[Marxism] The Real Battle: Winning in Fallujah Is Just the Beginning

["Charles Brown" <cbrown@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

  The Real Battle: Winning in Fallujah Is Just the Beginning
  By Wesley K. Clark
  The Washington Post

  Sunday 14 November 2004

  Americans scouring news reports of the U.S.-led assault on the Iraqi city
of Fallujah can be forgiven if they are experiencing a degree of confusion
and uncertainty.

  Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
assures us that U.S. and Iraqi government forces have moved steadily through
the insurgent stronghold and that the assault has been "very, very
successful." Last night, even as troops fought to secure the final section
of the Sunni city, senior Iraqi officials declared it "liberated." But it's
hardly surprising that the measure of success in Fallujah is elusive:
There's no uniformed enemy force, no headquarters, no central command
complex for the troops to occupy and win. At the end, there will be no
surrender.

  Instead, the outcome of the battle must be judged by a less clear-cut
standard: not by the seizure and occupation of ground, but by the impact it
has on the political and diplomatic process in Iraq. Its chances for success
in that area are highly uncertain. Will Fallujah, like the famous Vietnam
village, be the place we destroyed in order to save it? Will the bulk of the
insurgents simply scatter to other Iraqi cities? Will we win a tactical
victory only to fail in our strategic goal of convincing Iraqis that we are
making their country safe for democracy -- and specifically for the
elections scheduled for the end of January?

  An attack on Fallujah has been inevitable for many months. If we are to
succeed in the democratization of Iraq, the interim government and its U.S.
and coalition allies must have a "monopoly" on the use of force within the
country's borders. There can be no sanctuaries for insurgents and
terrorists, no fiefdoms run by private armies. Fallujah could not continue
to be a base for those waging war on the Iraqi government and a no-go place
for those organizing elections.

  Now that we have engaged, there cannot be any doubt about the outcome. It,
too, is inevitable. U.S. forces don't "lose" on the battlefield these days.
We haven't lost once in Iraq. Nor in Afghanistan. Not in the Balkans, or in
the first Gulf War. Nor in Panama. We fight where we are told and win where
we fight. We are well trained, disciplined and, when we prepare adequately,
exceedingly well equipped. We will take the city, and with relatively few
U.S. casualties. And we will have killed a lot of people who were armed and
resisting us.

  But in what sense is this "winning?"

  To win means not just to occupy the city, but to do so in a way that
knocks the local opponent permanently out of the fight, demoralizes broader
resistance, and builds legitimacy for U.S. aims, methods and allies. Seen
this way, the battle for Fallujah is not just a matter of shooting. It is
part of a larger bargaining process that has included negotiations, threats
and staged preparations to pressure insurgent groups into preemptive
surrender, to deprive them of popular tolerance and support, and to
demonstrate to the Iraqi people and to others that force was used only as a
last resort in order to gain increased legitimacy for the interim Iraqi
government.

  Even the use of force required a further calculus. Had we relentlessly
destroyed the city and killed large numbers of innocent civilians, or
suffered crippling losses in the fighting, we most certainly would have been
judged "losers." And if we can't hold on and prevent the insurgents from
infiltrating back in -- as has now occurred in the recently "liberated" city
of Samarra -- we also shall have lost.

  The battle plan was tailored to prevent significant destruction. It called
for a slow squeeze, starting with precision strikes against identified
targets, and followed by a careful assault directed at taking out the
opposition and reoccupying the city, while minimizing civilian and friendly
casualties. We have superior mobility, with heavily armored vehicles; we
have superior firepower, with the Bradley's 25mm cannon, M1A1 Abrams tanks,
artillery and airstrikes; we have advantages in reconnaissance, with
satellites, TV-equipped unmanned aerial vehicles and a whole array of
electronic gear. But urban combat partially neutralizes these advantages. A
weaker defender can inflict much punishment with only a meager force
fighting from the rubble, provided they fight to the death. So this has not
been a "cakewalk." This has been a tough battle, and the men and women
fighting it deserve every Combat Infantryman's Badge, Bronze Star or Purple
Heart they receive.

