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[Marxism] College Econ Report on Belarus
Here's a college economics report I just wrote on Belarus. I did not focus on
the political aspects. The president is not a member of the Communist Party.
The CP has the largest number of parliament seats, and is divided into 2
parties, the larger of which is in opposition.
There have been accusations against Lukashenko in the Western Press about
government measures against the opposition. According to my professor, "the
World Bank doesn't like him because he's slow on reform" -that is, economic
motives behind US policy. It should be noted that the government allows big
public signs of opposition from the nationalists. So it looks like there is
more civil liberties than in the Soviet period, but much less control in the
political realm. Therefore Lukashenko's system could be described as Stalinist,
in contrast to Gorbachev and Khrushchev; indeed he admires Stalin.
I really don't know the political situation there.
In any case my report was on economics. And whatever the opinion on
politics, Trotsky wrote approvingly of the USSR's economic growth under Stalin,
because of its Socialist basis.
I got an A and the teacher was impressed!
Hal Smith
Socialist Economics
and Transition Class
The Economic Growth of Belarus
After the Soviet Union collapsed, most of its former states used a ?big
bang? approach and quickly established the fundamentals of a capitalist
economy. Belarus, on the other hand, moved only slowly in the direction of a
capitalist economy. While much of the command economy was removed, the state
continues to play a central role in the Belarusian economy. How can the
nation?s normal economic growth be explained, in contrast to Russia?s failing
economy? While Russia underwent massive privatization and economic collapse,
Belarus maintained robust economic growth and GDP levels due to the stability
of its economic structure. The state?s retention of enterprises prevented
business failure and asset stripping. High taxes maintained the infrastructure
while a market price system was introduced.
The result of Belarus?s market socialism is economic stability. The
nation?s market socialism means the state owns key sectors of production,
allows limited private ownership of secondary sectors, and that the market
generally determines prices. The country maintains a GDP similar to its initial
level. Real GDP in 2000 as a percent of 1990 GDP is 89%, which is the 2nd best
in the Commonwealth of Independent States (The CIS refers to the 15 regions
which were once part of the Soviet Union and are now independent states). For a
further comparison, the CIS average is 62%. In 1992, GDP growth was -9.64% and
in 1995 it was -10.4%. But that year Alexander Lukashenko was elected president
and announced an economic policy of market socialism. The GDP grew by 2.8% in
1996 and made up for its previous setbacks with a growth rate of 11.4% in 1997,
and 8.4% in 1998. Its 2001, 2002, and 2003 growth rates were 4.7%, 4.7%, and
6.1% respectively. Similarly, Per Capita GDP in US dollars was $1,021 in 1995,
$1,504 in 1998, $1,239 in 2001, and $1,437 in 2002. Thus, the economic
structure of Belarus has been able to foster strong economic growth, especially
when compared with other CIS nations.
Inflation also fell considerably, from 971% in 1992 to 293.8% in 1999 and
then to 34.8% in 2002. Annual average consumer prices changed from a rate of
709.3% in 1995 down to 42.6% in 2002. And producer prices changed from a rate
of 462% in 1995 to 40.0% in 2002. Thus the nation?s economic policies have
strongly reduced inflation from its overblown initial level in 1992. Tight
fiscal policies undertaken in 1999 were vital in bringing down inflation to its
current level.
In addition, income equality remained at the same level relative to other
CIS nations. Belarus?s GINI income inequality coefficient was: .23 in 1990, .28
in 1994, and .26 in 1998. The corresponding average CIS indicators were .28,
.36, .46 respectively. A nation?s GINI coefficient measures how much income
disparity exists between its rich and poor. The World Bank estimates that less
than 2% of Belarus?s population is in poverty. Thus not only is the nation?s
wealth evenly distributed, but its healthy growth rates mean that there is
enough to go around and provide for everyone?s basic needs.
Belarus has the 5th highest UN Human Development Index (HDI) of the CIS
countries- after the Baltic states and Russia- although it outranks them all in
literacy (99.7%). The United Nation?s HDI measures the well being of a nation?s
population, based on standards such as poverty, education, child welfare, and
health. A lower HDI value signifies a higher rank. Belarus?s HDI value is .790,
whereas the average value for Central and Eastern Europe is .796. Thus
Belarus?s economic system successfully provides for its citizens? well-being,
compared with other CIS nations.
