[Marxism] "Consensus Growing in Iraq for a Withdrawal Timetable"

["Fred Feldman" <ffeldman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

The item that follows these comments is from Juan Cole's website,
Informed Comment.

The growing desire among Iraqis for a timetable for withdrawal shows
that support for the occupation is simply becoming politically
illegitimate in Iraq.  The Chalabis and Allawis need to come forward as
people trying to end the occupation.  That's an achievement for the
people of Iraq and for those who have been actively resisting the
occupation.

However, simply calling for a withdrawal timetable -- which the incoming
government seems certain to  do after the colonial election -- does not
resolve the question of whether the new government will break from its
assigned role as an occupation government.

The key question is whether the government will accept Condoleeza Rice's
insistence that Iraq must prove its readiness for the restoration of
independence by creating a military force capable of crushing the
resistance to the occupation and the permanent bases, share of the oil
industry, and other conquests that the US rulers expect to maintain
after the occupation.  A government that accepts in practice the Rice
standard for "earning" the end of the occupation will be an occupation
government, fighting to preserve Washington's conquests from the
occupation.

Juan Cole, whose favorite Iraqi political figure seems to be Sistani (I
have to admit that, relative to many of my left comrades, I'm a tiny bit
soft on  Sistani myself), argues that the Shia leader is fearful of
ending the occupation because he suspects that the Baathist section of
the resistance might make a drive for full power over the country again.
Given the history, I don't blame him for worrying, although I would note
that he would have less to worry about if he had thrown his support
behind Sadr and others who have been attempting to forge a strong Shia
military force against the occupation.  The history certainly does
indicate that the Baathists have tended to resist sharing power as well
as foreign occupation.

But Sistani's fear will not change the character of the basic choice the
Shia elite must face: for or against the occupation.  For or against
those who have fought the occupation.

Following the "success" of the colonial elections -- and we can be sure
that their "success" will be proclaimed across the media and to all the
nations -- the new government will begin "reaching out" to the Sunnis.
But which Sunnis?  The US-approved Sunnis?  The Sunni Allawis and
Chalabis?  The Sunnis who are determined to crush the resistance?  Or to
those who have fought the occupation arms in hand and in other ways?
Will they forge a bloc with the Sunni resistance against the occupation?
Or will they join with Sunni quislings to build a an army to defeat the
resistance?

In the latter case, Sistani et al will have turned not only against the
Sunni masses, but against the Shia as well, and the consequences will be
devastating for them and for Iraq.

The other course -- against the occupation -- could significantly
shorten Iraq's suffering and contribute to winning back the country's
lost national freedom. If the new government goes that route and, just
to be on the safe side, organizes and arms the Shia masses to oppose the
occupation and defend their rights in the aftermath, that would be fine
with me.

Fred Feldman






Consensus Growing in Iraq for a Withdrawal Timetable

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leading figure in the United Iraqi Alliance
(UIA the largely Shiite party that is likely to form the next Iraqi
government), gave a press conference on Wednesday that I saw on LBC
satellite television. Al-Hakim said that Iraqis did not want to continue
to depend on foreign troops for their security, but would have to become
self-sufficient in that regard. Al-Hakim headed for nearly two decades
the Badr Corps, the paramilitary wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). His hopes of using it as the corps of a new
Iraqi security force have been thwarted by the Americans, who insisted
it turn in its heavy weapons and who remain suspicious of it as a
stalking horse for Iran. (The Badr Corps was largely trained by the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards.) The Badr Corps has now morphed into a
political party, the Badr Organization, which is separate from SCIRI and
which has seats in the UIA slate. Al-Hakim's comments on Wednesday
suggest that he may try to use Badr more aggressively if the UIA wins,
against the Sunni Arab insurgency.

The UIA has it in its party platform that if it wins it will demand that
the US establish a timetable for withdrawal of its troops from Iraq.
This idea is becoming increasingly popular in Iraq.

The idea has now been endorsed behind the scenes by officials in the
United Kingdom. A UK government source told the Daily Telegraph, '"The
main Iraqi parties are already talking about when coalition forces
should be drawn down . . . America knows it will have to deal with the
issue soon." ' British eagerness in this regard is driven in part by the
recognition by the Blair wing of the Labour Party that the presence of
British troops in Iraq is extremely unpopular with the British public.
Blair probably won't be dumped by his party the way Thatcher was by
hers, but Iraq is just an enormous drag on his government and his
popularity. The UK is currently having its own Abu Ghraib moment, as
shocking photographs circulated during the trial of three British troops
for abusing Iraqi detainees.

Arab satellite television news reported early Thursday morning that Iyad
Allawi is also putting forward a plan to regain for Iraq sovereign
authority over military decisions in Iraq, and asking for a withdrawal
timetable. Such a timetable is also in the platform of Allawi's party.

The FT revealed one reason for which Allawi is making such frantic
policy statements two weeks before the elections. Mohammad Tawfiq, an
important Kurdish political figure, told the Financial Times that the
interim government of Iyad Allawi had never developed a practical
strategy for implementing security. He also predicted that Allawi would
not get enough support in the forthcomming elections to form the new
government, based on his talks with Iraqis from all over the country. He
thought the United Iraqi Alliance would do very well, but that it would
not nominate a cleric for prime minister. And he is confident that the
Shiites will yield to Kurdish desires for a consolidated,
ethnically-based province of Kurdistan, to be formed out of 6 of the
present 18 provinces.

What are the pros and cons of setting a timetable for withdrawal of
coalition troops? The pro is that unless a firm timetable is set, the
coalition commanders will have no precise goal toward which to work in
wrapping up their tasks in Iraq. They could easily end up being there as
long as Israel was in Lebanon (and the Syrians, who came in to Lebanon
in 1976 to restore order at the instance of the US and Israel, are still
there!) Moreover, some of the hostility toward Coalition troops on the
part of Iraqis might subside if there was a known timetable for their
withdrawal.

One con is that a precipitous withdrawal of coalition troops could lead
to the total breakdown of security and give the guerrilla insurgents the
run of Iraq. This sort of factor has stood in the way of previous US
bids to begin drawing down the number of troops.

Another con is that in colonial situations setting a firm deadline for
withdrawal beforehand can be disastrous. The imperial power becomes a
lame duck. Why should anyone care if they are arrested if they know the
arresting officers will be gone in 6 months? Plus, such deadlines can
encourage massive communal violence as ethnic groups jockey to take over
as the imperial power departs. The British in India announced a deadline
for August of 1947, and helped provoke the Partition of the country into
Indian and Pakistan, an event that led to population displacements and
rioting that cost between half a million and a million lives. Likewise,
the May, 1948, deadline the British set for withdrawal from Palestine
led to the outbreak of the 1948 War and the expulsion of nearly a
million Palestinians from their own country.

One solution to this latter problem might be to set a timetable for
withdrawal of Coalition land forces, but for the US and its allies to
continue to offer the new Iraqi government's army close air support in
any battles with the neo-Baathists and jihadis that might try to take
advantage of the withdrawal to make a coup and institute a bloodbath.



_______________________________________________
Marxism mailing list
Marxism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism