[Marxism] Ariel Dacal Diaz: "The USSR - The Thwarted Transition"

["Walter Lippmann" <walterlx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

CUBA, THE THWARTED TRANSITION
by Ariel Dacal Diaz
--------------------------------

INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
by Walter Lippmann, November 13, 2004

Cuba's 1960 alliance with the Soviet Union was a vital
connection without which the island's revolution would,
in all likelihood, have been overthrown by Washington.

That alliance was, of course, a complex process with its
positive and negative consequences. Long-term economic
stability on the one hand, but a failure to deeply probe
and utilize the island's natural resources, such as the
exploration for oil only initiated in recent years, are
but two examples of the Cuban-Soviet relationship.

The fall of the Soviet Union was a momentous occurrence
in the life of the USSR, and for the Cuban Revolution as
well. Many in the capitalist world though that the Cuban
revolution would not survive the fall of its principal
trading partner. But Cuba has defied virtually all of the
predictions of its detractors. Cuba today, even with its
many social problems, and in the absence of the USSR, is
still a force to be contended with on the international
political arena. 

As recently as just yesterday the Wall Street Journal
issued a giant blast against the island's latest moves
to protect its national soverignty, making reference to
the WSJ's [frustrated, thwarted, to use the word in the
title of this article] hopes for the fall of Cuba into
the hands of the capitalist system of production.

Thoughtful people in Cuba have been looking back at the
Soviet experience, trying to understand how and why the
USSR collapsed. It was, of course, inevitable that such
an examination would bring any serious student to confront
the ideas and writings of Leon Trotsky, as the author of
this extended commentary, posted to the internet October
2004, demonstrates. While Cuba was allied with the USSR,
an indispensable connection without which the Revolution
could not have survived in those days, essays like this
could not have been published. The fact that they can be
published now, and this is not the only such commentary
on this subject, confirms again that Marxist approaches
to social and historical reality retain their validity.

They also show that the notion that Cuba is some sort 
of Stalinist gulag is just not in accord with the facts.
This is not to suggest that large numbers of people here
are pondering such subjects. They're not. But thoughtful
people are seeking ways to make sense out of this critical
part of the island's history. CubaNews is very pleased to
present this to you. You may find this somewhat turgid in
its literary style. Bear with it. The content is worth 
your time to consider as the author clearly did.

The Spanish original along with the English translation 
may also be viewed on the internet at this address:
http://www.walterlippmann.com/docs015.html 


Walter Lippmann
Havana, Cuba
http://www.walterlippmann.com/
==========================================================

The USSR: the Thwarted Transition 
by Ariel Dacal Diaz
(October 2004) 

Translated for CubaNews 
by Ana Portela from Cuba Literaria

(Ariel Dacal Diaz is Chief Editor at the politics section of
Social Sciences Publishers, a leading publishing house.)

The intended transition to socialism in the USSR has
fostered many debates for decades, in which the ideological
antagonism gains more importance than the subject requires
after the Soviet collapse. Yet, the final decision was to
disdain a precious opportunity to uproot the bases of
bourgeois domination; an opportunity to rethink, understand
and assume (assume above all) the characteristics of the
Soviet process as a whole that offers important elements
for anti-capitalist alternatives demanded by the 21st
century.

Towards this end we develop our study, beginning with the
understanding of the history of the USSR, given its
essential importance, both outside and within its borders
analyzing the following problems: Who held power in the
Soviet Union?, What was their ideology? At what point can
we speak of the rupture of the Bolshevik project? In the
following pages, we attempt to make some notes on these
questions.

?The unforeseen class? [1]

Stalin was the visible face and representative of the
bureaucracy that gradually broke ties with the Bolshevik
essence and that broke the weak mechanisms of political
participation of the masses.

It would be moot now to ask: what were the sources of
Soviet bureaucracy? Second-rate figures rose to occupy the
main administrative posts within the revolution since many
of the old combatants of the vanguard died during the civil
war or broke with the masses occupying less important
posts, accommodating themselves to the new conditions of
power. At the same time, Soviet power was forced to use
people of the previous governmental apparatus,
incorporating technical and specialized personnel as well
as the peasant masses that were proletarianized. In this
manner, Lenin?s party was declassed, in which the
requirements for entry of new militants was the result of a
long and rigorous process of checking, except for the
workers who had worked in industry for more than ten years.
[2]

Soviet bureaucracy went through a complex process in its
formation, separated from all historically known means. It
later took over power, dominated knowledge and its
transmission, controlled the means of production of ideas,
whose reproduction was guaranteed for decades. The process
of bureaucratization had its origins from the very
beginning of the Revolution, but its consecration as a
dominant sector in society occurred during the 30s.

Lenin explained the rise of bureaucracy as a parasitic and
capitalist excrescence in the institution of the worker?s
State, rising up through the isolation of the Revolution in
a country of peasants, backward and illiterate [3]. He had
his opinion of this new group of leaders that had there own
ideas, their own feelings and their own interests. Trotsky
noted that ?these men would not have been capable of making
the Revolution but have been the best adapted to exploit
it? [4].

The raw material for the ?ideological? activities of those
in power in the USSR were the great masses of illiterates
who, certainly, rose from darkness and were easily managed
in the name of something better, falling into a secondary
ignorance that it was precisely this to rise up as a
society. Except for the most politically advanced sectors,
the minority, of course, the ideas of socialism had not
been taken up by the population that had to be educated and
prepared for the revolutionary debate.

This unforeseen class that was privileged with state power
was, in theory, representatives of the interests of the
masses, while in practice, it administered public property
benefiting from it. It is true that members of the
bureaucracy did not have private capital; but without any
control over the rest of the social sectors, it directed
the economy ? extending or restricting any branch of
production ? set prices, organized their allotments,
controlled surplus. In this manner, they took over the
party, army, policy and the propaganda that sustained them.

With the passing of time, primarily towards the latter part
of the seventies, they coined the phrase in the socialist
camp as ?they and us? that reflected the differences that
were being revealed and that was deep?rooted, warned of
during an earlier stage by many revolutionaries who pointed
to the stratification of society or, more precisely, to its
preservation.

The analysis on the subject of bureaucracy has one of its
most controversial sides in its ties or autonomy regarding
other classes. For some authors, this could not become a
central point in a stable system, since it was only able to
express the interests of another class. According to this
criterion, the Soviet case fluctuated between the interests
of the proletariat and the owners.

On the other hand, some authors affirmed that the
bureaucracy did not express foreign interests, nor did it
move between two extremes but was manifest as a social
group aware of its own interest.

The events reveal that the bureaucratic class completely
took over power and property. It vanquished in the power
struggle after having crushed all its opponents. However,
it revealed its diffused interests in an underhanded
discourse claiming to be representatives of the
proletariat.

For decades, the dominant class did not dare to reinstate
private property over the means of production until, in
1991, deviously; it began to knit ties with the Russian
bourgeoisie. According to the Institute of Sociology of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, more than 75% of this
?political elite? and more than 61% of the ?business elite?
have their origin in the Nomenklatura of the ?Soviet?
period. Consequently, the social, economic and political
positions of society were in the same hands. Bureaucracy,
itself, was responsible for the transformation of the
economic and political forms of its domination, maintaining
control over the system, but again on behalf of a class.

The hidden mentality

By which codes of political culture was Soviet bureaucracy
able to dominate? Let us begin with the masses that carried
out the Revolution of 1917; a mass that had a mentality of
servitude, with no experience in democracy and the
development of a proletariat conscience, the, class called
on to lead the Revolution, that was in the hands of a small
group of persons. The rural masses, a majority at the time,
were the most conservative, sustained by the high level of
existing illiteracy.

For its part, the usurper bureaucracy, holding power, was
another historical example of how the vanquishers
incorporated the mentality of the vanquished. In this case,
they inherited the codes of domination by absolute control,
a political elitism, the idea that the ?throng? did not
know how or was unable to lead, needing a figure that would
synthesize the destiny of the country. It should be noted
that one of the features most appreciated by the average
citizen in Russia regarding its leaders is the image of a
strong man, capable of confronting with determination the
crucial difficulties of the country.

Linked to the above-mentioned characteristic, the norm of
the dominators broke with the responsibility of the high
figure regarding the problems, creating a mystical
environment around him. Together with this in the social
imagination, an opinion was formed that the
responsibilities of the state of existing situations was
the responsibility of the intermediate levels of the
dominators.

The result was that, with the rise of Stalinism, the
principles fostered by the Bolshevik uprising regarding
policy and participation of the masses as the driving force
in the subversive explosion, where they would make and
carry out political decisions, was rooted out. Also pushed
aside was the manner in which the Soviets that had
transformed into spontaneous institutions of the struggle
of the masses and acquired functions of State, giving the
masses the possibility of participating in policy decisions
as well as the mechanisms of mobilization, real and
independent. In this process, the political organizations
and masses suffered a considerable atrophy.

This same mentality was observed in the ?great Russian
pride? of which Lenin gave warning. The bureaucracy made
its imperial policies during this Soviet period, coining
the phrase ?big brother? by which East Europe became known
and by the doctrine of limited sovereignty placed in black
and white by Brezhnev.

On the other hand, these components of Russian mentality
are the basis to understand why the standard of living of
the ruling Soviet class was similar to those of the
bourgeoisie. As early as 1936, Trotsky gave an example of
this stratification. A marshal, a director of a company,
the son of a minister, had an apartment, vacation villas,
cars, schools for their children, special clinics and many
other benefits that were not accessible to the maid of the
first, the farmhand of the second and the vagabond. For the
first group this difference was no problem. For the second
it was of utmost importance.

An individual in the Soviet society who yearned for
features, goods and standard of living that were part of
the capitalist culture was the most evident test that he,
at least, had not flourished in the new socialist
mentality, the new man and a new acuity. The socialist
Soviet, post Lenin, symbol of real socialism, was never a
valid, articulate or viable alternative to the previous
system. The cultural substitution did not arrive,
considering that socialism was, above all, a project that
was sustained by a new culture. Therefore, the outcome was
not ?a socialist society (nor a capitalist one, of course)
but a new form ? state directed, bureaucratized ? of
domination and exploitation, opposed the nature of the fair
and liberating emancipation of socialism? [5].

The rupture

The political practice of the Soviet bureaucratic class was
a break with Leninist ideas in the most diverse spaces of
Soviet society. Following are some notes to corroborate
this hypothesis.

The leader of the October revolution stressed, ?It is
necessary to maintain awareness that the struggle demanded
the communist to think. It is possible that they know
perfectly well about the revolutionary struggle and the
state of revolutionary movement in the world. However, to
overcome the terrible scarcity and poverty, what we need is
culture, honesty and the capacity to reason? [6].

The bureaucracy barred revolutionary controversy, prevented
effective political participation of the masses. The Soviet
leaders ignored that socialism cannot triumph over freedom
of thoughts, against man but, on the contrary, through
freedom of thought, improving the living conditions of this
man.

The dogmatism that Marxism suffered, the persecution and
discredit of those who attempted to defend it, the
erroneous Marxism?USSR synthesis (including its disastrous
international consequences), and the impossibility of
developing other lines of thought, promoted the formation
of generation of Soviet people lacking the necessary
conceptual theoretical experience to confront contemporary
historical challenges.

The cultural transition of the Bolshevik project is
restrained, above all, by the authoritarian nature of the
Soviet bureaucracy. The absence of real participation, of
civic space for answers and control of power, affected all
levels of social life, from an economic performance to
ethnic conflicts.

Regarding the above mentioned and analyzing the project of
approval of the Soviet Constitution, Trotsky pointed out
that ?it is true that the project was submitted in June for
the approval of the peoples of the USSR . But it would be
in vain to search in all of the sixth part of the surface
of the globe, for the communist who would dare criticize
the work of the central committee or, anyone, not a party
member, who would have the courage to reject the
proposition of the leading party? [7]

In a sample of this catastrophic blunder was the attempt to
dilute individuality to an ever-increasing abstract
collectivity, with a marked lack of respect for what is
different, schematizing a model of the strong, inflexible
citizen as if the man dreamt of could be formed by decree.
What was at the basis was a simplistic concept of man,
completely ignoring the psychology and modifications in
diverse environments. The Soviet leadership did not only
reveal its incapacity to maintain the revolutionary spirit
alive in a process of confrontations to historic
circumstances of their interaction, but they crushed any
vestiges of diverse, critical thought challenging
authority.

