[Marxism] An article about Iran

[ardeshir mehrdad <ardeshir_mehrdad@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Attached is an article about the recent political development in Iran, from 
Iran Bulletin/ Middle East Forum : New-conservatives, regime crisis and 
political perspectives in Iran . www.iran-bulletin.org




Dear Mehdi:

Do you have an unpublished article about Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's
cabinet appointments?

On Aug 14, 2005, at 6:10 PM, Kiamehdi@xxxxxxx wrote:

> Dear Friends
> Unfortunately the wrong copy of the article on the Iranian
> presidential elections was sent to you. Please discard the previous
> one
> the correct article is entitled iran-bulletin_presidential election
> yours
> Mehdi Kia
> New-conservatives, regime crisis and political perspectives in Iran
> Ardeshir Mehrdad and Mehdi Kia
>
>
> In the recent presidential elections in Iran, Mahmood Ahmadinejad,
> an unknown conservative military commander, won. His victory was
> surprising, as many had predicted Hashemi Rafsanjani would become
> Iran?s next president. Rafsanjani, perhaps the second most powerful
> man in the Islamic Republic, was supported by a broad coalition of
> reformists and pragmatist elites. The shock of this surprise
> victory may partly explain the crude nature of some of the analyses
> that followed. Even more striking is the failure to address the
> deeper causes and background to this event, and to analyse its
> consequences. This article is an effort to address these issues.
> At the onset a few observations may be helpful:
>
> Background
> In the Islamic Republic, elections, including presidential ones,
> are fundamentally undemocratic, tightly controlled processes. The
> law deprives many citizens such as women, religious minorities
> (including non-Shi?ite Muslims) and political opponents of the
> religious state, etc from standing for president. This is enforced
> in practice by the unlimited power of the Council of Guardians [1].
> This Council has consistently   rejected anyone it considers
> unsuitable for the ruling circles. Therefore, in practice,
> elections in the Islamic Republic are nothing more than a
> ?beiat? [expression of allegiance] with one of the few, and often
> the only, person the Council of Guardians has let through its net
> [2]. In such conditions non-participation in elections, rather than
> reflecting voter apathy, is one form of expressing ?dissent?, a
> means of protesting against the regime and questioning its
> legitimacy [3].
>
>
>
> Those sections of the state that are up for periodic elections,
> including the presidency, are in general of secondary importance in
> the power structure. The system revolves round an unelected central
> core, headed by a Supreme Leader, vali-e- faqih, with truly
> unlimited powers. It is here that all major decisions are made,
> especially so after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and his
> replacement with Ayatollah Khamenei?. The presidency and the
> administration have ultimately an executive responsibility ? or as
> the outgoing President Mohammad Khatami puts it they ?play the role
> of a footman?. Yet because of the faction-ridden nature of the
> ruling elites, the individual in charge of the executive becomes
> important since this appointment could effect the distribution of
> public resources and to some extend the ability of the entire state
> structure to function. Hence control of elected organs, and the
> presidency in particular, are also hotly contested, and subject to
> intense bargaining, among the various factions.
>
>
>
> The most important function of elections in the Islamic Republic
> rests precisely here: namely the redistribution of power among the
> various ruling factions. This contest is particularly acute at
> times when the internal crisis of the regime is intensified and
> when the normal bargaining processes are unable to reach a
> ?consensus?. ?Elections? in such conditions become a mechanism for
> the re-allocation of power, where factions test their respective
> power against electoral legitimacy. Until the latest election, the
> normal practice in the Islamic Republic was for all the factions to
> observe the rules of an in-house democratic game. After the initial
> weeding process by the Council of Guardians, the power centres did
> not intervene in favour of one or other candidate outside ?the
> legal framework?, or more accurately, did not undermine too
> explicitly legal appearances [4].
>
>
>
> What at first glance distinguishes the latest election in the
> Islamic Republic from all its predecessors is that for the first
> time the rules of the democratic game among the regime?s various
> factions have been openly flouted. Cheating, in the shape of
> manufacturing votes has always been a common practice, whether
> through stuffing ballot boxes, or miscounting this or that voting
> booth in favour of a candidate. The Council of Guardians has
> frequently declared null and void votes cast for some candidates.
> Finally the overall number of votes cast in elections is always
> massaged. This is, after all, a way to claim greater legitimacy
> among the voting public for the entire system. This fraud, however,
> always took place by common consent among the factions, supposedly
> without damaging the electoral prospects of one or other candidate.
>
>
>
> What is totally unprecedented is what took place in June. The world
> witnessed structural, nation-wide and highly organised deception,
> led from the apex of the pyramid of power in favour of one
> candidate that took not just the world, but a large section of the
> ruling elite of Iran by surprise. The shape and scope of this
> scheme was such that it would not be an exaggeration to state that
> Ahmadinejad, a commander in the Revolutionary Guards Corps, took
> over the presidential palace through a blood-less coup or as
> revolutionary guard commander Zolqadr said afterwards ?in a complex
> way ? and [through] multi-layered planning? [5].