  During the recent presidential campaign, there was a lot of talk about
supporting our troops in wartime. And yet calling what's going on in Iraq
"war" has distracted us from marshaling the diplomatic and political support
our troops need to win.

  To a considerable extent, the insurgency in Iraq has been supported by
external efforts: Syria's facilitating of passage by jihadists, Iran's eager
efforts to reintegrate Shiism and assure the emergence of an Iraqi regime to
Tehran's liking, efforts by some Saudis to reinforce Sunni dominance in
Iraq. (On the eve of the battle in Fallujah, one group of 26 Saudi religious
scholars urged Iraqis to support the insurgents.)

  The success of our military efforts in Iraq is thus directly connected to
the skill of U.S. diplomacy in the region. Certainly neither Syria nor Iran
could welcome American success in Iraq if they believe it means they'll be
next on a list of regimes to be "reformed" by the United States -- and yet
that's precisely the goal of American policy. Bringing about change in those
countries should be a matter of offering inducements as well as making
threats, but not if it adds to the danger for our men and women in uniform.
We need to choose: continue to project a grand vision, or focus on success
in Iraq. Not only the safety of our troops, but the success of our mission
depends on a degree of Syrian and Iranian accommodation for an
American-supported, peaceful, stable, democratizing Iraq. And we won't get
that support if they think they're next on the hit list.

  It is equally important to seek a resolution of the conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians, which has fueled the recruiting efforts and
determination of the jihadists we're fighting in Iraq.

  And then there's the matter of the political struggle inside Iraq. If,
despite a high level of chaos, the elections do take place, the Bush
administration must be prepared to accept and empower an Iraqi government
and a nascent political process with sufficient independence to win support
from the populace and undercut anger at the American troops. For most of a
year, the effort at political transformation was been submerged beneath the
rubric of "reconstruction" and hindered by the attitude that "security must
come first." Security and domestic Iraqi politics go hand in hand.

  Which brings us back to some of the factors that made last week's battle
of Fallujah inevitable: a series of circumstances and errors in 2003 -- an
initial coalition occupying force too small to achieve dominance over a
historically restive population, the lack of a skilled political corps to
reorganize the local inhabitants, the proscription of Baathist participation
in the early postwar recovery and the disbanding of the Iraqi military. Then
there was the aborted April 2004 effort to subdue the city, in which an
under-strength Marine assault was called off by the White House. A silly
plan of turning the city back over to a thrown-together Iraqi force left the
enemy in control of the battlefield and turned Fallujah into even more of an
insurgent stronghold.

  This insurgency has continued to grow, despite U.S. military effectiveness
on the ground. While Saddam Hussein's security forces may have always had a
plan to resist the occupation, it was the failure of American policymakers
to gain political legitimacy that enabled the insurgency to grow. And while
the failure may have begun with the inability to impose order after Saddam's
ouster, it was the lack of a political coterie and the tools of political
development -- such as the Vietnam program of Civil Operations-Revolutionary
Development Support (CORDS) -- that seems to have enabled the insurgency to
take root amid the U.S. presence. These are the sorts of mistakes the United
States must avoid in the future, otherwise the battle of Fallujah may end up
being nothing more than the "taking down" of an insurgent stronghold -- a
battlefield success on the road to strategic failure.

  Troops are in Fallujah because of a political failure: Large numbers of
Sunnis either wouldn't, or couldn't, participate in the political process
and the coming elections. Greater security in Fallujah may move citizens
(whenever they return) to take part in the voting; it's too early to say.
But it's certain that you can't bomb people into the polling booths.

  We should be under no illusions: This is not so much a war as it is an
effort to birth a nation. It is past time for the administration to
undertake diplomatic efforts in the region and political efforts inside Iraq
that are worthy of the risks and burdens born by our men and women in
uniform. No one knows better than they do: You cannot win in Iraq simply by
killing the opponent. Much as we honor our troops and pray for their
well-being, if diplomacy fails, their sacrifices and even their successes in
Fallujah won't be enough.

  -------

  Retired Army Gen. Wesley Clark served as commander in chief, U.S. Southern
Command and later as supreme allied commander in Europe during the war in
Kosovo. He was a candidate for the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination.

  -------



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