[Marxism] Popper

["Jurriaan Bendien" <andromeda246@xxxxxxxxx>]

Paul,

I share your view of Popper to a great extent, though let's not forget the
old Popper was also a member of the Montpelerin society
http://www.montpelerin.org/ . My quip about "apes" was a reference to
evolutionary science.

In general, the logical positivists sought for logical and empirical
criteria to distinguish sense from nonsense, and aimed for a general
demarcation criterion which would distinguish between science and
non-science.

But such a general, superscientific demarcation criterion does not exist.
The criteria for distinguishing between science and non-science aren't so
straightforward, and to a large extent specific and internal to a particular
discipline or science. Antonio Gramsci suggested in this sense, that it was
ludicrous to talk about "the" scientific method, because scientific methods
are developed in a way that is appropriate to the object of study, and may
not be generalisable to another, qualitatively different object of study.

Language is also a factor - in continental Europe science has a broader
meaning, i.e. any kind of systematic, sustained research inquiry could
qualify as a science, one even talks about "theological science" in that
sense.

To a certain extent, the logical positivists in the 1930s were motivated by
criticism of the "scientific" pretensions of Marxist-Leninist ideology and
its philosophy of dialectical materialism, which they correctly called
metaphysical. But as Stefan Amsterdamski points out, it is also incorrect to
say that science does not involve some metaphysical presuppositions, because
it does. The best one can say, is that some metaphysical presuppositions are
more conducive to scientific inquiry than others.

In his replies to Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos pointed out that falsification
is not a sufficient demarcation criterion for science, because it is
not possible to falsify scientific theories and hypotheses absolutely
through a Popperian crucial experiment. Among other things, this has to do
with the reality than experiments normally test not one hypothesis but a
cluster of theories, and that one can rarely be absolutely certain whether a
(negative) empirical result is due to experimental conditions or design, or
to
theoretical suppositions insofar as they are specifiable. If falsification
is accepted, given the experimental evidence, then scientists do this
because "for all intents and purposes" a hypothesis turned out to be
false; but this is a methodological decision, and not a claim about any
ultimate truth. It is the truth only "as far as we know."

The basic objection Lakatos had to Popper's theory of science was that
science does not aim to falsify hypotheses, but instead seeks to confirm
theories, for the purpose of increasing the body of useful knowledge. It
aims to prove, much more than to disprove, since falsified theories are
useless.

The scientific moral is not simply, as Popper implies, to live with as few
illusions as possible (skepsis), but to create as much usable knowledge as
possible. For this purpose, as Marx says, an ability for constructive doubt
is necessary - "de omnibus dubitandum".

In this sense, Frederick Engels already remarked that the only ultimate
proof we have of our theories is our ability to practical change something
in the world with them. Thus, for example, if we are able to send an
astronaut to the moon, this proves something about the validity of our
theories about physics, even although parts of those theories might later be
revised again.

The other aspect of Popperian "bold hypotheses" is that it may be quite
difficult to test those hypotheses adequately, precisely because they are
bold or grand hypotheses which challenge conventional thinking. It
not infrequently happens in scientific research that hypotheses and theories
are proposed in advance of any ability to test them conclusively. In
addition, at any time science operates with hypotheses and theories which in
future will turn out to have been wrong.

Reference: Lakatos, Imre (1973) The Role of Crucial Experiments in Science,
Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science, 4, 309-325.

But if scientific statements are regarded as fallible statements, then this
means they are always at least
open to empirical and logical tests, because they could be wrong. Paul
Feyerabend also notes that the creative process of forming hypotheses often
cannot be rationally reconstructed, i.e. why or how a particular hypothesis
or solution was arrived at, may not be a logical, or experientially
observable
process at all.

When Alex Callinicos seeks to apply Lakatosian and Popperian criteria to the
history of Marxist theories (even although he also likes to rubbish Popper)
he falls in the trap of mistaking political doctrine for science. Marxist
theorising about society moreover includes an irreducible moral component as
part of its content, which goes beyond the search for truth. This (implicit
if not explicit) moral component to a large extent explains why particular
Marxist theories continued to be upheld, and not any scientific truth
criteria.

Willard Quine remarked that 'Any statement can be held true come what may,
if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system'. This idea is
not unlike Hegel's quip that "you can find a reason for anything'. It
applies especially to politics. The most you can therefore say is that the
ethics which is preferable is an experiential (empirical) ethics which
permits rational moral learning, by assessing the real effects on human life
which the adoption of particular moral principles has, or has had. The
"theory of state capitalism" drew a superficial analogy between the Soviet
socio-economic system and capitalism, but as Cliff himself explained, this
analogy was originally made not on scientific grounds but on moral grounds.

Ridolf Hilferding regarded Marx's theories about capitalism as "purely
scientific", arguing that they were compatible with a variety of political
conclusions and inferences. But this is dubious also, precisely because of
the irreducible moral stance they involve. Marx aimed to understand society
in a way that made it possible to change it for the better, but even that
already involves a moral stance, namely that one ought to try and change
society for the better.

In addition, truths about society are not offered in a void - so long as
individual interests can conflict with social interests, social competition
exists, and social classes exist, people will prefer some truths over other
truths on the basis of a moral stance which is not neutral, but partisan. ]

The most one can do in that case, is make one's moral commitments explicit,
and distinguish between moral discourse and claims about matters of fact,
while being aware of the ways in which they could influence each other. All
the problems start, when it is claimed that "Marxism is scientific". But
Marxism as political stance or world outlook isn't scientific, anymore than
liberalism is scientific, at best Marxism honours the values of scientific
progress, and utilises scientific insight for political or moral purposes.

You wrote:

... a concept of the unknowable that I think is real; is not mystical; and
whereof, as Wittgenstein would remind us, we cannot speak - though perhaps
we nee not remain silent?

An ex-colleague who studied physics said to me once, "you have to be able to
say 'I don't know'". It is often best to acknowledge that you don't know,
rather than give the impression that you do know. Also, if you honestly
acknowledge you don't know, you are in a better position to learn the things
that it takes to get to know it, if that is the issue - viewed in a
dialectical way, both not-knowing and knowing define knowledge. Nothing is
so deluding as people who assume they know things which they do not know
and, under the circumstances, cannot know.

Happy new year

Jurriaan


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