>
>
>
> These elections were also held at a time of unprecedented
> developments in the region. As far as the Middle East is concerned,
> Iran is in a very strong position, mainly thanks to the military
> interventions of its long term ?foes?, the United States and
> Britain. To the East, the Taliban regime (with whom it nearly went
> to war in the late 1990s) is defeated, and many of Iran?s allies
> are back in power as regional warlords, such as the governor of
> Herat province in western Afghanistan under the pro-Iran warlord
> Haji Ismail Khan. However Iran?s main international success has
> been achieved in Iraq. Without firing a single shot, they have seen
> not only the removal of Saddam?s secular Ba?thist regime ? a
> neighbour they hated more than Israel and the US ? but the coming
> to power of their protégés, the Shi?a parties and militias of
> ?Islamic Daawa? (the Iraqi occupation Prime Minister?s party) and
> other major parties in the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance such as the
> Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), sharing
> power with the Kurdish PUK and KDP. All are organisations well
> known for getting military, financial and political support from
> Iran since the 1980s. This, together with chaos created by military
> occupation in Iraq is part of the reason why the Islamic regime in
> Iran felt confident enough to take unprecedented risks in these
> elections.
>
>
>
> As a result of this election, for the first time in the life of the
> Islamic Republic, virtually every organ and institution of power,
> electable or otherwise, has been handed over to the complete
> control of the conservatives. It would appear on the surface that
> political power is now homogeneous and concentrated at the apex of
> the regime, in the hands of its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
> Khamenei?. However, there is evidence that the coup d?état that was
> carried out behind the curtains of elections was not just directed
> against reformists, or the leading candidate Hashemi Rafsanjani,
> but against the majority of the existing groupings in the ruling
> oligarchy [6].
>
>
>
> There is no doubt that, Ahmadinejad and his supporters belong to
> the conservative wing of the ruling bloc. However, among the
> various conservative circles, Ahmadinejad, in particular belongs to
> groups that have been named radical new-conservatives. He was one
> of the founders of the groups called Alliance of Builders of
> Islamic Iran (abadegaran) and Devotees (isar-garan). Over the last
> few years, encouraged and supported by the Supreme Leader, these
> groups have been taking root, predominantly in the security-police
> and military organs. They espouse populist-Islamist and value-based
> slogans that distinguishes them from the other conservatives. It is
> also clear that in the pre-election bargaining of the various ultra-
> conservative factions, Ahmadinejad was not acceptable to all and
> the conservatives went into the elections with four candidates.
>
>
>
> As a result of the June election for the first time in a quarter of
> a century a military man, rather than a mullah, takes over as head
> of the executive. This almost completes the trend of military-
> security control of the main organs of state, which began at the
> end of the Iran-Iraq War, and gained momentum over the past 8
> years. This trend began in the municipal council elections when the
> abadgaran took control of many towns and cities two years ago and
> was consolidated when they went on to control the Majles
> (parliament). The point cannot be overemphasised that this is an
> entirely new and qualitative change, one that could have a decisive
> influence on the relation between barracks and mosque in a theocracy.
>
>
>
> The open interference by the supreme leadership apparatus
> [Khamenei?s entourage] in the ?elections?, the key role of the
> military and para-military apparatus in shaping and organising the
> vote, and ultimately the coming to power of the populist new-
> conservatives was an act which was contrary to the norms in the
> present political culture. Not surprisingly it gave rise to an
> unprecedented wave of protest from among the ruling elites. Such
> behaviour can undoubtedly upset the line-ups within the regime and
> place the leadership apparatus, and specifically further isolate
> Ali Khamenei?. It can weaken his position among the clerical
> oligarchy, which for nearly three decades has held real power in
> its hands. It is not beyond the bounds of imagination that the
> Assembly of Experts [7], despite being controlled by conservatives,
> will question his suitability to continue as leader. Rafsanjani?s
> recent proposal to replace the Supreme Leader (Khamenei) with a
> Council of Leadership could well be taken up seriously with the
> support of other influential clerics. So, why take such a risk? How
> can one explain this political purge that took place under the
> guise of elections? What are its possible consequences?
>
> Why the coup?
> The 9th presidential election was a stage where the crisis
> engulfing the regime and the solutions that could harness these
> crises were simultaneously played out in the shape of an aggressive
> struggle for power. It took place at a time when the existence of
> the regime was seriously threatened from three directions: At home
> the regime is fast approaching a crisis of control, increasingly
> isolated and assaulted by a general wave of disaffection and
> protest. Meanwhile the regional and global noose is tightening in
> pursuit of Bush?s project of ?regime change?. Finally within the
> regime the factional splits and quarrels have made it impossible
> for the ruling elites to take decisive decisions and act in a
> united way.
>
>
>
> These crises, of course, have structural causes [8] wedded in the
> contradictory nature of power in the Islamic Republic. They were
> born with the regime, and have steadily worsened over the last two
> decades, in particular after the adoption of neo-liberal policies
> and the application of the structural adjustment programmes. They
> have been deepened, more recently by Bush?s post September 11
> policies, to the extent that today the regime finds itself faced
> with real dangers.
>
>
>
> Over these years, and in response to the regimes crises, the rulers
> gradually lined up, gelled into two different politico-ideological
> camps. Self-styled ?reformists? faced conservatives. The former
> believe that without ?reforms? the system cannot survive, although
> they hold different views as to what ?reform? entails. Some limit
> it to policies and ultimately the conduct of the state in relation
> to the people, in particular in the social and political arena.
> Others go as far as institutional reforms in the power-structure.
> For instance they want a change in the constitution to increase the
> relative power of elected organs in relation to those that are
> appointed [9]. They also want to normalise and ?reduce tension? in
> foreign relations, and abide by international norms. This, they
> believe will guarantee the survival of the system and hence their
> hold on power.
>
>
>
> During 1999-2001 the ?reformists? attracted the support of a large
> section of the population and clocked substantial victories in a
> chain of elections, occupying almost every institution up for
> election. Yet at the very moment of victory their dream turned to
> nightmare. It became obvious to all but the most blind that this
> repressive and reactionary regime is not only immutable, but the
> institutional power structure is intertwined with the interests of
> the ruling groups such as to make any reforms impossible. In
> addition the appalling consequences of the economic policies of the
> reformists on the daily life of the millions, had not only created
> major disappointment, but made inevitable the prospect of growing
> protests.
>
>
>
> The international scene fared no better, and September 11 put an
> abrupt end to Iran?s efforts to normalise foreign relations.
> Khatami?s ?dialogue of civilisations? foundered when Bush placed
> Iran among rogue states and officially declared a policy of regime
> change. It then became obvious that, contrary to the hopes raised
> by Khatami?s inauguration 8 years before, in a changing world
> political environment his discourse and foreign policies cannot
> provide the regime with any protection against outside threats. The
> effect of these setbacks was, on one hand, to weaken the position
> of the reformist faction within the overall ruling structures,
> subjecting them to greater pressure from the conservatives. And, on
> the other hand, destroyed the internal cohesion of the various
> groupings that made up the ?reformist? alliance. The result was
> repeated schisms and splits.
>
>
>
> The conservative bloc has a different strategy to deal with the
> burgeoning crises: Concentrate power more and more at the top and
> use naked repression and terror through the military and police
> apparatus. All the cliques within this bloc oppose any change in
> the institutional structure of power, especially if that means
> reducing the authority of the leadership apparatus [10], which to
> them assures the ?Islamic? foundation of the entire system. They
> are convinced that any flexibility in ?principles and values? will
> lead to oblivion, and should be ruthlessly resisted. Indeed, they
> aim to simplify the muddled and contradictory aspects of the regime
> by doing away with the semi-elected republic in favour of a self-
> appointed caliphate, with a highly centralised structure [11].
> Conservatives also viewed any openness in the political atmosphere
> or the formation of any form of independent social or political
> associations as a dangerous threat to their total control of
> society. Faced with the erosion of politically mobilised social
> support for the Islamic Republic, they turned to hired military and
> mercenary forces as their sole instrument of control.
>
>
>
> On the international level the conservatives prefer to play the
> card of Islamic movements, terrorist activities and politico-
> religious conflicts. They also try to open up whatever breathing
> space they can by manoeuvring in the gaps and on the competing
> interests among great powers, in particular looking towards China,
> Russia and Japan. To achieve this their main weapon is commercial
> and economic concessions. Notwithstanding such policies, however,
> they have not flinched from making behind the scene deals and
> concessions, if it served to consolidate their power, nor to use
> the nuclear weapons card.
>
>
>
>
>
> The conservative bloc, particularly since the death of Ayatollah
> Khomeini, had occupied all the key positions of power. These
> included all the organs that came under the command of the Supreme
> Leader ? the armed forces, the police intelligence apparatus and
> the judiciary. Moreover control over the Council of Guardians, by
> drawing red lines that cannot be crossed, permits control over
> every branch of state, including the state bureaucracy and the
> executive.
>
>
>
> Yet the despotic and intensely reactionary nature of the various
> cliques within the ultra-conservative bloc severely limits their
> ability to deal with the emerging crises. Indeed within a few years
> after the revolution of 1979 they themselves became the main cause
> of political and social crises, pushing the latter to bursting
> point. This may be a reason why throughout its entire life this
> bloc could never extend its support base beyond the military and
> quasi-military networks and the people under the direct umbrella of
> the charities run by them. Their track record in dealing with the
> crisis of legitimacy and the ever-escalating isolation of the
> regime has been dismal. This can be seen in the proportion of votes
> for their candidates ? never exceeding 25% of the votes cast. They
> only became electable when the rest had boycotted elections [12].
> This fact was one reason why, at least for the last 10 years, they
> were content to tolerate the rival bloc?s control over the
> executive machinery and the legislative Majles, while keeping a
> tight grip on the protective shield of the security forces.
>
>
>
> With the failure of the reformists to keep their support base,
> their inability to act as a safety valve for the entire regime, the
> failure of their foreign policy to provide to provide a partial
> shield against US threats, the conservatives faced a new quandary
> and starkly precarious conditions [13]. They had only two choices:
> compromise and abandon the ruling political system in a step by
> step posses of isolation, or face a deadly confrontation and put up
> with the consequences. Faced with this Hobson?s choice the
> conservatives split into various factions: The Alliance of Builders
> of Islamic Iran (abadgaran), Principled Reformist (usul-garane
> eslah talab) etc.