Under the pretext of being the guide of society, the CPSU
became the machine that halted, undermined and assaulted
the natural processes of the society. The difference
between Lenin and Stalin, among the many, is the fact that
the latter, taking advantage of some of the conditions
created, in life, by that great revolutionary leader,
deflected the essence of partisan direction towards
totalitarianism [8]. Lenin had prepared the Bolshevik Party
to direct the workers, not to tame them or subjugate them
[9].

With the economic hyper?centralization that followed this
process, the Soviet bureaucracy managed the minutest
detail, the control of production through a mediocre
framework of intermediate levels, as a means of separating
it from the control by the masses. This intermediate level
was made up of technicians, administrative managers and
specialist, becoming a true plague that could not be torn
down during the existence of the USSR . The historian, Eric
Hobsbanw recalls that ?shortly before the ( Second World )
War there were more than one administrator for every two
manual laborers? [10].

>From that moment, the Soviet model presented to basic
problems that are proof, from a Marxist theoretical point
of view, that there was a breach between socialism as a
higher state of development of the productive forces and
production relations and Soviet reality. On the one part,
the remaining socio?economic forms that could converge in
building the bases of a new society were arbitrarily
eliminated. On the other hand, ?economic islands? were
created (industrial, mining and agricultural complexes)
violating the social division of labor while ignoring the
necessary cooperation between sectors and branches of the
economy.

This practice halted specialization and the introduction of
new techniques that prevented a rational use of resources.
Due to the vertical and willfully that imposed on the
productive process the development of a sector in detriment
of another, without the proper integration between them. In
this situation, the productive units, far from being
autonomous, were prisoners of an uncontrolled primacy of
political criteria over economic necessities.

The workers continued separated from the means of
generating wealth. They did not become real owners as a
result, of the bureaucratic?administrative factors that
kept them from an effective ownership. The adulteration was
in identifying state ownership of property with
socialization, limiting these to the complexity and depth
that Marx had understood as improvement of the capitalist
means of production [11].

Also in the question of gender there was a rupture of the
ideals of the October Revolution. The new Worker?s State
granted ample legal and political rights such as the right
to divorce, abortion, elimination of marital authority,
equality of legal marriage with common law unions, etc.
Alexandra Kollontai was the first woman elected by the
Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party in 1917 and the
first woman to occupy a post in the government of the new
state: People?s Commissar for Health and later the first
woman ambassador in history.

As of 1926, under Stalin, the civil marriage was again
instituted as the only legal union. Later the right to
abortion was abolished, together with the suppression of
the women?s section of the Central Committee and its
equivalent branches in the different party organization
levels. In 1934 homosexuality was forbidden and
prostitution became a crime. Not respecting the institution
of family became a ?bourgeois? conduct or ?leftist? in the
eyes of the bureaucracy. Illegitimate children returned to
that category that had been abolished in 1917 and divorce
became a costly and difficult process [12].

Police institutions also became a function of the new
interests. At the beginning, the objective of the Committee
for State Security (KGB) [13] was to combat
counterrevolution, sabotage and speculation, objectives of
legitimate defense against the reactionary opposition of
the Revolution. But, these logical aims were progressively
modified with the ascension of bureaucracy to power until
it became the institution that preserved the interests of
the bureaucratic State, whose objective was to eliminate
the opposition of the revolutionary forces [14].

In addition, KGB officials received high salaries as well a
good destinations abroad, comfortable housing and enjoyed
privileges within the USSR that also affected the moral
importance. Undoubtedly, it was a privileged sector within
society that was understandable considering its real
function as guardian of the interests of bureaucracy.

The Red Army was created from the bases in January of 1918.
The worker?s state needed its own armed institution to
defend its interests, primarily due to the aggressions that
soon followed by more than 14 countries, at the same time.
As a new concept, the policy of the Bolshevik leadership
was open to constant debate where the armed forces played
an important role and, naturally, the army had the same
ideas of party and State.

The Red Army did not escape the reactionary attacks of the
bureaucracy that immediately began to change it into the
defender of its interests, progressively eliminating its
popular basis. The measure that clearly reflects this
process was the decree that re?established the body of
officials, dealing a crushing blow to the revolutionary
principles that gave rise to this armed institutions and
whose important pillars was, precisely, the elimination of
the officials body, giving importance to the command that
is won with capacity, talent, character, experience, etc.

