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[Marxism] Kargalitsky on Putin



(from the 2005 Socialist Register, which can be ordered from www.monthlyreview.org)

The Russian State In The Age Of American Empire
By Boris Kagarlitsky

There is a debate going on in Russia. One school of thought sees presi­dent Vladimir Putin as a great Russian patriot defending the country from the imperialist ambitions of America. Another school of thought sees him merely as an American puppet. Naturally, Putin's patriotism is no more (and no less) honest than his proclaimed desire to keep Russia democratic. His claims to defend national interests can be taken seriously only by those who accept any government propaganda at face value. Despite its patriotic rhetoric, the Putin adminis­tration has made a whole series of valuable gifts to the leadership of the US. Russian military bases in Vietnam and Cuba were closed, the latter move looking like a direct invitation to the US to invade the island, while with Moscow's agreement US military bases were established in Central Asia. The Republican administration of George W. Bush is viewed in the Kremlin as an optimal partner, unlike the Democrats with their tedious queries about human rights.

What is more important, the Russian government is helping G.W. Bush's administration economically. As an oil-producing economy in a period of high oil prices, Russia enjoys a massive inflow of petrodollars. In May 2003, currency reserves at the nation's Central Bank hit record levels, exceeding 60 billion US dollars, and have kept on rising rapidly. But this huge sum of money isn't invested in the domestic economy or used to solve the country's dramatic social problems. On the contrary, in 2004 the Moscow government was cutting social spending and launching a new attack on the remaining elements of the welfare state, claiming that there weren't enough resources. All the extra money is withdrawn from the economy and goes into a Stabilization Fund, theoretically designed to be used when oil prices decline. In fact, much of this money is invested in US government bonds. Instead of solving Russia's own problems, the Moscow government is busy supporting the dollar and pulling the US economy out of recession.

If attempts to present Putin as a great national leader resisting US domi­nation can hardly withstand any encounter with the facts, this doesn't mean that the opposite view is right. Those who see Putin merely as an American puppet are not very convincing either. Putin's tough declarations concerning the US invasion of Iraq brought an outburst of nostalgic joy among the patriotic community; for several minutes, in fact, it seemed as if Russia was opposing the US. But strangely enough, the threatening speeches that resounded in Moscow made no impact whatever on Washington, and were not even reflected in US-Russian relations. The members of the Bush administration understood not only how weak Putin's Russia really was, but also how dependent it was. The source of the USA's problems was quite justifiably seen as lying in France and Germany, which might have been suspected of advancing their own ambitious project as an alternative to US hegemony. What at first glance might have seemed like a struggle between Russia and the US was in fact a struggle over Russia, waged between the US and Western Europe. For precisely this reason Washington, which reacted with extreme irritation to the position taken in Paris, displayed only conde­scension with regard to Moscow.

The contradictory images of Putin's administration, which can thus be labelled 'nationalist' and 'comprador' at the same time, reflect the objective contradictions of today's Russian political economy, and ­ partly as a result of this ­ a total lack of coherence in Moscow's foreign policy. Not only are Russian elites divided into pro-European and pro-American currents, but also, to make things even more confusing, neither current has a clear view or a consistent political line. Both sides base their perspectives on wishful thinking, believing either in American invincibility or in the unstoppable nse of a United Europe. Both sides are wavering.

Ideology is also confused. Political liberals are protesting against the growing repressiveness of Russia's political system and they worry about the xenophobia that is becoming fashionable among larger and larger sections o society. But they also are in love with Israel, support G.W. Bush in his w on terrorism, and see America as the ideal democracy. Many of them hate Western Europe for its 'liberal irresponsibility', its 'multicultural permissive ness' and its 'support for Palestinian terrorists'. Some pin their hopes on US Democrats, expecting them to fix what G.W. Bush has damaged m moment of craziness'. But never do they see any problem with American imperialism as such. To make things worse, economic liberals see no problem in either repression or xenophobia, and remind everyone that the Russian economy never did so well in twenty years as it is doing under Putin. They are also happy with US policies because these policies, for good or bad reasons, help to keep oil expensive. And the nationalists, of course, hate America, but share President Bush's concern with terrorism and the 'Islamic threat'. Funnily enough, the most anti-Semitic politicians in Russia are also the greatest admirers of the 'Israeli security model'.

This confusion isn't a cultural or political phenomenon. In fact, the weak­ness of Russia's elite in international affairs is just a function of its economic and social weakness, which can't be compensated for even by the highest oil prices on the world market. Russia isn't a global player, nor even a self-defined minor actor (like, say, Finland or Japan). It is simply a battlefield for the global conflicts which are emerging - not a subject but an object of inter­national relations. This object is alive and has senses. It is even aware of some (though not all) of its interests. But it is unable to act consistently.

Putin proclaimed a new national idea: competitiveness. Patriotism was finally placed at the service of capitalism. This totally bourgeois view of life contrasted with the orgiastic embezzlement of the -naive Yeltsin epoch, which perceived capitalism exclusively as a consumer society. The people who made up the Putin draft were denied the scope of their predecessors; pragmatic through and through, they were thus completely anonymous. The triumph of greyness and pettiness that is evident at all levels of the Russian state and business is also clear proof that the country's elite has finally learnt the rules of bourgeois behaviour. Taking the place of the oligarchs was the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, collaborating closely with Western capital. This collaboration, moreover, has become much more fundamental and long-term, just as Russian capitalism has also become more mature. The problem, however, is that ruling elites in Russia remain deeply dependent on oil exports, and on Western financial markets. At the same time they feel much less dependent on the population of their own country, which seems to be obedient, passive and demoralized. As long as local markets and the local population are of very little interest to the rulers, the country is doomed to remain dependent, no matter what is proclaimed in official declarations.


Louis Proyect
Marxism list: www.marxmail.org


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