>
>
>
> These new groupings, which could be called Islamist new-
> conservatives, carved their place in the political spectrum of the
> country by being critical of and rejecting all other factions: the
> reformists (supporters of Mohammad Khatami), pragmatists
> (supporters of Rafsanjani) [14] and traditional conservatives. In
> their view all three, had failed in practice, and indeed
> exacerbated the crisis such that the very existence of the regime
> was threatened. For the new-conservatives, recourse to an
> immediate, bold and radical solution seemed unavoidable. And this
> is what they did ? a slow consolidation of power followed by a
> silent coup.
>
>
>
> Over the last few years the new-conservatives had managed to
> quietly infiltrate many organs, outwitting their rivals to end up
> controlling many town councils, the Majles and now the presidency.
>
> New-conservative policies
> The new-conservative groups, emerging predominantly from within the
> armed forces and working under the umbrella of the leadership
> apparatus, aim for a new equilibrium. This is an equilibrium that
> will reduce the internal and external crises and ensure the
> survival of the system. The aim is to create a powerful,
> centralised, principled state, cleansed of corruption, one that can
> count on renewed support from the lower sections of society, the
> military and semi-military forces, armed with nuclear weapons, all
> funded by petro-dollars. With these tools they believe they can
> confront both internal and external challenges without resorting to
> any structural changes, while maintaining the ideological-
> authoritarian nature of the regime.
>
>
>
> The difference between the new-conservatives and the more
> traditional conservatives lies in: First, prioritising destitute
> masses to win back their support for the regime. Second, on their
> definition of the state. Theirs will be an interventionist state, a
> state that will control all the main lifelines of the country,
> quite unlike the ?privatised? variety of the traditional
> conservatives. Third, on focusing their slogans and discourse on
> social justice and the welfare of poor rather than on Islamic
> values and the question of haq va baatel [right and wrong in
> religious matters]. This grouping, however, is still in the process
> of development, and their exact policies are somewhat ill defined,
> indeed in the making. The broad outlines can, however, be deduced
> from statements and utterances of its spokespersons. There are two
> central solutions.
>
>
>
> a. To centralise power at the apex and embark on a political,
> organisational and financial purge of the executive body of the
> state. What they hope to do is to harness internal tensions and to
> block any effort by opponents to use internal splits to further
> their aims. These are reflected in such slogans as the fight
> against bureaucratic corruption, the state aristocracy, and the
> rentiers.
>
>
>
> b. The attempt to form a new political movement in order to
> rekindle the social base of the regime, in particular among the
> urban and rural poor ? something that had gradually eroded over the
> last 15 years. In fact they are trying to ride the popular
> discontent of the victims of the economic policies of the regime.
> Here they hope to cultivate the right material to help them rebuild
> the crumbling fortifications of the regime. Moreover, they might
> well be in need of cannon fodder were the conflict with the US and
> Israel to escalate. The role of such slogans as social justice, the
> fight against inequality, the anti-poverty drive, the ?taking the
> oil money back to the people?s table?, the solution to the housing
> problem, employment and marriage of youth and such like is
> precisely to serve this purpose.
>
>
>
> Some supporters of Ahmadinejad have referred to this as the ?third
> revolution? one that instead of clergy or students has its
> leadership in the military [15]. This revolution is being born in
> the barracks rather than mosque or university. Others see this is a
> rebirth of the idealism of the early revolutionary years and a re-
> emergence of Islamic populism [16].
>
>
>
> It was along such a trajectory that the unannounced alliance
> between a number of new-conservative groupings under the leadership
> of Khamenei?s circle were able to lead the recent elections,
> through a carefully planned and executed plan with ?headlights off?
> until the eve of the second ballot, to go on and occupy the last
> bastion of the reformists and pragmatists [17]. The ground is now
> ploughed for the absolute rule of the velayate faqih ? something
> the late Ayatollah Khomeini had called for but failed to implement
> successfully - foiled by the deep contradiction of his regime [18].
>
>
>
> Does this scheme rest on real capabilities, real ground and real
> potentialities? If successful can it save the regime from the
> quagmire it is sinking in? Or is this just a moribund attempt with
> no other outcome but further weakening of the regime, its greater
> isolation and a speeding up of its implosion and collapse?
>
> Can the new-cons do the impossible?
> To answer these questions we will consider the real conditions,
> potentials and limitations faced by the Islamic Republic today.
> However it is important to first clarify a few issues:
>
>
>
> 1. The crisis of the Islamic Republic has structural roots. They
> are above all the expression of the incompatibility of a religio-
> ideological ultra-reactionary regime with its material surroundings
> and historic setting. It is no surprise that the Islamic government
> has been in continuous crisis since birth, repeatedly surfacing
> under various guises and at numerous levels. The constant need for
> political and structural changes has been an inevitable necessity.
> At best these efforts, which surfaced as political U-turns, have
> merely shifted the epi-centres of such crises from one area to
> another - avoiding an explosion without removing the underlying
> causes. Every time the question was the same: What are the regime?s
> capacities, where are the U-turns heading and what would be the
> passing effects of any change in policy?  For the mullahs ruling
> Iran, such crises were the norm. We have therefore witnessed a move
> from ?principles? to ?expediency?, from elitism to populism, from
> decentralisation to the reverse and back again ? always in search
> of stability! [19].
>
>
>
> 2. In the current domestic and international conditions the Islamic
> Republic cannot find a solution to survive without totally negating
> its very existence. The stark choice it faces is either to submit
> totally to colonial conditions (either keeping the religious
> appearance or under a secular mask) as have some its neighbours,
> and to dissolve in Bush?s plan for a ?larger Middle East?, or
> surrender to a progressive participatory and radical democracy.
> Despite all the outcries and widespread claims to the contrary,
> there is no third road. No matter how daring the manoeuvres, or how
> unexpected the changes and shifts in power and policies, this
> regime will face a fresh deadlock sooner rather than later making
> its collapse inevitable.
>
>
>
> 3. The Islamic Republic has come out of the latest election weaker
> than ever, and will embark on yet another political U-turn,
> creating an even greater level of instability. There are two main
> reasons for this. Firstly in order to make to entice the population
> to participate in the electoral process, it has had to retreat from
> what was always considered its fundamental principles and values.
> The rulers were forced to recognise, and even consider some of the
> political, economic and cultural demands of the people. We saw them
> apologising for the dismal record of the last 3 decades. Even more
> astonishing was how all candidates avoided issues relating to
> ?Islam? and ?revolution? and directly or indirectly criticise the
> authoritarian and oppressive nature of their own regime [20].
>
>
>
> Moreover, in this election, candidates on both sides of the
> political spectrum encouraged negative voting. People were asked to
> vote to reject, rather than to support a particular candidate or
> slogan. Reformists and pragmatists encouraged people to vote
> against reaction, despotism and to guard against the danger of
> fascism (meaning Ahmadinejad). Conservatives asked people to vote
> against corruption, inequality, poverty, and the plunder of public
> resources (meaning Rafsanjani) [21].
>
>
>
> Yet despite all the departures and all the tricks, and in spite of
> the usual threats of dire consequences of voting abstention,
> official sources admit that only 28 of the 48 million eligible were
> dragged to the polling booths (this figure includes the rigged
> votes). In circumstances where most of the opposition, the ones who
> call for an overthrow of the Islamic regime, had asked for a
> boycott, the absence of 40% of the voters, rather than a sign of
> disbelief or indifference, is a clear and unambiguous sign of
> widespread opposition to the very existence of the system [22].
>
>
>
> 4. In its quest for political homogeneity and unanimity in power,
> the regime was forced to jettison the ruling alliance that had
> lasted nearly three decades, an alliance that helped the system
> maintain stability. Now, for the first time in its entire
> existence, the Islamic Republic has to be answerable to its various
> challenges, both domestic and external, without the help of
> reformists and pragmatists in key positions. At a time when it has
> little room to manoeuvre, the regime has lost one of the main
> weapons it has used successfully on so many occasions to sow
> indecision among its domestic and foreign opponents [23]. From now
> on it has to face its crises head on, and in doing so to rely on
> its last resource, the military barracks, to keep its balance.
>
>
>
> The country is increasingly in military hands. Significantly, on
> the road to creating a military state, the special position and
> stature occupied by the clergy has been uniquely questioned. For
> the first time in 25 years a non-cleric is president ? and a
> military man to boot. The logic for the central role of velayate
> faqih - the embodiment of the monopoly of rule by the clergy ? and
> the very basis of Khomeini?s vision of Islamic government ? has
> been abandoned.
>
>
>
> 5. Moreover, by choosing Mahmood Ahmadinejad, an extremist counter-
> intelligence officer in the Revolutionary Guards, with a history of
> involvement in terrorism and murder [24], to head the executive,
> foreign relations, even attendance at international gatherings will
> become more problematic than ever before. In particular with the
> nuclear weapons issue the US and Israel are in a better position to
> incite international public opinion against the Islamic Republic.
> Now, any judge or attorney anywhere can try their hand at
> prosecuting the second person in the Iranian government.
>
> Not yet ready to fall?
> Is the regime, then, ready to fall? Notwithstanding the fact that
> the Islamic Republic has come out of this election weaker and more
> fragile than before, one cannot necessarily conclude that it is on
> the threshold of immediate implosion and collapse. It is likely to
> continue its existence for some time yet. The future of the regime
> rests on a number of factors and the way they interact. Some of
> these factors may allow the regime a breathing space while others
> will do the opposite:
>
>
>
> Will Iran?s rulers be able to implement a series of rapid new-
> conservative reforms to rekindle the support of a significant
> section of the destitute masses [25]? Can an anti-popular, utterly
> reactionary, despotic and authoritarian regime, which was once able
> to use support from the ?dishinherited? to maintain power do so
> again? Can a regime, which in pursuit of exporting its revolution,
> sent these supporters to clear minefields for eight years, dangling
> a plastic ?key to heaven? round their neck, be capable of regaining
> their trust? Will the people who had been betrayed once consent to
> being betrayed again [26]?