This measure acquired a political objective by giving the
officials a social importance. In this manner, they closely
joined them with the leadership group weakening their union
with the troops that led to the rupture of the
communication between the troops and the political
leadership. The officer?s body carefully watched over the
?purity? and loyalty of the officers to the ?Party? and the
? Socialist State ?. Also weakened was the spirit of
freedom and debate that had existed among the ranks of the
Army in strong correlation with the opinion that ?no army
can be more democratic than the regime that nourishes it?
[15].

One of the most sensitive factors was the rupture of the
basic principles of the Bolshevik program that determined
that the salaries of the high officials could not surpass
the mean of a worker?s salary. By 1940, when a worker
earned 250 rubles a month, a deputy received 1000 rubles, a
president of a republic received 12,500 rubles and the
president of the Union received 25,000 rubles for the same
period [16]. During the years of the Perestroika, there was
a well-known ?special supply? that increased the purchasing
power of the high officials far above what a worker or
engineer received.

The Bolshevik leadership, based on events that it had to
confront in the last months of political life, foresaw the
danger of the inherited ?great Russian? of the years of
Czarist domination and exploitation remaining in the
politics of the new State. ?Under these conditions ? Lenin
pointed out ? it is natural that the freedom to separate
from the union (?) be it by a simple piece of paper
incapable of defending the non Russians from the attack of
that real Russian (?) that oppressor that is the typical
Russian oppressor. Undoubtedly the Soviet and Sovietized
workers, an extremely low percentage, would drown in the
ocean of the great chauvinist Russian beast like a fly in
the milk? [17].

The real facts, in spite of the letter of the Law of laws
and other regulations, indicated the impossibility of
affirming that the republics that formed the Soviet State
coordinated their activities with the Center but, instead,
were directly subordinated to Moscow . Stalin simply named
from above the political representatives. The elite of the
republics, although occupying posts of certain importance
at the level of the republics, found it hard to occupy
important ones at the Union level, were Russian
predominance had a fundamental weight [18].

The head of the Russian revolution paid special interest to
the concepts of political practice in terms of the Union .
?One thing is the need to unite against the Western
imperialists, defenders of the capital world. There is no
doubt whatsoever (?) Another thing is for us to fall, even
in questions of detail, in imperialist attitudes towards
the oppressed nationalities undermining, consequently, the
principles of all our defense of principles in the fight
against imperialism? [19].

Final Notes

Soviet socialism after Lenin was not a valid, articulate
and viable alternative to capitalism because the usurping
bureaucracy was not, and could not be, the bearer of a
superior ideology, of a cultural project, understood as a
surgical instrument to make a new society or create
conditions to achieve it.

The men who took power were neither the thinking communists
nor the educated ones that Lenin foresaw as the raw
material necessary to confront and conquer the great
historical challenge that Russia assumed in 1917. In truth,
his political practice was a break with that principle.
These men, gradually ascending from society and becoming
the dominant sector were a by?product of the Revolution and
revealed their incapacity to guide history towards the
ultimate objective: the creation of socialism.

The current Russian politicians with a bourgeois outlook
hidden for decades under the cloak of Soviet bureaucracy.
The Yeltsin regime changed the party men, the government
and security members into businesspersons and property
owners.

Despite the postponement of the transition to socialism
that events of the USSR presuppose for Russia , the
revolutionary triumph of the October revolution continues
to be of utmost importance. In 1922, Lenin wrote, ?our
state machine may be defective but they say that the first
steam engine was also defective. Also, it is not known if
it ever worked but that is not important. It does not
matter that the first steam engine was useless, the fact is
that today we have a locomotive. Although our state
apparatus is poor what is still important is that it was
created; that it was the greatest invention in history; a
State of the proletariat was created? [20].

This is the necessary reference point to prepare and carry
out the anti?capitalist alternatives of the XXI century.

References

[1] The title of this epigraph was suggested by the article
by Alexei Goussev, The unforeseen class: Soviet bureaucracy
as seen by Leon Trotski, In: www.herramienta.com

[2] Robert Weil. ?Burocratization: The problem with out the
class name. In this article, the author makes a detailed
analysis of this social group, its origins, its
characteristics and the manner in which it took power. The
article would be of interest for those who want more
information on such an essential question to understand the
Soviet process. In the journal Socialism and Democracy.
Spring/Sommer, 1988.