What makes Belarus?s economic structure unique among CIS nations is the
strong role of the public sector and state institutions continue to play. If
the level of government revenues is used as an indicator of the strength of
public institutions, Belarus comes up with a high value; the percent of general
government revenue to GDP in 1996 and 2002 was 40.8% and 44.0% respectively.
The CIS average was 24.2% and 26.6% respectively. Belarusian government
expenditures as a percent of GDP in 1996 and 2002 were 42.4 and 42.0%
respectively. The average CIS figures were 29.8% and 27.6% respectively. Not
only are government expenditures a high percent of GDP, but the government?s
budget balance is improving from -2.7% of GDP in 1995 to -1.8% in 2002. The
strong public infrastructure provides a good framework for economic growth. The
mix of strong public institutions and few big private interests decrease the
role of a big mafia and its corruption of the government through financial
means.
At the same time, Belarus has an exceptionally low Cumulative
Liberalization Index (CLI), which measures the amount of capitalist reforms.
Specifically, CLI is the sum total of all the Liberalization Index values for a
nation since 1989. A nation?s Liberalization Index refers to the amount of
flexible and free market prices, along with the amount of private ownership.
The more of these two elents, the higher the CLI value will be. Belarus?s CLI
in 1992, 1995, and 1997 was .38, 1.55, and 2.54 and respectively. In that same
period, Russia went from .67 to 4.32. Thus the size of Belarus?s public
sector, as measured by government revenue, and the structural character of the
public sector, represented by its CLI, show both strength and little change.
The stability of the nation?s public sector has been accompanied by successful
economic growth. But in most other CIS nations, the public sector has been
dramatically reduced.
Therefore economic structural stability and economic growth are strongly
related. Especially Russia, among the CIS countries, experienced a decline in
the role of state institutions compared to the economy as a whole, as measured
by government revenues as a percent of GDP. And its economy collapsed. Estonia
followed Russia in taking huge steps towards a capitalist economy, but
maintained a stable level of government revenues. Consequently it maintained a
normal growth rate. Belarus differed from both countries by avoiding hasty
economic changes, while maintaining its public sector. Likewise, Estonia
experienced normal growth. By 2002, Estonia, Uzbekistan, and Belarus had the
smallest amount of change in government revenue during transition, and became
the ?top performers,? while Russia?s economy collapsed. Thus the economist
Vladimir Popov writes, ?To sum up, there is enough evidence that differing
performance during transition, after factoring in initial conditions and
external environment, depends mostly on the strength of institutions and not so
much on the progress in liberalization per se.?
Nevertheless it is important to realize possible weaknesses in
Belarus?s economic system, stemming from the fact that it has not strongly
reformed its economy or privatized. In 1990, 1994, and 1999, the private sector
made up 5%, 15%, and 20% of GDP respectively. In addition, small business
growth is sluggish because of high taxes and regulations. Small Enterprises
make up 37.7% of all enterprises in Belarus. In Russia the number is 56.3% and
in the Ukraine it is 69.2%.
As a result, Belarus?s growth might not be sustainable in the long run.
According to Zuzana Brixiova, the IMF representative to Belarus, ?around 40
percent of industrial enterprises- and over 60 percent of agricultural firms-
are loss making.? These firms are buoyed up by state subsidies and cause
inflation. Thus, while inflation has decreased drastically, it is still the
highest among CIS nations.
Another problem is that heavy trade regulations mean low trade with
non-CIS countries. As a result, from 1993-1998 Belarus experienced a real
export growth of -3.2%. The CIS average is 3.2%) Another result of the
nation?s trade policy is that among CIS nations, the vast majority of it is
with Russia. As for Belarus?s major export partners, 57.2% of its export went
to Russia, Germany received 4.7%, and France 3.9%. The government?s subsidies
and high tariffs are not an essential part of market socialism because they
only hinder the market and neither are they part of government ownership per
se. While the subsidies and tariffs could be abolished without significantly
altering Belarus?s economic structure, it is questionable how many weak
businesses could survive in their absence.