>
>
>
> There are two possible answers to these questions:
>
>
>
> Affirmative: If it makes good use of the opportunities offered,
> especially those resulting form the US occupation of Iraq and
> Afghanistan , the Islamic regime can mobilise some of the poorest
> in its support and survive the current crisis. These opportunities
> include the quagmire of Iraq (which could help the Islamic Republic
> play its Shi?te card), the current buoyant oil market and the way
> any new crisis in the Middle East might influence oil prices, the
> significant foreign exchange reserves they have accumulated and the
> surplus earnings due to the current high oil prices. These could be
> channelled into immediate improvement in the living conditions for
> targeted sections of the population and reduce discontent among them.
>
>
>
> Then there is the deep crisis among the ranks of the opposition
> forces whose potential to fill the current political vacuum has
> shrunk. There is also the weakness and disunity among radical and
> progressive forces that could have helped activate the existing
> class divisions and use it to organise and mobilise the independent
> organisations of workers and toilers. And finally if they
> successfully use the basij ? a nationwide political-military
> organisation [27] that it controls, and the wide network of mosques
> and associated charities, as powerful means of communication
> between the state and the deprived and marginalised masses.
>
>
>
> Negative: If the new political cliques in power cannot overcome
> some of their contradictions the obstacles they face both within
> and outside the ruling apparatus. These obstacles are:
>
>
>
> Creating a new balance between the economic interests of the mafia-
> like rentiers at the top and the demands of the dispossessed masses
> [i.e., the core element of the new-conservative?s strategy]: Being
> able to redistribute public resources (especially oil income) to
> reduce the burdens of life. This will require cutting all or at
> least some of the tentacles of an insatiable monster. An octopus
> with one end in the inner circles around Khamenei? and the numerous
> institutions under its tutelage, and tentacles in the Revolutionary
> Guards, the security apparatus, the newly built palaces of the top
> families, and the offices of their offspring (popularly known as
> the aghazadeha = sons of clerics). In other word, being able to
> keep the promise to have the ?oil money on the table of the poor?
> and to create hope.
>
>
>
> Neutralising the immediate and savage resistance of capital ? both
> domestic and foreign - which will view the slightest deviation from
> its model of neo-liberal economy and austerity as anathema: Being
> able to gain its confidence and to sell them an economic policy
> full of contradictories and ambiguities. And to prevent domestic
> and foreign capitalists using their most effective weapon, flight
> to other places, thereby squeezing the economy and increasing
> unemployment [28].
>
>
>
> Repressing or overcoming the demands of working people, key agents
> of socio-political change. Given the radicalisation of such demands
> by the masses, the regime will need to block efforts to organise at
> various levels; to entice working people to blindly follow yet
> another ?saviour?, it will have to split the ranks of the labour
> force, and to isolate the more radical sections of the labour
> movement [29].
>
>
>
> Controlling the political context within which the regime operates:
> That is to say, first of all, to crush the popular movements for
> social equality, cultural and political freedom, and self-
> governing. Being able to create an environment of fear such that
> anti-despotic movements, and in particular women, youth,
> intelligentsia, and non-Fars nations and ethnic groups are
> controlled. Being capable of suppressing the rising waves of
> cultural and civil disobedience and political protest.  In short,
> producing a schism between the demand for bread and that for freedom.
>
>
>
> Stabilising the regime?s relationship with the world most powerful
> states:  In particular, preventing the nuclear weapons issue from
> becoming explosive, and hence being able to divert petro-dollars as
> before to the state coffers.
>
>
>
> And finally, preventing the crises outside from infecting the
> corridors of power and fracturing the political and factional
> homogeneity achieved by the present coup: That is to say,
> preventing the singularity of decision-making being destroyed,
> giving way once again to factional squabbles, obstructions and such
> like, this time between the existing military-economic mafias in
> the conservative faction.
>
>
>
> There is little evidence that new-conservatives in Iran will raise
> once more the flag of social justice in a ?third revolution?. If
> the ?first revolution? was a real tragedy, the ?third revolution?
> will probably be nothing more than a nauseating comedy.
>
>
>
> Yet the key to the puzzle of Ahmadinejad is in the hands of the
> working class. Emergence of a progressive, radical and mass working
> class movement is the only development that could fill the current
> ideological and political vacuum within which reactionary populism
> of Ahmadinejad is trying to act. A class that is the only social
> force capable of preventing demagogic populism  [30].
>
>
>
> The crucial issue facing Iran, however, is not the fate of
> Ahmadinejad. It is the fate of the country. It does not require
> much imagination to understand that the Islamic Republic has a
> mortal disease. Ahmadinejad?s remedy is only temporary. Inevitable
> death awaits this regime, so out of keeping with its era. What
> Ahmadinejad and the regime are vainly trying to save is already
> doomed.
>
>
>
> But the fate of the country is not inevitable. In the manifold
> crises facing Iran, will the country face collapse and break-up,
> invasion or a real liberating future? That choice, and that future,
> is being made today. And the answer is clearly not preordained nor
> totally dependent on how, or at the hands of whom, the Islamic
> regime falls.
