[Marxism] Re: Popper

["paul illich" <paul_illich@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Jurriaan,

Thanks for the exhaustive and discursive reply - I enjoyed it.

A couple of comments, however.

You wrote:

> The basic objection Lakatos had to Popper's theory of science was that
> science does not aim to falsify hypotheses, but instead seeks to confirm
> theories, for the purpose of increasing the body of useful knowledge. It
> aims to prove, much more than to disprove, since falsified theories are
> useless.

But this is exactly Popper's point - that you _cannot_ confirm a theory,
only make it more satisfying a picture of reality than a previous one,
with the possibility that it may need to be amended radically in the light
of new findings. Once, however, a necessary prediction leading from a
theory is shown to be false, the theory is dead-wood - or at least the
relevant aspects of the theory. The culture of science; it's finacial
backers
and their requirements; it's elevation to a pseudo-religious place in our
society, etc all lead to weaker science, whereby everyone puffs up and
defends their own ground. This has, of course, always been so - it is,
we are told, "human nature" whatever that is. This inertia and friction
cause cherished beliefs in scince, as elsewhere, to be cleaved to, so that
chnage is forced through dialectic violence, as paradigms shift like
tectonic plates. I do not believe that this aspect of the sociology
of science is there to be merely described, but to be altered - for all
our goods. Popper looked at the philosophy of and behind science, not
at its sociology, and insofar as that is [I believe] so, many of the
critiques of him miss the point entirely. Yes, falsified theories are
in a sense "useless", but then again, no - the points at which a theory
that has been widely accepted on previous evidence as a useable working
hypothesis are extremely interesting and important. They are the bedrock
of the next theor/hypothesis.

> But if scientific statements are regarded as fallible statements, then this
> means they are always at least
> open to empirical and logical tests, because they could be wrong.

Well, exactly.

> An ex-colleague who studied physics said to me once, "you have to be able
> to say 'I don't know'".

I have always read this to be Wittgenstein's point, but I may be wrong, as I
never really got on with the Tractatus!

Cheers and happy new year

Paul



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