[3] Taken from Ted Grant and Alan Wood: Lenin and Trotsky,
what did they truly defend. In: www.engels.org

[4] León Trotsky. The Revolution Betrayed. What is the
Soviet Union and where is it going? Pathfinder. New York .
1992

[5] Adolfo Sánchez. ?¿Vale la pena el socialismo?? In:
Revista El viejo topo, November 2002, number 172.

[6] Vladimir I. Lenin. ?Political Report to the eleventh
congress of the Party?. In: The last fight of Lenin.
Speeches and articles. 1922-1923. Pathfinder , New York ,
United States , 1997, p- 65

[7] León Trotsky. The Revolution Betrayed. What is the
Soviet Union and Where is it Going? Pathfinder. New York .
1992, p-211

[8] Regime in which the leaders forcefully impose one
unique system for all society and even penalize an
alternative idea. Robin Blackburn. ?After the fall ?,
p-177. In a broad exposé, domination of a party of the
masses led by a charismatic leader, an official ideology,
the monopoly of the mass media, the monopoly of the armed
forces, a terrorist police control, a centralized control
of the economy. Philippe Bourrinet. ?Víctor Serge:
totalitarismo y capitalismo de Estado (Deconstrucción
socialista y humanismo colectivista)? www.lrp-cofi.org

[9] The Bolsheviks, against their better intentions, were
forced to establish a monopoly of political power. This
situation, considered extraordinary and temporary created
great dangers at the time in which the vanguard of the
proletariat was subjected to a growing pressure of other
classes. Ted Grant and Alan Wood Lenin and Trotski, what
did they truly defend. In: www.engels.org

[10] Eric Hobsbawn. Historia del siglo XX. 1914-1991. Serie
Mayor, España, Barcelona, 1998, p-383

[11] Jorge Luis Acanda. Sociedad Civil y hegemonía. Ob.
Cit., p-264

[12] Adriana D´Atri. An analysis of the role of socialist
women in the fight against oppression and of working women
at the beginning of the Russian Revolution. October 20,
2003 . Inn Diario electrónico alternativo Rebelión. www.
Rebelión.org

[13] Until the death of Stalin, the secret services of the
USSR functioned under different names: Cheka, GPU, OGPU,
NKVD, KGB, MGB. In 1935 the MGB (Ministry of State
Security) fused with MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and
took over the command of the new Komitei Gosudarstvennoi
Bezopasnosti (KGB).

[14] Although this institution never abandoning its
function of the regime?s political police, its most
aberrant period, in terms of crimes and contempt for human
life, was headed by Stalin who relied on one of the most
despicable persons during the tragic period of Stalinism:
Beria, who headed the KGB for 15 years, accumulating a
criminal file in a 50 page folio of charges for which he
was tried after the death of his boss and which took him to
the firing squad. He was the man who guaranteed the
security of Stalin and, perhaps, his most efficient
collaborator endowed with a unique moral rottenness that
supported him to stay for such a long time at the side of
the General Secretary of the CPSU. For more information
see: Maximovich , Ala. ?Lavrenti Beria?. In: Revista
Sputnik. No 12, Moscow, December 1988.

[15] León Trotski. La revolución traicionada? Ob. Cit,
p-184

[16] Suzzane Labin. Stalin el Terrible. Ob. Ct. , p-136

[17] Vladimir I. Lenin. La última lucha de Lenin. Ob. Ct. ,
p-204

[18] Often, within the territorial demarcations that were
not a part of the Russian Federation, the Russian
representatives were favored with the best posts in key
sectors of the economy and policy that, according to
Barbara Sarabia, subtly inclined the balance in favor of
the Center because the bordering republics supplied
important raw materials, whereby the industrial development
was concentrated in key regions and the Baltic, assuming a
gradual economic and technological backwardness that was
the fate of the Asian Soviet. Bárbara Sarabia. ?Reflexiones
en torno al desmonte de la URSS? In: La Perestroika en tres
dimensiones: expediente de un fracaso. Investigaciones,
Centro de Estudios Europeos, La Habana, 1992, p- 108

[19] Ibd., p- 210

[20] Vladimir I. Lenin. Ob.Ct., p-70

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