>
>
>
> This future is once again in the hands of the organised working
> class of Iran. Will the working class be able to tie its strategic
> potential to the energy and creativity of the social movements?
> Would it be capable of giving birth to a real agent for social
> change through combining organisation and organisational ability?
> If the answers to these questions are positive, then not only the
> swamp the Ahmadinejads of Iran want to use to create another ultra-
> conservative and reactionary movement will dry up, but the country
> will avoid the threat of collapse, break-up or invasion. ?Otherwise
> there will be silence, and silence is our sin!? [31]
>
>
>
> The experience of the last eight years has proved that a heavy
> penalty awaits those that are unable to use the opportunities
> facing them to create something new and surrender to the idea of
> reconciliation with reality. With the advent of the ultra-
> reactionary new-conservatism, those movements who fail to take up
> the occasion provided today to move to a better life, and to a
> different world, are without doubt going to face a more savage
> penalty.
>
>
>
> Ardeshir Mehrdad, Mehdi Kia
>
> July 2005
>
>
>
> ardeshir_mehrdad@xxxxxxxxxxx
>
> kiamehdi@xxxxxxx
>
> footnotes
> 1. An all-powerful 12-man committee appointed by the Supreme Leader
> and given veto rights on elections and laws that in their view are
> incompatible with ?Islam?. In the latest election only 8 of over
> 2000 candidates passed its veto and were allowed to go on the
> ballot paper ? and even here the two reformist candidates, Mostafa
> Moin (Minister of Higher Education in the outgoing government) and
> Mehralizadeh were only reinstated after serious protest.
>
> 2. See Iran: Majles election boycott. What next? iran bulletin -
> Middle East Forum series II no 1 p 2
>
> 3. This is a fundamental difference between elections in the
> Islamic Republic and normal parliamentary democracies. The Iranian
> electors are highly politicised and have shown their ability to use
> the ballot box very adroitly to play the political field in highly
> undemocratic conditions pertaining to the country. See for example
> Presidential elections: What if the magic fails. iran bulletin 1993
> no 2 p6; Majles elections iran-bulletin nos 25-26; Iran: Majles
> election boycott. What next? iran bulletin - Middle East Forum
> series II no 1 p 2
>
> 4. What some western analysts have called ?democracy Iranian-
> Islamic style?
>
> 5. There is evidence that a coup-like plan, kept carefully ?blacked-
> out? until 24 hours before the second round of elections, was put
> into motion. Ahmadinejad , who had been trailing in the first round
> of elections until counting was well underway suddenly emerges as
> the challenger to Hashemi Rafsanjani to the open protest of the
> other runner up, former Speaker of Majles, Mehdi Karrubi.
> Ahmadinejad ?s campaign distributed 5 million copies of a CD,
> almost exclusively in the poorer districts of the country, which
> showed Rafsanjani and his family living in luxury while
> Ahmadinejad  was portrayed living a simple life and giving away
> most of his salary to the poor. Then in the second round the Basij
> (militia) troops put into effect a ?headlights off? plan in which
> each of the 1.5 million strong Basij had to bring 10 persons to
> vote. See Shargh news paper (Farsi) 14 July 2005. Chief of
> Revolutionary Guards Corps, Zolqadr addressing in a large meeting
> of the Basij: ?in the complex political situation when foreign
> powers and extremist currents inside have for some time been
> determined, and planned, to change the result of the elections in
> their favour and to prevent the emergence of an efficient and
> principled government, we had to act in a complex way and the
> principled forces, thanks be to Allah, through correct and multi-
> layered planning, were able to get the support of the majority of
> the people in a tight and real competition?? Sharq, Teheran July
> 2005 (in Farsi).
>
> 6. There were eight candidates. Moin and to a lesser extent
> Mehralizadeh represented the reformists. The pragmatist Rafsanjani
> was very much a compromise candidate who came in at the last minute
> and was expected by all commentators to win. Others were Karrubi
> who represented the Society of Militant Clergy ? with some links to
> the reformists. The rest belonged to various conservative factions.
> These were former police chief Gjalibaf, Ali Larijani the Supreme
> Leader?s representative on the National Security Council and of
> course Ahmadinejad .
>
> 7. The Assembly of Experts is elected by the voters every 8 years
> from among senior clergy (defined as those with ?knowledge and
> wisdom?). Among their role is to elect the velayate faqih ? the
> supreme leader to the Islamic Republic who in turn has absolute
> power over the entire civil and political society.
>
> 8. See Ardeshir Mehrdad. The road to a terminal decline:
> alternatives split society at one end even as it is united in
> another. iran bulletin 1995, nos11-12 p6
>
> 9. The velayate faqih appoints most influential posts. In
> additional to the Council of Guardians, he appoints the heads of
> the arm forces, the judiciary, and has ?representatives of the
> velayate faqih? in virtually every organ.
>
> 10. The present vali faqih: Seyyed Ali Khamanei?.
