6 FRUS, p 292. 
7 Department of Defence 1958, Importance of Indonesia to Australia and Regional 
Defence. 
8 FRUS, p 292. 
9 M. Jones 2002, US relations with Indonesia, the Kennedy-Johnson Transition, 
and the
Vietnam Connection, 1963-1965, Diplomatic History Vol 26 No 2, p 253 n14. 
10 M. Jones 2002, US relations with Indonesia, the Kennedy-Johnson Transition, 
and the
Vietnam Connection, 1963-1965, Diplomatic History Vol 26 No 2. 
11 H. Brands 1989, The Limits of Manipulation, Journal of American History, Vol 
76, p 792. 
12 F. Bunnell 1990, American ?low posture? policy toward Indonesia in the 
months leading to
the 1965 coup, Indonesia No.50, p 35. 
13 F. Bunnell, p 36. 
14 H. Brands 1989, The Limits of Manipulation, Journal of American History, Vol 
76, pp
793-4. 
15 D. Easter 2005, ?Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling?: Western Covert 
Intervention in
Indonesia, October 1965 ? March 1965, Cold War History Vol 5, No 1, p 58. 
16 FRUS, p 257. 
17 F. Bunnell, p 43. 
18 FRUS, p 257. 
19 FRUS, p 257. 
20 FRUS, p 256-7. 
21 FRUS, p 258. 
22 F. Bunnell, p 50. 
23 F. Bunnell, p 49. 
24 H. Brands, p 800. 
25 D. Easter, p 59. 
26 D. Easter, pp 59-60. 
27 According to that day?s CIA Situation Report, ?A power move which may have 
far-reaching
implications is under way in Jakarta?. Source: FRUS, p 300. 
28 H. Brands, p 801. 
29 H. Brands, p 805. 
30 B. Anderson 1987, How did the generals die?, Indonesia, p 110. 
31 B. Anderson 1987, p 111. 
32 D. Easter, p 62. 
33 D. Easter, p 61. 
34 D. Easter, p 61. 
35 D. Easter, p 62. 
36 M. Curtis 2003, Web of Deceit: Britain?s real role in the world, Vintage, p 
392. 
37 M. Curtis 2003, p 392. 
38 R. Cribb 2001, Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966, Journal of Genocide 
Research, 3(2),
219-239. 
39 H. Brands, p 803. 
40 D. Easter, p 64. 
41 D. Easter, p 64. 
42 D. Easter, p 68. 
43 K. Najjarine and D. Cottle 2003, The DEA, the ABC and Reporting of the 
Indonesian Crisis
1965-1969, Australian Journal of Politics and History vol 49 no 1, pp 48-60. 
44 D. Easter, p 64. 
45 D. Easter, p 64. 
46 M. Curtis, p 389. 
47 FRUS, p 386. 
48 FRUS, p 387. 
49 FRUS, p 346. 
50 FRUS, p 346. 
51 FRUS, pp 379-380. 
52 FRUS, p 355. 
53 FRUS, p 355. 
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