Another disadvantage is that Belarus?s Democracy Index (DI) in 1994 was
.50. It dropped to .17 in 2000. In contrast, the DI of the CIS nation with the
best economic growth, Estonia went from .75 to .92. A nation?s democracy index
measures a people?s civil rights and its power in government. The weak
democratic control over state decisions in Belarus means that the country could
eventually experience resource misallocation similar to that which caused the
economic breakdown of the Soviet Union. Such serious resource misallocation due
to lack of popular involvement in the Soviet Union included bloated military
budgets, overemphasis on heavy industry, and little attention to consumer
needs. With an underdeveloped small business sector, these problems might
resurface in spite of market prices.
Hence, although Belarus is experiencing positive growth it comes at the
price of an uncertain future. The scarcity of small businesses and losses
incurred by firms are particularly troubling. Although a mafia?s corruption of
the government does not develop to the same extent as in Russia, economic
decisions made by a powerful bureaucracy will be less efficient than those made
with democratic involvement and oversight.
Overall however, Belarus changed successfully from a command economy to
a market economy characterized by limited price fixing. At the same time it
maintained economic stability and normal economic growth. These benefits
outweigh any supposed disadvantages from the slower pace of changes. It is true
that the current structure may be unsustainable in the long run. But
institutions remain strong and stave off a large-scale collapse in the short
term. In the meantime the necesary changes can occur at a healthy pace. The
Belarusian economy can benefit from observing mistakes made in the hasty
privatization of other CIS countries. In conclusion Belarus avoided a
large-scale economic collapse in the short run by preserving important aspects
of the state economy, maintaining strong public institutions, and prolonging
the process of transition.
Bibliography
Belarusian Embassy. ?Economic Section.?
<http://www.belarusembassy.org/economic/>
Brixiova, Zuzana. ?Economic Transition in Belarus: Achievements and
Challenges.? IMF Seminar for Parliamentarians 7-11 June 2004.
<http://www.imf.org/external/country/BLR/rr/pdf/060904.pdf>
CIA. ?Belarus.? CIA World-Factbook 11 May 2004.
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bo.html>
Cukierman, Alex, Miller, Geoffrey P., and Neyapti, Bilin. ?Central Bank Reform,
Liberalization, and Inflation inTransition Economies: an International
Perspective.? Journal of Monetary Economics, v. 49, 2002.
<http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/pdf/CGB2002.pdf>
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. ?Transition Report 2003.?
Fidrmuc, Jan. ?Economic Reform, Democracy, and Growth during Post- Communist
Transition.? Journal of Monetary Economics, v.19, 2003.
<http://www.worldbank.org/research/inequality/SAIS/lecture5-6/fidrmuc.pdf>
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. ?The Advantages of
Trade- Economic Cooperation with the Republic of Belarus.?
<http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.php?d=economic&id=2>
Mitra, Pradeep, and Selowsky, Marcelo. ?Transition- the First Ten Years:
analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and the USSR.? World Bank 2002.
<http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ECA/eca.nsf/Attachments/Transition1/$File/Complete.pdf>
National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. ?Macroeconomic Environment for
Implementing the Republic of Belarus Monetary Policy Guidelines for 2003.?
<http://www.nbrb.by/engl/publications/report/2003/2003_1.pdf>
Popov, Vladimir. ?Shock Therapy Versus Gradualism: The End Of The Debate.?
Comparative Economic Studies, v.42 n.1 p1 Spring 2000.
United Nations, ?Belarus.? Human Development Report 2004.
<http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_BLR.html>
United Nations. ?United Nations Human Development Index? 2004.
<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr04_HDI.pdf>
Vorobeychik, Yevgeny. ?Comparative Analysis of the Economic Transition of
Belarus and Ukraine.? <http://www.eecs.umich.edu/~yvorobey/BelarusUkraine.pdf>
World Bank Group. ?Belarus Country Brief 2003? September 2003
<http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/2656afe00bc5f02185256d5d005dae97/8ec2dc1ef03aed3e85256d5d0067dc90?OpenDocument>
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