>
> 11. The dual structure of the Islamic Republic rests of two
> pyramids. One the religious-political pyramid at the apex of which
> sits the Supreme Leader ? Ali Khamenei?. The other the executive
> presidency based on a parliament and presidency elected through
> tightly regulated and controlled electoral procedures. See Ardeshir
> Mehrdad. Will Iran? political system absorb civil society or be
> overcome by it. iran bulletin 1998 no 19-20 p10
>
> 12. As happened in the last elections to the Majles and the
> municipal councils. See iran bulletin-Middle East Forum Series II
> no 2 p
>
> 13. Key elements in this quandary were the failure of the project
> to ?reform civil society? and the increasing poverty and failure of
> the economic privation programme.
>
> 14. Known in Iran as Kargozaran Sazandegi = agents of construction
>
> 15. Khomeini called the occupation of the US embassy in 1981 the
> ?second revolution?.
>
> 16. Kaveh Afrasiabi. The Ayatollah?s Reign, June28, 2005
> www.atimes.com
>
> 17. See ibid footnote 5.
>
> 18. See Ardeshir Mehrdad. Velayate Faqih ? a system on its
> deathbed. iran bulletin 1998 nos 17 p6
>
> 19.  For example when the clashes became paralysing Khomeini
> created a new organ to stand above all other organs: the Assembly
> for Expediency. See Where does the Assembly for Expediency fit.
> iran bulletin 1998 nos 17 p9
>
> 20. Unlike previous occasions there was little effort to use
> religious orthodoxy as a powerful weapon to get voters into the
> booths. Instead each candidate tried to distance themselves as much
> as possible from the past and to absolve themselves from any
> responsibility towards it. This was most obvious with Ahmadinejad
> who, as a relatively unknown figure, made greater use of this ruse
> with benefit. Moreover such influential bodies as the Society of
> Teachers at the Qom Seminary, the Teheran Society of Militant
> Clergy, the Assembly of Militant Clergy, the Islamic Coalition
> Party (Hey?at-haa-ye Mo?talefe), who had played such crucial roles
> in previous elections, their support being critical for getting the
> vote, were sidelined and few candidates were happy to be officially
> linked with any of them.
>
> 21. A negative vote is not always a protest vote, or even a
> boycott. It can also be a vote to prevent things worsening: a
> choice between bad and worse.
>
> 22. This is exactly the opposite to what Ali Khamenei? tried to
> imply, and some opposition forces echoed. Presence in voting booths
> cannot be automatically put to the account of the legitimacy of the
> regime. A negative vote to the record of the regime is not
> necessarily a positive vote for its existence.
>
> 23. Right up to the recent election many opposition forces had used
> the presence of the reformists within the regime as a chance for a
> peaceful transition to a post-Islamic Republic era. The same hopes
> had been used by, among others, the EU.
>
> 24: See for example Enghelabe Islami for details of Ahmadinejad ?s
> involvement in the murder of Kurdistan Democratic Party leaders in
> Vienna (in Farsi). See also for other references
>
> 25. The experience of the Iran-Iraq war is useful here. Then it
> used this weapon to break the siege of domestic opponents, while
> putting up an effective resistance to foreign invasion. It now
> hopes to use the same weapon to reduce the capacity of domestic
> opponents to manoeuvre and to prevent foreign powers, and
> specifically the USA, to try a direct overthrow ? whether by a
> velvet revolution, or a limited or unlimited invasion.
>
> 26. Can political Islam, as a mass-populist movement, reconstruct
> itself in Iran after suffering a serious defeat, especially in the
> framework of a system that is the institutionalised expression of
> this defeat? It might be better to answer this question in a
> separate article.
>
> 27. A ?barrack-based party?, as Mohammad-Reza Khatami put it in an
> interview with HOMA TV, a Satelight channel.
>
> 28. A day after the election of Ahmadinejad  the Teheran Bourse
> lost 5% of its share value. The decline has continued since and has
> not been reversed by the end of July. Iranian State TV, Jaam-e jam,
> interview with head of the Iranian Bourse. July 28, 2005.
>
> 29. There is no doubt that the populist slogans of Ahmadinejad
> have found an echo in some of the poorest sections of society. This
> has been pointed out by the international media, and corroborated
> by independent sources. What is forgotten, however, is that while
> most of the middle layers turned out to vote for Rafsanjani, the
> majority of the 20 million who did not vote belonged to these
> destitute strata. This signifies that Ahmadinejad ?s influence
> among the layers he has specifically targeted remains weak. This
> does not bode well for the central strategy of the new-conservatives.
>
> 30. In 2000 at least, 20-23% of the urban and rural households
> lived under the absolute poverty line. See Nili et al, ?Barrasi-e
> tahavolaat-e faghr, tozi?e daramad, va refaah-e ejtemaa?ei; Sazeman-
> e modiriyat va barnaameh-rizi-e keshvar; 1379 (Teheran, in Farsi).
> The official rate of unemployment in Iran is 16 percent (Central
> Bank) and unofficial estimates are about 30 %.
>
> 31. Poem by Siavash Kasrai?
>

Yoshie Furuhashi
<http://mrzine.org>
<http://monthlyreview.org>


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